STUDY PERMIT APPLICANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED BEFORE REFUSAL

The visa officer in the case below breached procedural fairness by failing to interview the applicant, even though he had admitted to fraud in previous applications and was turned down for visas multiple times.  The matter was sent back to a different officer. There is no information as to the final outcome of the Study Permit application ( i.e if a Study Permit was granted).However, it must be noted that in most cases, applicants "win a battle and lose the war, as the Court notes below, that there is a very high bar to overcome when an applicant has been refused multiple times and has been found to have presented fraudulent documentation in the past. In this case, the grant of judicial review is purely based on procedural fairness.

Maklakov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between Andriy Maklakov, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2013] F.C.J. No. 239

2013 FC 242

Docket IMM-3998-12

 Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario

Kane J.

Heard: January 31, 2013.
Judgment: March 7, 2013.

(24 paras.)

---

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

1     KANE J.:-- The applicant, Mr Andriy Maklakov, is a citizen of the Ukraine. He brought this application for judicial review pursuant to section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA or the Act] of the February 22, 2012 decision of a Visa Officer [the Officer] at the Canadian Embassy in Kiev, Ukraine which refused his application for a study permit pursuant to subsection 11 of the Act.

2     For the reasons that follow, the application is granted and the matter is remitted for reconsideration by a different Officer.

3     Mr Maklakov made three previous applications for study permits, all of which were refused, and five applications for visitor's visas, four of which were refused. He was granted one visitor's visa in 2008 to attend to his dying mother in Canada. His troubled visa history is attributed to his earlier application in 2003 when he used a fraudulent letter from an employer to bolster his economic situation. He admitted his fraudulent documents upon questioning and has disclosed this in subsequent applications.

4     The applicant has been denied visitor's visas and study permits since 2003, including in 2010, due to his "propensity for fraud and misrepresentation" and because his "study permit application is simply another means of entry into Canada."

5     The decision which is the subject of this application for judicial review relates to the applicant's application for a study permit to attend SAIT Institute in Alberta. The applicant was accepted into the program, first to study English, and then to study film and video production to enhance his skills as a filmmaker in Ukraine. He submitted documents to show that he would live with his sister and brother-in-law who are well established in Calgary. He provided a statement from a Canadian bank with a balance of $20,000 to cover his tuition and related expenses. He indicated that his wife would continue to work and reside in Ukraine with their child while he studied in Canada and that he has a film business in Ukraine.

6     The Officer found that the applicant did not meet the requirements under section 11 of the Act. The reasons for the decision include the letter of refusal, the Officer's notes and an accompanying checklist which indicated that the Officer was not satisfied the applicant would leave Canada at the end of his stay, due to two factors; "the purpose of your visit" and "your current employment situation". Under the heading "other reasons", the Officer noted "you have a history of misrepresentation and lack credibility".

7     The Officer's notes also include the following:

 

·        "(The applicant) is 34 years old, married, going to attend SAIT for a one year ESL course. Employed as an operator and director of editing at Vidoe [sic] Master Plus. Has been refused SPs on three occasions, Received TRV in 2008, Has admitted to submitting fraudulent docs in the past. (He) has also applied for a Film and Video Production course. (He) has a Canadian bank account showing 20,000 cad in savings. Spouse and minor child in Ukraine. (He) shows no source of funds. (He) has not provided a compelling reason for studies in Canada. He is an admitted fraudster and lacks credibility. I am not satisfied that the [sic] is a bona fide temporary resident. Application refused." 

8     The applicant raised three grounds for this judicial review: first, that the Officer denied the applicant procedural fairness because he was biased; second, that the Officer denied the applicant procedural fairness by not providing an opportunity for the applicant to address the Officer's concerns about his credibility; and, third, that the Officer's decision was unreasonable as it was based on erroneous findings of fact or failure to consider documentary evidence in support of his application.

9     The respondent submits that given the applicant's history and admissions of fraud and misrepresentation, he had a higher burden to meet to establish the bone fides of his application. The applicant failed to do so because he did not provide sufficient evidence to establish the purpose of his study in Canada, his source of finances or how his business would operate in the Ukraine while he was in Canada. The respondent submits that the application was refused due to insufficiency of evidence and not due to credibility findings and, therefore, there was no duty on the Officer to convoke an interview and there was no reasonable apprehension of bias.

10     With respect to the allegations of bias, the applicant and respondent agree that the test for bias is that set out by Justice de Grandpré, writing in dissent, in Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board, [1978] 1 SCR 369, at p 394:

 

·        ... the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information... [T]hat test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically -- and having thought the matter through -- conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly." 

11     As noted in R v RDS [1997] 3 SCR 484 by Justices L' Heureux- Dube and McLachlin, referring to the above noted test;

 

·        113 Regardless of the precise words used to describe the test, the object of the different formulations is to emphasize that the threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high. It is a finding that must be carefully considered since it calls into question an element of judicial integrity. Indeed an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias calls into question not simply the personal integrity of the judge, but the integrity of the entire administration of justice. See Stark, supra, at paras. 19-20. Where reasonable grounds to make such an allegation arise, counsel must be free to fearlessly raise such allegations. Yet, this is a serious step that should not be undertaken lightly. 

12     Although the Supreme Court of Canada was referring to an allegation of bias against a judge, the same principle applies to other decision makers; allegations of bias are serious and should be made with caution.

13     In the present circumstances, there is no evidence on the record to suggest that the Officer pre-judged the application. While the Officer was aware of the applicant's history which provided relevant background information, he considered the current application and the supporting documents before making his decision. I do not agree that the Officer showed any bias or that a reasonable person would conclude that the Officer would not decide the matter fairly.

14     As the respondent submits, the applicant had a high burden to satisfy the Visa Officer of the criteria for a study permit given his misrepresentation in 2003. The respondent argues that the applicant failed to meet that burden with sufficient evidence. However, the Officer clearly regarded the past misrepresentation as a credibility issue, as he noted twice in his reasons. The applicant submits that this one misrepresentation, which he admitted in all subsequent applications, has resulted in refusals in all but one application.

15     It is settled law that the requirements of procedural fairness are more relaxed for visa applications and that it would be practically impossible for Visa Officers to convoke interviews in all cases. However, procedural fairness will require interviews in some circumstances.

16     In Hassani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1283, Justice Mosley canvassed the jurisprudence with respect to the duty of fairness owed to visa applicants and noted at paragraphs 23 and 24;

 

·        [23] In Rukmangathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 284, [2004] F.C.J. No. 317 (QL) [Rukmangathan], the Court offered the following guidance in determining what is required of a Visa Officer when different types of concerns arise: 

 

·        para 22 ...the duty of fairness may require immigration officials to inform applicants of their concerns with applications so that an applicant may have a chance to "disabuse" an officer of such concerns, even where such concerns arise from evidence tendered by the applicant. Other decisions of this court support this interpretation of Muliadi, supra [Muliadi v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1986] 2 F.C. 205 (C.A.)]. See, for example, Fong v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 705 (T.D.), John v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] F.C.J. No. 350 (T.D.)(QL) and Cornea v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2003), 30 Imm. L.R. (3d) 38 (F.C.T.D.), where it had been held that a visa officer should apprise an applicant at an interview of her negative impressions of evidence tendered by the applicant. 

 

·        para 23 However, this principle of procedural fairness does not stretch to the point of requiring that a visa officer has an obligation to provide an applicant with a "running score" of the weaknesses in their application: Asghar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997] F.C.J. No. 1091(T.D.)(QL) at para. 21 and Liao v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1926. And there is no obligation on the part of a visa officer to apprise an applicant of her concerns that arise directly from the requirements of the former Act or Regulations: Yu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 36 F.T.R. 296, Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 151 F.T.R. 1 and Bakhtiania v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1023 (T.D.)(QL). 

 

·        In Rukmangathan, the Court concluded that the visa officer's problems with the applicant's application, namely, why he had taken further courses in Canada, the consideration that his marks were "low" (although they were in the mid-70s range) and the "poor quality" of two of his educational documents, should have been placed before the applicant for a response. The Court made this finding on the basis that most of the officer's concerns could not be said to have emanated directly from the requirements of the legislation. 

 

·        [24] Having reviewed the factual context of the cases cited above, it is clear that where a concern arises directly from the requirements of the legislation or related regulations, a visa officer will not be under a duty to provide an opportunity for the applicant to address his or her concerns. Where however the issue is not one that arises in this context, such a duty may arise. This is often the case where the credibility, accuracy or genuine nature of information submitted by the applicant in support of their application is the basis of the visa officer's concern, as was the case in Rukmangathan, and in John and Cornea cited by the Court in Rukmangathan, above. 

 

·        Emphasis added

17     In the circumstances of this case, given the Officer's concerns about the applicant's credibility and given that the applicant will never succeed if every officer takes a similar view of his history, the Officer had a duty to convoke an interview, whether in person or by other means, to explore his concerns about the applicant's credibility and to provide an opportunity for the applicant to respond.

18     In this case, the applicant was aware that he had an uphill battle to support his application for a study permit which he attempted to address in his submissions setting out the purpose of studying in Canada, the acceptance from SAIT Institute, the financial information and the letter from his sister and brother-in-law. However, the credibility finding could not be overcome without an opportunity to address this with the Visa Officer. The Officer's failure to convoke an interview constituted a breach of procedural fairness.

19     A breach of procedural fairness will not always result in relief. However, in these circumstances, it is not inevitable that the result would have been the same if the Officer had conducted an interview. Therefore, the application should be remitted to be considered by a different Visa Officer.

20     It is not necessary to address the arguments related to the findings of fact.

21     The applicant also submits that costs should be awarded to him for the same reasons advanced to support this application and, generally, due to the Officer's failure to make a proper decision.

22     Rule 22 of the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules provides as follows:

 

·        22. 

No costs shall be awarded to or payable by any party in respect of an application for leave, an application for judicial review or an appeal under these Rules unless the Court, for special reasons, so orders. 

* * *

 

·        22. Sauf ordonnance contraire rendue par un juge pour des raisons spéciales, la demande d'autorisation, la demande de contrôle judiciaire ou l'appel introduit en application des présentes règles ne donnent pas lieu à des dépens. 

23     Based on a review of the jurisprudence, including Ndererehe v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 880 and Johnson v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1262, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1523, I do not find that any special reasons exist in this case to justify an award of costs.

24     This Court's judgement is that the application is granted and the matter is remitted for reconsideration by a different Officer. No costs are awarded. No questions were proposed for certification.

JUDGMENT

 

·        THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that:

 

·        1. 

The application is granted and the matter is remitted for reconsideration by a different Officer. No costs are awarded. No questions were proposed for certification. 

KANE J.

FOREIGN STUDENT WHO PRESENTED FALSE BANK STATEMENTS LOSES JUDICIAL REVIEW

The case below illustrates the perils of  presenting false information in a visa application. In this case, the student presented fraudulent bank statements to support his application for a Study Permit, was later caught after the visa was issued, and ordered deported by the Immigration Division (ID). In addition,l he was charged with a misrepresentation, which will preclude any new visa application for at lest two years. BEWARE of making false statements or presenting false inforamtion!

Khedri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between Akrem Khedri, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2012] F.C.J. No. 1509

[2012] A.C.F. no 1509

2012 FC 1397

Docket IMM-3292-12

 

 Federal Court
Montréal, Quebec

Noël J.

Heard: November 15, 2012.
Judgment: November 30, 2012.

(34 paras.)

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·        REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

1     NOËL J.:-- This is an application for judicial review under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (IRPA), of a decision of the Immigration Division (ID) of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada rendered on March 22, 2012. The Panel concluded that Akrem Khedri is inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA.

I. Facts

2     The applicant is Tunisian. He applied for a student visa at the Canadian Embassy in Tunisia, which was issued on December 28, 2010. He arrived in Canada on January 1, 2011, and was granted at the time a study permit valid until March 31, 2012.

3     In support of his visa application, he submitted a bank statement from the Société tunisienne de Banque Bank (STD Bank) in Tunis.

4     On January 10, 2011, an official from the Canadian Embassy in Tunisia contacted the STD Bank to verify the authenticity of a number of bank statements from Tunisian students, including that of the applicant. The STD Bank confirmed that only three of all the bank statements provided were authentic. That of the applicant was not mentioned.

5     On December 7, 2012, an immigration officer met with the applicant for an explanation on the bank statement in question. According to the immigration officer's report, the applicant stated that his father obtained the bank statement and that he was not, therefore, responsible for submitting a fraudulent document.

6     A hearing before the ID was held on March 13, 2012. In its decision, the ID issued an exclusion order against the applicant, pursuant to paragraph 229(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, as it concluded that the applicant's misrepresentation induced an error in the administration of the Act, within the meaning of paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA.

II. Impugned decision

7     The ID confirmed the Minister's position that the bank statement was fraudulent, based on the evidence before the Panel, on a balance of probabilities.

8     In fact, the ID found that it was probable that the applicant's bank statement was included in the statements sent to the STD Bank for verification on January 10, 2011, despite the fact that a list of names of persons whose bank statement was verified was not included. Moreover, the CAIPS notes on the applicant's record confirm that information.

9     The ID rejected the applicant's explanation that he honestly believed that the statement was authentic, as his father, who had taken the steps to obtain it, confirmed to him that this was indeed the case. The applicant provided as evidence an e-mail from his father confirming all of this, but the ID gave little probative value to it.

10     Furthermore, the ID noted that there was no evidence that the applicant took any steps with the STD Bank to clarify the situation. Such evidence would have proven useful considering that it was the bank who was in the best position to rectify the situation. Thus, the decision-maker considered the applicant as being not credible given his choice not to act, especially when he alleges that he feared he would not be able to finish his academic year.

11     Finally, the decision-maker rejected the applicant's argument that there had to be an intentional element for paragraph 40(1)(a) to apply.

12     Thus, the analysis of the evidence as a whole led the Panel to conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that the applicant's bank statement was fraudulent and that this element of fraud was material to his application, namely, his financial capability to support himself while studying in Canada. The ID was, therefore, of the view that it was reasonable to believe that this misrepresentation induced an error in the application of the IRPA.

III. Applicant's position

13     The applicant submits that the ID should have considered the fact that he was unaware that the document was falsified and that, therefore, it erred in concluding that it is not necessary to prove the intent of the applicant to mislead.

14     In the alternative, the applicant submits that the ID arrived at an unreasonable conclusion in determining that the document was falsified. Moreover, he alleges that the ID unduely reversed the burden of proof in the circumstances by imposing on the applicant the burden of proving the authenticity of the document.

IV. Respondent's position

15     The respondent submits that the decision-maker must assess the evidence as a whole based on a balance of probabilities. In this context, the applicant had to substantiate his submission that the bank statement was authentic on the basis of probative evidence. Furthermore, the applicant cannot be exempted from the law on the sole basis that he was unaware that the statement had been falsified.

V. Issue

16     Did the ID err in concluding that "mens rea" is not required for misrepresentation under paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA?

17     Did the Panel err in concluding that the bank statement submitted in support of his student visa application was falsified?

VI. Standard of review

18     The standard of review applicable to the first issue, namely, whether paragraph 40(1)(a) requires an element of "mens rea," is the standard of reasonableness, as it is a question of law related to the interpretation of the officer's home statute (Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers' Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3 SCR 654). The second issue requires the application of the reasonableness standard, as it is a question of mixed fact and law (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paragraphs 164-166, [2008] 1 SCR 190).

VII. Relevant legislation

19     Paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA reads as follows:

 

·        Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 

 

·        Misrepresentation

 

·        40. 

(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible for misrepresentation 

 

·        (a) for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act; 

 

·        ... 

* * *

 

·        Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés, LC 2001, ch 27 

 

·        Fausses déclarations

 

·        40. 

(1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour fausses déclarations les faits suivants : 

 

·        a) 

directement ou indirectement, faire une présentation erronée sur un fait important quant à un objet pertinent, ou une réticence sur ce fait, ce qui entraîne ou risque d'entraîner une erreur dans l'application de la présente loi; 

...

VIII. Analysis

20     The conclusion that the applicant provided a fraudulent document in support of his visa application and that he must therefore be subject to an exclusion order is reasonable.

21     Paragraph 40(1)(a) is clearly written. It states that misrepresentation can be made "directly or indirectly" and no intent is required on the part of the person making the allegedly fraudulent statement. Indeed, if this is what Parliament had intended, the section would clearly reflect the need for a misrepresentation to be made with intent. Moreover, in the guide "ENF 2: Evaluating Inadmissibility," under Tab 9.2, which deals with the nature of misrepresentation, explicit reference is made to two elements. First, "indirect misrepresentation is where a third party makes a misrepresentation." Second, "the misrepresentation need not be willful or intentional -- it can also be unintentional."

22     This Court has on a number of occasions addressed the issue of the application of paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA to situations where the applicant alleges that misrepresentation occurred without his or her knowledge. Sayedi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 420, 2012 CarswellNat 1125 (Sayedi) summarizes the position of the case law on the matter. In Sayedi, supra, at paragraph 43, it was decided that applicants cannot shirk their duty of candour on the basis that they were unaware that their immigration consultant had submitted false documents in support of their application:

 

·        ... The applicants in this case chose to rely on their consultant. The principal applicant acknowledges having signed his application. It would be contrary to the applicant's duty of candour to permit the applicant to rely now on his failure to review his own application. It was his responsibility to ensure his application was truthful and complete -- he was negligent in performing this duty. 

23     As for the possibility of relying on a "defence" when there is a finding of misrepresentation on the part of the applicant, the Court established that such a possibility is not open to applicants (Sayedi, supra, at paragraph 44):

 

·        [44] Furthermore, in order for the applicants to rely on a 'defence' to the finding of misrepresentation, that defence must be grounded either in statute or common law. In my view, there is no such defence under the Act: the wording of section 40(1)(a) is broad enough to encompass misrepresentations made by another party, of which the applicant was unaware: Wang, above at paragraphs 55-56. Furthermore, in Haque v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 315, the Court held that the fact that an immigration consultant was to blame for the misrepresentation was no defence. As already discussed, the applicants cannot avail themselves of the exception for an innocent mistake. 

24     The applicant cannot, therefore, argue that he was unaware that the bank statement sought by his father was fraudulent to be exempted from the application of paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA. In fact, the case law is clear: where a person misrepresents through a third party, paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA continues to apply (Wang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1059, at paragraph 56, 47 Imm LR (3d) 299). Furthermore, the obligation to provide truthful information and to ensure that his or her application is consistent with legislation lies with the applicant (Haque v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 315, at paragraphs 13-14, 2011 CarswellNat 1638).

25     The applicant alleges that the ID should have followed the line of authority established in Osisanwo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1126, 3 Imm LR (4th) 52 (Osisanwo) and Baro v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1299, 2007 CarswellNat 4369 (Baro). The ID took it into consideration, but did not follow it.

26     As for the applicant's argument that the principle in Osisanwo, supra, should be followed, it cannot be upheld. This Court established in Sayedi, supra, that the facts in Osisanwo, supra, were highly unusual. In fact, the applicants honestly and reasonably believed the child they had was born of their union, as indicated on the birth certificate. Rather, the general rule is that a misrepresentation can occur without the applicant's knowledge and that the principle established in Osisanwo, supra, should not be interpreted as supporting the general proposition that a misrepresentation must always require subjective knowledge for paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA to apply.

27     Moreover, the facts before us make it impossible for the applicant to even attempt to justify the non-application of paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA on the basis of an honest and reasonable belief. In fact, since it is the applicant's father who made arrangements with the STD Bank to obtain the statement, the onus was on him to verify its truthfulness. Thus, he cannot avail himself of the exception provided for in 40(1)(a) of the IRPA for his negligence.

28     To conclude, the ID fairly interpreted paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA. In fact, it considered the two lines of authority that deal with the element of intent in the administration of paragraph 40(1)(a) and concluded that the facts arising from the applicant's situation were not analogous to those in Osisanwo, supra, and Baro, supra.

29     Finally, as for the applicant's alternative argument, it cannot be accepted by this Court. In fact, the decision-maker considered the fact that the STD Bank stated that some statements were falsified and it is likely, therefore, that the STD Bank's response to the Embassy's question pertained to the applicant's bank statement. For his part, the applicant submits as evidence only the fact that his father assured him that the statement was truthful to support his submission. He did not make any attempt to verify its accuracy with the STD Bank to try to rectify the situation.

30     The ID reasonably concluded, therefore, based on a balance of probabilities, that the bank statement was not authentic. In fact, the ID assessed the respondent's evidence that a number of bank statements were verified with the STD Bank and that the bank's response regarding the valid bank statements did not include that of the applicant. It also considered the evidence submitted by the applicant, which included a letter from his father attesting to the truthfulness of the bank statement. It properly noted that the evidence submitted by the applicant was not consistent with the best evidence rule, as the applicant's father cannot attest to the truthfulness of a letter issued by a third party. It was fair, in the circumstances, to expect that the applicant submit more probative evidence to rebut the evidence submitted by the respondent.

31     To conclude, the ID did not reverse the burden of proof. It, therefore, committed no error with respect to the applicable burden of proof (see Zhang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1313, at paragraph 16, 281 FTR 35) and it validly found that it was more likely that the bank statement was falsified, considering the weakness of the evidence submitted by the applicant.

IX. Question for certification

32     A question for certification was submitted by the applicant. The nature of the question is the same as that certified in Osisanwo, supra; the applicant states, however, that a question may concern applications other than an application for permanent residence. The question is as follows:

 

·        Is a foreign national inadmissible for misrepresenting a material fact if at the time of filing his/her application for permanent residence, or work permit or student visa, he/she had no knowledge of the material fact that constituted such misrepresentation? 

33     The respondent is of the view that the question proposed by the applicant should not be certified, as the wording suggests that the Court found that the ID rendered an unreasonable decision in determining that the applicant was not necessarily aware that the bank statement was fraudulent. As mentioned earlier, the facts of this case differ from the facts of Osisanwo, supra.

34     The Federal Court of Appeal ruled in Huynh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 134 DLR (4th) 612, 36 CRR (2d) 93 (FCA), that for a question to be certified, it is necessary that it raise a question of law of general importance. This Court finds that it is not appropriate to certify a question in this application for judicial review, as the facts of this case are not suitable for certification. In Sayedi, supra, at paragraph 56, Justice Tremblay-Lamer declined to certify a question of the same nature as that submitted by the applicant on the ground that the answer to this question is already well-settled. This Court agrees with this finding.

JUDGMENT

THE COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES THAT:

 

·        1. 

This application for judicial review is dismissed. 

·        2. 

No question will be certified. 

Certified true translation: Daniela Guglietta, Translator