STUDY PERMIT APPLICANT MUST SHOW THAT HE WOULD RETURN , BENEFITS FROM STUDY COURSE

This is an interesting discussion of the requirements necessary in a Study Permit application. Fedreal COurt held that the applicant must show the benefits of the course of study, that he would return to his country after the permit expires, and, in general terms, that his proposed course of action "makes sense" for him.

Garcia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between
Elvis Christian De La Cruz Garcia, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2016] F.C.J. No. 819

[2016] A.C.F. no 819

2016 FC 784

Docket: IMM-5408-15

 Federal Court
Montréal, Quebec

Y. Roy J.

Heard: June 23, 2016.
Judgment: July 8, 2016.

(24 paras.)

---

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

1     Y. ROY J.:-- An application for judicial review was filed under section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, chapter 27 (IRPA) regarding the decision made by a visa officer to refuse the application for a study permit that had been filed by the applicant. The reason given was that the applicant had failed to convince the decision-maker that he would leave the country at the end of his stay. Based on the following reasons, the decision is reasonable and the application for judicial review is dismissed.

2     The applicant is a citizen of Guatemala. He is married and is the father of a young child. It appears that on November 5, 2015, the applicant tried to obtain a study permit, such as can be obtained under section 216 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (the Regulations). This study permit was intended to allow the applicant to begin studies to learn English. The studies in question were allegedly to begin on November 9--four days later--and to continue for a period of 40 weeks, at 24 hours per week.

3     In his country of citizenship, this applicant held a position as a systems analyst for a relatively prestigious company from October 2009 to August 2015. As of August 5, 2015, he had just started a job with a high-profile multinational corporation, with a monthly salary of $1,650.00, which, we are told, is a significant salary in Guatemala. In addition, this individual had accumulated savings of over $40,000.00. Yet, according to the visa officer at the Embassy of Canada to Guatemala, it would cost several thousand dollars for the applicant to come and study English for 40 weeks in Canada--around $30,000. I would add that the applicant stated that his spouse also earns an income in Guatemala.

4     The decision-maker in this case concluded that he was not convinced the applicant would return to his country of origin after his immersion period in an English program ended. This decision-maker wondered about this applicant's departure from Guatemala, given that he had just started a new job with a prestigious multinational corporation. No explanation was given as to the reasons why the applicant wanted to learn English, despite the fact that he had admitted to not knowing even the basics of the language. The decision-maker also held that the studies would cost several thousand dollars, and that the applicant's salary would be missed by his family back in Guatemala. The decision-maker did not understand why he would want to come and learn English in Montréal. The lost wages and the costs of studying abroad were not justified. The decision-maker therefore concluded that he was not convinced the applicant would return to Guatemala.

5     The applicant did not indicate what he believed the appropriate standard of review to be. However, his main allegation was that the decision-maker had not allowed him to address his concerns, which, the applicant claimed, constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice. When an allegation is made that the principles of procedural fairness have been breached, the standard of review is the standard of correctness (Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 SCR 502). Thus, the judge providing judicial review is not required to show deference to the impugned decision.

6     When applying this standard of review, it is up to the applicant (upon whom the burden of proof rests) to prove that procedural fairness has been breached. In such matters, the degree of procedural fairness is limited. Yet, this was not done. Subsection 11(1) of the IRPA sets out the foreign national's duty to obtain a visa before entering Canada:

·         11 (1) A foreign national must, before entering Canada, apply to an officer for a visa or for any other document required by the regulations. The visa or document may be issued if, following an examination, the officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act. 

* * *

·         11 (1) L'étranger doit, préalablement à son entrée au Canada, demander à l'agent les visa et autres documents requis par règlement. L'agent peut les délivrer sur preuve, à la suite d'un contrôle, que l'étranger n'est pas interdit de territoire et se conforme à la présente loi. 

7     The Regulations allow for the provision of a temporary resident visa as long as certain conditions are met:

·         179 An officer shall issue a temporary resident visa to a foreign national if, following an examination, it is established that the foreign national 

·         (a) 

has applied in accordance with these Regulations for a temporary resident visa as a member of the visitor, worker or student class; 

·         (b) 

will leave Canada by the end of the period authorized for their stay under Division 2; 

·         . . . 

* * *

·         179 L'agent délivre un visa de résident temporaire à l'étranger si, à l'issue d'un contrôle, les éléments suivants sont établis : 

·         a) 

l'étranger en a fait, conformément au présent règlement, la demande au titre de la catégorie des visiteurs, des travailleurs ou des étudiants; 

·         b) 

il quittera le Canada à la fin de la période de séjour autorisée qui lui est applicable au titre de la section 2; 

·         [...] 

As for study permits, they are governed by section 216 of the same Regulations, which reads as follows:

·         216 (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), an officer shall issue a study permit to a foreign national if, following an examination, it is established that the foreign national 

·         (a) 

applied for it in accordance with this Part; 

·         (b) 

will leave Canada by the end of the period authorized for their stay under Division 2 of Part 9; 

·         . . . 

* * *

·         216 (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (2) et (3), l'agent délivre un permis d'études à l'étranger si, à l'issue d'un contrôle, les éléments suivants sont établis : 

·         a) 

l'étranger a demandé un permis d'études conformément à la présente partie; 

·         b) 

il quittera le Canada à la fin de la période de séjour qui lui est applicable au titre de la section 2 de la partie 9; 

·         [...] 

8     Thus the applicant has a fundamental duty to prove that he will return to his country. The decision-maker, in this case, held that the evidence was insufficient. It is the applicant's duty to present sufficient evidence when filing his or her visa or permit application so as to substantiate that he or she satisfies the requirements of the IRPA. The decision-maker was not required to specify in what way the application was insufficient, as the applicant seems to suggest. In my view, this is not a question of whether the evidence is credible or that a particular piece of evidence is believed not to be genuine, but rather it is a question of the evidence being sufficient, since the decision taken was only based on the insufficiency of the evidence.

9     In my opinion, it is worth establishing the state of law in these matters. Before this Court, the case law has consistently established that the applicant's duty to prove that he will return to his country implies that satisfactory evidence must be presented. As I stated in Bar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 317, there is no legal duty to speak with an applicant to suggest additional elements of evidence.

10     This is also the opinion expressed by Mr. Justice Fothergill in Hakimi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 657:

·         [19] The onus was on the Applicant to satisfy the Officer that he was not an immigrant and that he met the statutory requirements of the IRPA and the Regulations (Obeng v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 754 at para 20 [Obeng]). As this Court observed in Hong: 

·         [31] Applications for student visa are to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis and the role of the Visa Officer does not amount to supplementing the applicant's evidence, as counsel for Ms. Hong seems to suggest. It is trite law that the onus is on the applicant to provide the Visa Officer with all the relevant information and complete documentation in order to satisfy the Visa Officer that the application meets the statutory requirements of the Act and the Regulations (Tran v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2006 FC 1377. More particularly, in this case, it was the applicant's responsibility to provide the Visa Officer with all of the evidence in order to satisfy the Visa Officer of her financial capacity. 

The same opinion was held by Mr. Justice LeBlanc in Katebi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 813.

11     In fact, these decisions are variations on a theme, which was explained directly and concisely in Hassani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 3 FCR 501, 2016 FC 1283:

·         [24] Having reviewed the factual context of the cases cited above, it is clear that where a concern arises directly from the requirements of the legislation or related regulations, a visa officer will not be under a duty to provide an opportunity for the applicant to address his or her concerns. Where however the issue is not one that arises in this context, such a duty may arise. This is often the case where the credibility, accuracy or genuine nature of information submitted by the applicant in support of their application is the basis of the visa officer's concern, as was the case in Rukmangathan, and in John and Cornea, cited by the Court in Rukmangathan, above. 

12     In my view, the visa officer did not contest the information's authenticity or accuracy. No one is contesting the fact that the language training exists or that the applicant has the financial resources to take the training for a period of nine (9) months. The Court was not convinced that the negative response was based on anything other than the fact that the evidence provided did not satisfy the fundamental duty to prove that the applicant would leave the country at the end of his authorized stay. Procedural fairness does not stretch to the point of requiring a visa officer"to provide an applicant with a 'running score' of the weaknesses in their application" (Rukmangathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 284, at paragraph 23).

13     In this case, the applicant wanted to argue that the decision-maker had based his decision exclusively, or almost exclusively, on that which he called generalizations. He took particular issue with the phrase "[m]ost serious students have started taking English before going to Canada to improve on the basis they've acquired." As I understand the argument, the applicant claims that this comment should be barred and constitutes a breach of procedural fairness, and therefore deference to this decision is not appropriate.

14     That being said, with all due respect, the applicant's error is in failing to consider the circumstances of his application and the context in which the phrase was written. The visa officer has a certain expertise that one acquires through processing visa applications. Common sense, combined with experience, cannot be discounted. If this remark had been the sole basis for denying a visa application, the Court would have had a certain sympathy for the applicant. However, this statement made by the decision-maker is just one of a series of points:

·         * 

The visa application was allegedly submitted on November 5 for courses that were to begin on November 9; 

·         * 

The applicant had just started a lucrative job with a multinational; 

·         * 

There was no indication that the applicant's employer had requested language training or that a leave had been granted. The decision-maker therefore deduced that the applicant, after barely three months of employment, would have to quit his job; 

·         * 

Not only would there be the lost wages, but the visa officer determined that the total costs would be approximately $30,000; 

·         * 

The applicant gave no indication of the benefit that he hoped would come from taking such training; 

·         * 

The applicant's spouse and his child would not accompany the applicant, which would add to the sacrifice and the costs. 

After making the list of insufficiencies, the visa officer stated that he was "not satisfied that he is [sic] a genuine purpose to visit Canada." Since the file is insufficient--whereas a complete file would have addressed the issues raised in a way that makes sense--the visa officer concluded that he was not convinced that the applicant would leave Canada at the end of his stay.

15     As I pointed out at the hearing, the absence of a breach of procedural fairness does not make a decision reasonable within the meaning of Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190.

16     If the applicant had also contested the reasonableness of the decision taken by the visa officer, the Court would have determined that the decision taken was reasonable, within the meaning of paragraph 47 of the Supreme Court's decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190. The deference owed to the decision-maker is sufficient to dispense with the issue. The applicant did not prove that the decision was unreasonable.

17     It must be recalled that the applicant bears the burden of proving that the decision rendered does not fall within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law. Without being a model of articulation, the decision is transparent and the facts and inferences show cause for it.

18     The applicant has a different perspective on the reasons. For example, the fact that the applicant and his family have the financial means to cover the costs of the course and the stay is presented as a justification for his coming to Canada to study--because he can afford it. The applicant is reading into the visa officer's decision the suggestion that he would not be able to reintegrate into Guatemalan society. Lastly, the applicant seeks to circumvent the decision by reaffirming that his wife has her own source of income.

19     This raises two points. Firstly, Dunsmuir acknowledges that a reasonable decision is not that which is correct or that which the reviewing judge would have preferred. It is sufficient for the decision to be among the possible acceptable outcomes.

20     It is incongruous that an applicant should, without explanation, wish to get out of his country, leaving his wife and child behind, to come and learn English in Montreal. The applicant is leaving not only his family behind him, but also a high-paying job, and is committing to considerable expenditures without any indication whatsoever as to what benefit he might gain from all of this. This insufficiency of evidence also demonstrates the reasonableness of the decision of the individual who must decide if a person will return to his country of origin after his stay in Canada. The burden of proof upon the applicant is to show that the decision is not an acceptable possible outcome.

21     This brings us to my second point. That which the applicant puts forth is nothing but a different interpretation. It does not render the decision unreasonable. Furthermore, the respondent in no way suggested that the applicant would not be able to reintegrate into Guatemalan society. What the applicant was trying to do was to invoke the case law of Bonilla v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 20 [Bonilla]. The applicant is responding to a false question. The question regarding the family's financial circumstances is similar. The decision-maker's point was to note the high costs, the lost income and the absence, given that he had only held his job for a short time. The fact that the applicant's spouse has her own source of income has no bearing on the fact that deciding to come and take language training is a costly choice when the applicant gave no evidence as to his motivation. This is the source of the insufficiency in the decision-maker's opinion. The ability to pay is not an issue.

22     The applicant bases his argument mainly on the decision in Bonilla. Yet, this case is not useful as it is based on very different reasons. That which was criticized in Bonilla was that the visa officer was essentially basing his decision on a rather crude generalization suggesting that after four years of secondary studies, it was unlikely that an applicant would return to his country of origin, given the long separation from his family and culture.

23     In our case, the true issue arises not from a generalization but rather from the fact that concerns about the evidence provided were not conveyed to the applicant. In my opinion, it was the sufficiency of the evidence that was lacking. The comments made by Mr. Justice de Montigny when he was a judge in this Court have not been disavowed and remain valid.

·         [16] It seems to me the visa officer went beyond what was expected. The officer was under no obligation to alert Mr. Liu of these concerns since they were about matters that arose directly from Mr. Liu's own evidence and from the requirements of the Act and of the Regulations. An applicant's failure to provide adequate, sufficient or credible proof with respect to his visa application does not trigger a duty to inform the applicant in order for him to submit further proof to address the finding of the officer with respect to the inadequacy, deficiency or lack of credibility. . . 

·         Liu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1025 (cited case law omitted) 

24     Consequently, the application for judicial review is dismissed. There are no questions to certify.

JUDGMENT

THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is dismissed. There are no questions to certify.

Y. ROY J.

POST GRADUATE WORK PERMIT REFUSED FOR STUDYING PART TIME

In the case below, recently decided, the Federal Court refused to overturn a negative decision by an immigration officer to refused to grant a Post Graduate Work Permit to a foreign student who reduced his courses to  part time status.  Although the court noted that there is nothing in the regulations to mandate full time studies over an above the minimum, it held that the refusal was reasonable, although it left the door open for a different court to rule in a different manner. Students beware: you must study on a full time basis to avoid problems when applying for a work permit.

Zhang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between
Zheng Zhang, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2016] F.C.J. No. 1021

2016 FC 1057

Docket: IMM-5645-15

 Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario

R.F. Southcott J.

Heard: August 31, 2016.
Judgment: September 19, 2016.

(21 paras.)

---

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

·        R.F. SOUTHCOTT J.:-- 

I. Overview

1     The Applicant, Zheng Zhang, is a citizen of China who has been studying in Canada at the post-secondary level under a study permit issued by Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC]. Following completion of his studies, Mr. Zhang applied for a work permit under CIC's Post-Graduation Work Permit Program [PGWPP]. His application was refused by a CIC officer, who was not satisfied that Mr. Zhang met the program requirement of having continuously studied full time in Canada.

2     Mr. Zhang seeks judicial review of the officer's decision, arguing that: (a) the decision is unreasonable; and (b) he was denied procedural fairness because the officer failed to advise him, before making the decision, of his concerns regarding Mr. Zhang's satisfaction of the PGWPP requirements. The Respondent, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, argues that the decision is reasonable and that no breach of procedural fairness has occurred.

3     For the reasons explained in more detail below, this application is dismissed. The officer's decision is reasonable, taking into account the deference owed to the officer in concluding whether a particular course of study qualifies as full time. The officer's concerns regarding Mr. Zhang's satisfaction of the PGWPP requirements also do not relate to the credibility, genuineness or accuracy of information submitted by Mr. Zhang, so as to invoke a duty to give Mr. Zhang an opportunity to address those concerns.

II. Background

4     In the decision refusing the application, the officer refers to the transcripts that Mr. Zhang submitted from University of Windsor Centre for English Language Development and St. Lawrence College. Based on the transcripts, the officer makes the following findings:

·        A. 

Mr. Zhang was registered at the University of Windsor from May to August 2011 and September to December 2011. His fall 2011 term was incomplete, he passed the intersession 2011 term, and he failed the winter 2011 term. His overall attendance was 40%, and he did not meet the requirements to move to the next level of the program; 

·        B. 

There was a gap in Mr. Zhang's studies from January 2012 to January 2013; 

·        C. 

Mr. Zhang began studying at St. Lawrence College in the winter 2013 semester in January 2013. He withdrew from all but one course during that semester and withdrew from all but one course during the subsequent fall 2013 semester. During the following three semesters, he failed three courses and passed the remaining courses with a degree GPA of 1.72. 

5     The officer then states that he is not satisfied that Mr. Zhang has continuously studied full time in Canada and that the PGWPP requirements are not met.

6     Other than the conclusion that he had not been continuously studying full time, Mr. Zhang agrees that the officer's factual findings are accurate, with the exception that Mr. Zhang actually completed four, not three, semesters at St. Lawrence College following the fall 2013 semester.

III. Issues

7     The issues submitted by Mr. Zhang for the Court's determination are;

·        A. 

Whether the officer made an unreasonable determination that Mr. Zhang did not meet the eligibility requirements for a post-graduation work permit; and 

·        B. 

Whether there was a breach of procedural fairness based on the officer's failure to advise of concerns relating to the nature of study in Canada and the accuracy of the submitted documentation. 

IV. Standard of Review

8     The parties agree, and I concur, that the standard of reasonableness applies to the Court's review of the first issue and the standard of correctness applies to the second.

V. Legislation and Policy

9     As identified in the Minister's written submissions, the principal statutory authority for the issuance of the type of work permit at issue in this application under the PGWPP is section 205(c)(ii) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [the Regulations], made under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act]. Section 205(c)(ii) provides as follows:

·        Canadian interests

·        205 A work permit may be issued under section 200 to a foreign national who intends to perform work that 

·        ... 

·        (c) 

is designated by the Minister as being work that can be performed by a foreign national on the basis of the following criteria, namely, 

·        ... 

·        (ii) 

limited access to the Canadian labour market is necessary for reasons of public policy relating to the competitiveness of Canada's academic institutions or economy; 

·        ... 

* * *

·        Intérêts canadiens

·        205 Un permis de travail peut être délivré à l'étranger en vertu de l'article 200 si le travail pour lequel le permis est demandé satisfait à l'une ou l'autre des conditions suivantes : 

·        ... 

·        c) 

il est désigné par le ministre comme travail pouvant être exercé par des étrangers, sur la base des critères suivants : 

·        ... 

·        (ii) 

un accès limité au marché du travail au Canada est justifiable pour des raisons d'intérêt public en rapport avec la compétitivité des établissements universitaires ou de l'économie du Canada; 

·        ... 

10     Other than this statutory foundation, Mr. Zhang correctly submits that the PGWPP is primarily a product of policy, as neither the Act nor the Regulations provide the eligibility requirements. Both parties refer to these requirements being found in what Mr. Zhang describes as CIC's Program Delivery Requirements, a document which provides as follows:

·        The Post-Graduation Work Permit Program (PGWPP) allows students who have graduated from a participating Canadian post-secondary institution to gain valuable Canadian work experience. Skilled Canadian work experience gained through the PGWPP helps graduates qualify for permanent residence in Canada through the Canadian experience class (CEC). 

·        Employers seeking to employ open work permit holders are exempt from the requirement to first obtain a positive Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA) from Service Canada. The open work permits issued to the graduates in line with the PGWPP requirements are coded with the LMIA exemption code C43. 

·        A work permit under the PGWPP may be issued for the length of the study program, up to a maximum of three years. A post-graduation work permit cannot be valid for longer than the student's study program, which must be a minimum of eight months in length. 

·        ... 

·        To obtain a work permit under the PGWPP, the applicant must meet the following requirements: 

·        * 

have a valid study permit when applying for the work permit; 

·        * 

have continuously studied full time in Canada (i.e., studies must have taken place at a Canadian educational institution) and have completed a program of study that is at least eight months in duration; 

·        * 

have completed and passed the program of study and received a written notification from the educational institution indicating that they are eligible to obtain a degree, diploma or certificate. The educational institution must be one of the following: 

·        * 

a public post-secondary institution, such as a college, trade/technical school, university or CEGEP (in Quebec), 

·        * 

a private post-secondary institution that operates under the same rules and regulations as public institutions, 

·        * 

a private secondary or post-secondary institution (in Quebec) offering qualifying programs of 900 hours or longer leading to a diplôme d'études professionnelles (DEP) or an attestation de spécialisation professionnelle (ASP), or 

·        * 

a Canadian private institution authorized by provincial statute to confer degrees but only if the student is enrolled in one of the programs of study leading to a degree as authorized by the province and not in all programs of study offered by the private institution. 

·        Applicants must apply for a work permit within 90 days of receiving written confirmation (for example, a transcript or an official letter) from the educational institution indicating that they have met the requirements for completing their program of study. Calculation of the 90 days begins the day when the student's final marks are issued or when formal written notification of program completion is received, whichever comes first. 

VI. Analysis

·        A. 

Whether the officer made an unreasonable determination that Mr. Zhang did not meet the eligibility requirements for a post-graduation work permit

11     Mr. Zhang argues that the officer's recitation of the facts surrounding his attendance at the University of Windsor, and the gap in his studies from January 2012 to January 2013, is accurate but irrelevant to his application for a work permit, which was based on his program of study at St. Lawrence College. With respect to St. Lawrence College, Mr. Zhang notes that the officer referred to his withdrawal from all but one class in each of the first two semesters of the program, as well as his subsequent failure of three courses, and argues that one can withdraw from and fail classes and still be a full-time student.

12     While the officer's decision recites Mr. Zhang's full educational history in Canada, I read the decision as turning on the officer's analysis of the course of study at St. Lawrence College which, as Mr. Zhang submits, forms the basis for his application. In oral argument, both Mr. Zhang and the Minister referred to the officer's focus on Mr. Zhang's withdrawal from five of six courses in each of the first two semesters at St. Lawrence College. Similarly, my conclusion on the issue of the reasonableness of the decision turns on whether the officer reasonably found, based on Mr. Zhang's withdrawal from those courses, that he had not been continuously studying full-time.

13     Given the applicable standard, I must dismiss this ground of review. While Mr. Zhang correctly points out that neither the Act, Regulations nor policy documentation define the meaning of studying full-time, I consider the interpretation of this aspect of the program requirements to be within the scope of the determinations the officer must make, which attract deference and should not be disturbed if they fall within a range of acceptable and possible outcomes. Another officer, or the Court, might conclude that a student remains full-time notwithstanding that he has withdrawn from most of the courses in which he has enrolled. Indeed, it appears from the letter written by St. Lawrence College that the institution characterized Mr. Zhang as a full-time student. However, notwithstanding that characterization by the college, I do not regard the officer's conclusion, that on these facts Mr. Zhang was not studying full-time, to be outside the range of acceptable outcomes and therefore unreasonable.

14     Mr. Zhang also submits that he was clearly enrolled on a full-time basis for four semesters (winter 2014, summer 2014, fall 2014 and winter 2015), which is equivalent to two years of college and the official length of the program from which he graduated. He argues that he therefore met the requirement of studying on a continuous and full-time basis for at least eight months, being the minimum study period required under the PGWPP.

15     I find this argument comparable to that which was advanced before Justice Gascon in Rehman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1021. In that case, an applicant for a study permit, who had been studying part-time for a portion of his program, argued that he was required to have engaged in a period of continuous full-time study only for the minimum of eight months referred to in the PGWPP. Justice Gascon rejected this argument, holding at paragraph 19 that the full-time status and the duration of the program are two distinct requirements under the PGWPP. An applicant must have studied full time in Canada and must have completed a program of study that lasted at least eight months. Similarly, in the case at hand, I cannot conclude the officer's decision to be unreasonable for failing to grant Mr. Zhang's application based on full-time status for two of the three years of his program.

16     Finally, I note Mr. Zhang's argument that the officer made a factual error in referring to his enrollment during three semesters following 2013, when in fact he attended during four semesters. However, I agree with the Minister's position on this issue, that that this error is not determinative, as the identification of the additional semester would not have changed the officer's conclusion as to the effect of Mr. Zhang's withdrawal from the majority of his courses in 2013.

·        B. 

Whether there was a breach of procedural fairness based on the officer's failure to advise of concerns relating to the nature of study in Canada and the accuracy of the submitted documentation. 

17     In support of his procedural fairness argument, Mr. Zhang relies upon the decision in Hassani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1283. At paragraph 24, Justice Mosley explained that, where a visa officer's concerns with an application arise directly from the requirements of the legislation or related regulations, the officer will not be under a duty to provide an opportunity for the applicant to address these concerns. However, where the issue is not one that arises in this context, such as where the credibility, accuracy or genuine nature of information submitted by the applicant is the basis of the officer's concern, then such a duty may arise. Mr. Zhang argues that the officer failed to advise him of concerns regarding the accuracy of documents submitted in support of his application and refers in particular to the letter and transcript from St. Lawrence College referring to his status as full-time.

18     The Minister does not take issue with these principles but argues that the officer's concerns in the present case are unrelated to the credibility, accuracy or genuine nature of information submitted by Mr. Zhang. I agree with the Minister's position on this issue. While the requirements at issue in the present case are those derived from CIC policy rather than the Act or Regulations, the officer's concerns that resulted in rejection of this application arose from Mr. Zhang's failure to satisfy the officer that he had met the requirement of continuously studying full-time in Canada. Nothing in the officer's decision suggests that it turned on concerns about the credibility, accuracy or genuine nature of information submitted by Mr. Zhang.

19     In particular, there is no basis to conclude that the officer had concerns about the credibility, accuracy or genuine nature of the letter from St. Lawrence College referring to Mr. Zhang's attendance as full time. Rather, the officer reached his own conclusion as to whether Mr. Zhang had been studying full-time, based on the information available from the transcript, rather than relying onthe college'scharacterization of his status.

20     The present case is therefore distinguishable from the decision of Justice O'Keefe in Kaur v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 219, upon which Mr. Zhang relies. In that decision, the officer was not convinced that the applicant was a genuine student and had concerns about the credibility of documents received from the applicant's college. Justice O'Keefe held at paragraph 28 that, having formed the view that such documentation was not credible or was fraudulent, the officer ought to have arranged an interview with the applicant to provide an opportunity to respond to those concerns. In the present case, there are no such concerns evident from the officer's decision that would give rise to such an obligation.

21     Having found no error on the part of the officer under either of the grounds of review raised by Mr. Zhang, this application for judicial review must be dismissed. Neither party proposed any question of general importance for certification for appeal, and none is stated.

JUDGMENT

THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that this application for judicial review is dismissed. No question is certified for appeal.

R.F. SOUTHCOTT J.

STUDY PERMIT NOT AVAILABLE FOR VISITOR MINORS

This is an interesting case on the new Section 215 of the IRPA Regulations which made it easier for SOME visitors to apply for a Study permit. However, the limits of that ability are highlighted by the case.

Chow v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between
Yin Ji Rachael Chow, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent
And between
Yin Hong Clara Chow, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent
And between
Yin Gwan Elisia Chow, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2015] F.C.J. No. 893

2015 FC 861

Dockets: IMM-7450-14, IMM-7452-14, IMM-7453-14

 Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario

Southcott J.

Heard: June 25, 2015.
Judgment: July 22, 2015.

(37 paras.)

---

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

1     SOUTHCOTT J.:-- This Judgment and Reasons relate to three applications for judicial review of three identical decisions made by an Immigration Officer refusing the applicants' applications for study permits. At the hearing of these matters, counsel for the parties agreed that it is appropriate for the Court to issue one decision in relation to the three applications.

2     For the reasons set out below, the applications for judicial review are dismissed.

I. Background

3     The applicants are three sisters, all of whom are minors and nationals of New Zealand. Their mother is a Korean national and their father is a New Zealand national. Their parents were in Canada on Visitor Records when they filed applications for study permits for their daughters for the 2014-2015 school year.

4     The applicants first applied for study permits on July 7, 2014. Their applications were refused by letters dated August 6, 2014. They then submitted new applications on September 2, 2014, which were refused on October 24, 2014. Those are the decisions at issue in these proceedings.

5     The Officer's decisions stated that the applicants were not persons described in immigration legislation who could apply for a study permit from within Canada. Rather, an application of this type must be made at a Canadian Visa office in another country.

6     The Global Case Management System (GCMS) notes indicate that the officer decided that, as their parents were on Visitor Records, the applicants were not eligible to study in Canada under ss. 30(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (IRPA). As such, the applicants did not fall under the new ss. 215(1)(f)(i) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (IRPR) as they were not studying at the preschool, primary or secondary level. The applicants must therefore apply for study permits from outside Canada.

7     The applicants argue that this was an unreasonable interpretation of the relevant provisions in the IRPA and the IRPR.

II. Issue

8     The parties agree that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, given that the issue is a question of statutory interpretation and a question of mixed fact and law, involving the Officer's interpretation of his or her enabling statute and regulations connected with it (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, at para 124 [Dunsmuir]; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers Association, 2011 SCC 61, at para 30; McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, at para 21).

9     Therefore, the sole issue in these matters is whether the Officer adopted an unreasonable interpretation of ss. 215(1)(f)(i) of the IRPR and ss. 30(2) of the IRPA.

III. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions

10     The principal statutory and regulatory provisions relied on by the parties in argument are as follows:

·        Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27. 

·        Work and study in Canada 

·        30. 

(1) A foreign national may not work or study in Canada unless authorized to do so under this Act. 

·        Minor children 

·        (2) 

Every minor child in Canada, other than a child of a temporary resident not authorized to work or study, is authorized to study at the pre-school, primary or secondary level. 

* * *

·        Études et emploi 

·        30. 

(1) L'étranger ne peut exercer un emploi au Canada ou y étudier que sous le régime de la présente loi. 

·        Enfant mineur 

·        (2) 

L'enfant mineur qui se trouve au Canada est autorisé à y étudier au niveau préscolaire, au primaire ou au secondaire, à l'exception de celui du résident temporaire non autorisé à y exercer un emploi ou à y étudier. 

·        Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. 

·        No permit required 

·        186. 

A foreign national may work in Canada without a work permit 

...

·        (v) 

if they are the holder of a study permit and 

·        (i) 

they are a full-time student enrolled at a designated learning institution as defined in section 211.1, 

·        (ii) 

the program in which they are enrolled is a post-secondary academic, vocational or professional training program, or a vocational training program at the secondary level offered in Quebec, in each case, of a duration of six months or more that leads to a degree, diploma or certificate, and 

·        (iii) 

although they are permitted to engage in full-time work during a regularly scheduled break between academic sessions, they work no more than 20 hours per week during a regular academic session; or 

·        (w) 

if they are or were the holder of a study permit who has completed their program of study and 

·        (i) 

they met the requirements set out in paragraph (v), and 

·        (ii) 

they applied for a work permit before the expiry of that study permit and a decision has not yet been made in respect of their application. 

·        No permit required 

·        188. 

(1) A foreign national may study in Canada without a study permit 

...

·        (c) 

if the duration of their course or program of studies is six months or less and will be completed within the period for their stay authorized upon entry into Canada; 

...

·        Application before entry 

·        213. 

Subject to sections 214 and 215, in order to study in Canada, a foreign national shall apply for a study permit before entering Canada 

·        Application on entry 

·        214. 

A foreign national may apply for a study permit when entering Canada if they are 

·        (a) 

a national or a permanent resident of the United States; 

·        (b) 

a person who has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; 

·        (c) 

a resident of Greenland; or 

·        (d) 

a resident of St. Pierre and Miquelon. 

·        Application after entry 

·        215. 

(1) A foreign national may apply for a study permit after entering Canada if they 

·        (a) 

hold a study permit; 

·        (b) 

apply within the period beginning 90 days before the expiry of their authorization to engage in studies in Canada under subsection 30(2) of the Act, or paragraph 188(1)(a) of these Regulations, and ending 90 days after that expiry; 

·        (c) 

hold a work permit; 

·        (d) 

are subject to an unenforceable removal order; 

·        (e) 

hold a temporary resident permit issued under subsection 24(1) of the Act that is valid for at least six months; 

·        (f) 

are a temporary resident who 

·        (i) 

is studying at the preschool, primary or secondary level, 

·        (ii) 

is a visiting or exchange student who is studying at a designated learning institution, or 

·        (iii) 

has completed a course or program of study that is a prerequisite to their enrolling at a designated learning institution; or 

·        (g) 

are in a situation described in section 207. 

* * *

·        Permis non exigé 

·        186. 

L'étranger peut travailler au Canada sans permis de travail 

...

·        v) 

s'il est titulaire d'un permis d'études et si, à la fois : 

·        (i) 

il est un étudiant à temps plein inscrit dans un établissement d'enseignement désigné au sens de l'article 211.1, 

·        (ii) 

il est inscrit à un programme postsecondaire de formation générale, théorique ou professionnelle ou à un programme de formation professionnelle de niveau secondaire offert dans la province de Québec, chacun d'une durée d'au moins six mois, menant à un diplôme ou à un certificat, 

·        (iii) 

il travaille au plus vingt heures par semaine au cours d'un semestre régulier de cours, bien qu'il puisse travailler à temps plein pendant les congés scolaires prévus au calendrier; 

·        w) 

s'il est ou a été titulaire d'un permis d'études, a terminé son programme d'études et si, à la fois : 

·        (i) 

il a satisfait aux exigences énoncées à l'alinéa v), 

·        (ii) 

il a présenté une demande de permis de travail avant l'expiration de ce permis d'études et une décision à l'égard de cette demande n'a pas encore été rendue. 

·        Permis non exigé 

·        188. 

(1) L'étranger peut étudier au Canada sans permis d'études dans les cas suivants : 

...

·        c) 

il suit un cours ou un programme d'études d'une durée maximale de six mois qu'il terminera à l'intérieur de la période de séjour autorisée lors de son entrée au Canada; 

...

·        Demande avant l'entrée au Canada 

·        213. 

Sous réserve des articles 214 et 215, l'étranger qui cherche à étudier au Canada doit, préalablement à son entrée au Canada, faire une demande de permis d'études. 

·        Demande au moment de l'entrée 

·        214. 

L'étranger peut faire une demande de permis d'études au moment de son entrée au Canada dans les cas suivants : 

·        a) 

il est un national ou résident permanent des États-Unis; 

·        b) 

il a été légalement admis aux États-Unis à titre de résident permanent; 

·        c) 

il est résident du Groenland; 

·        d) 

il est résident de Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon 

·        Demande après l'entrée au Canada 

·        215. 

(1) L'étranger peut faire une demande de permis d'études après son entrée au Canada dans les cas suivants : 

·        a) 

il est titulaire d'un permis d'études; 

·        b) 

il a été autorisé à étudier au Canada en vertu du paragraphe 30(2) de la Loi ou de l'alinéa 188(1)a) du présent règlement et la demande est faite dans la période commençant quatre-vingt-dix jours avant la date d'expiration de l'autorisation et se terminant quatre-vingt-dix jours après cette date; 

·        c) 

il est titulaire d'un permis de travail; 

·        d) 

il fait l'objet d'une mesure de renvoi qui ne peut être exécutée; 

·        e) 

il est titulaire, aux termes du paragraphe 24(1) de la Loi, d'un permis de séjour temporaire qui est valide pour au moins six mois; 

·        f) 

il est un résident temporaire qui, selon le cas : 

·        (i) 

poursuit des études au niveau préscolaire, primaire ou secondaire, 

·        (ii) 

est un étudiant en visite ou participe à un programme d'échange dans un établissement d'enseignement désigné, 

·        (iii) 

a terminé un cours ou un programme d'études exigé pour s'inscrire à un établissement d'enseignement désigné; 

·        g) 

il se trouve dans l'une des situations visées à l'article 207. 

IV. Argument

·        A. 

Applicants' Submissions

11     The applicants note that, under ss. 30(1) of the IRPA, no foreign national is eligible to study in Canada "unless authorized to do so under the Act", which is why the applicants applied for study permits. Ss. 30(2) creates an exception for children at the pre-school, primary or secondary level who do not require a study permit. However, this exception does not apply to minor children of temporary residents who are not themselves authorized to work or study. The applicants submit that this means that such children must apply for study permits in order to study in Canada, which is what the applicants did.

12     The applicants then turn to their argument that the Officer erred in the interpretation of ss. 215(1)(f)(i) of the IRPR. The Officer has interpreted this provision to mean that the applicants would have to have been actively studying at a school to apply for a study permit pursuant to this provision, which allows for application after entering Canada. Otherwise, s. 213 of the IRPR provides that application must be made before entering Canada.

13     The applicants submit that this is an untenable interpretation of ss. 215(1)(f)(i). They note that, when interpreting a statute, "the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in there grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament" (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 21). Additionally, an "enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects" (Interpretation Act, RSC, 1985, c I-21, s 12). The applicants submit that the newly enacted ss. 215(1)(f)(i) of the IRPR must benefit from a liberal interpretation, because it is meant to act as an exception to the general rule that foreign nationals must apply for a study permit before entering Canada.

14     The interpretation favoured by the applicants is that the words "is studying at the preschool, primary or secondary level" in ss. 215(1)(f)(i) refer to the level at which the child will be studying, not to a requirement that the child be currently actively studying. In oral submissions, the applicants' counsel also argued that the fact the applicants were enrolled in school, albeit not yet entitled to enter the classroom, was sufficient to consider them to be studying for purposes of ss. 215(1)(f)(i).

15     The applicants argue that this provision cannot logically be taken to require that the child already be attending school in Canada when applying for the study permit. They contend this would happen in only three scenarios: the child already has a study permit obtained outside of Canada, the child is the minor child of a temporary resident who is authorized to work or study in Canada, or the child is illegally attending school without a permit. None of these scenarios apply to the applicants or to other minor children in circumstances similar to the applicants. The applicants argue that the Officer's interpretation therefore renders this provision meaningless and defeats the objective of the enactment.

16     The applicants refer to such objective being to allow minor children such as the applicants, who are already in Canada but do not fall under the exemption in ss. 30(2) of the IRPA, to apply for a study permit from within the country. In support of their contention as to the objective of the new ss. 215(1)(f)(i), the applicants refer to a Notice dated February 12, 2014 issued by the Government of Canada following publication of the relevant regulatory amendments in the Canada Gazette (SOR/2014-14 January 29, 2014, Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations), which referred to the amendments as aiming to strengthen Canada's status as a study destination of choice for prospective international students.

17     The applicants also refer to the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS) that accompanied the amendments as noting that strong support had been expressed for increasing the pool of those foreign nationals eligible to apply for a study permit from within Canada.

·        B. 

Respondent's Submissions

18     The respondent argues that the Officer reasonably found that the applicants did not meet the criteria of ss. 215(1)(f)(i) of the IRPR given that they were not studying at the preschool, primary or secondary level at the time of the application. The subsection states that the application for the study permit can be made from within Canada if the person is studying at the preschool, primary or secondary level. A plain and ordinary reading of the provision leads to the same conclusion as the Officer.

19     The respondent also relies on the RIAS to support the proposition that the new provision was not intended to apply to persons such as the applicants, but rather to allow students already properly studying in Canada without a study permit to apply for a permit from within Canada. In reliance on the RIAS, the respondent notes that ss. 215(1)(f) would apply to students studying pursuant to ss. 30(2) who need to apply for a study permit once they reach the age of majority, students studying in Canada for less than six months (as permitted without a permit pursuant to ss. 188(1)(c) of the IRPR) who want to continue their studies in Canada, or students who do not need a study permit but who still desire one as tangible proof of authorization to study or to derive certain benefits under the IRPA or the IRPR (such as the right to work under ss. 186(v) or (w) of the IRPR without a work permit).

20     Therefore, the fact that the applicants, or others in the applicants' circumstances, do not qualify for the exemption under ss. 215(1)(f)(i) does not render the Officer's interpretation unreasonable.

V. Analysis

21     Pursuant to ss. 30(1) of the IRPA, the default position is that a foreign national requires authorization to study in Canada. Ss. 30(2) provides an exception allowing for children to study at the pre-school, primary or secondary level, except for children of temporary residents who are not authorized to work or study in Canada. In this case, the parties agree that the applicants are children of temporary residents not authorized to work or study in Canada, given that their parents are in Canada on Visitor Records. Therefore, the exception in ss. 30(2) does not apply to the applicants.

22     Where a study permit is required by a foreign national, the default position under s. 213 of the IRPR is that the application for the permit must be made before entering Canada. Ss. 214 and 215 of the IRPR create exceptions to this requirement and allow, in certain circumstances, for application to be made when entering Canada or after entering Canada.

23     Where the parties diverge is whether the new ss. 215(1)(f)(i) of the IRPR, which came into force on June 1, 2014, applies to the applicants and whether the Officer should have granted them study permits pursuant to this regulation. The Court finds, for the reasons that follow, that it was reasonable for the Officer to come to the conclusion that ss. 215(1)(f)(i) did not apply to the applicants, and that they therefore had to apply for the study permits from outside Canada.

24     Based on a grammatical and ordinary meaning (Bell Express Vu v Rex, [2002] 2 SCR 559 at para 26) of ss. 215(1)(f)(i), which reads "is studying at the preschool, primary or secondary level", it was reasonable for the Officer to interpret this subsection as applying only to a temporary resident who is currently studying at the preschool, primary or secondary level. There is nothing in this provision or in the rest of the IRPA or IRPR that would make this interpretation unreasonable. While this interpretation is narrower than the interpretation the applicants would prefer, it is harmonious with the scheme of the IRPA and the other provisions of the IRPA and the IRPR that limit the right of foreign nationals, who want to study in Canada on a temporary basis, to apply from within Canada.

25     As detailed above, the respondent has cited examples of circumstances where foreign nationals who are lawfully studying in Canada would benefit from this provision by being entitled to apply for a study permit to continue their studies without having to leave Canada. As such, the new ss. 215(1)(f)(i) is not rendered meaningless by the Officer's interpretation as the applicants contend.

26     Both parties also referred the Court to the applicable RIAS as an interpretive aid. As noted by the Federal Court of Appeal in Astral Media Radio Inc v Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada, 2010 FCA 16, at para 23:

·        Although not a part of the Regulations, the Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement issued by the Board to accompany the Regulations may be taken into account by the Court in interpreting them. 

27     The portion of the RIAS that relates to the question in the case at hand reads as follows:

·        Regulatory amendments to in-Canada study permit applications

·        Certain foreign nationals who wish to apply for a study permit to attend a designated institution after they have entered Canada as a temporary resident, including those studying at the pre-school, primary or secondary level, exchange or visiting students, or those who have completed a course or program of study that is a condition for acceptance at a designated institution, are authorized under the new Regulations to apply for a study permit from within Canada instead of being required to leave the country to apply from abroad. This change facilitates the transition from visitor to study permit holder for minor students once they reach the age of majority, exchange or visiting students at a designated institution who wish to transfer to that institution permanently to complete their studies, and those students who wish to transition from a short term preparatory to a longer-term college or university program. (emphasis added) 

28     The language of the RIAS highlighted above, which appears to relate to ss. 215(1)(f)(i), supports the respondent's argument that this subsection applies to students studying pursuant to subsection 30(2) who need to apply for a study permit once they reach the age of majority. It does not support the applicants' argument that this subsection applies to foreign nationals in the circumstances of the applicants who wish to study, or have enrolled to study, at a pre-school, primary or secondary level.

29     The applicants submit that the Officer's interpretation of the provision is unreasonable because it does not apply to the applicants or other minor children in circumstances similar to the applicants. With respect, the applicants' argument is flawed because it relies on a premise that the objective of the enactment is to allow all minor children such as the applicants, who are already in Canada but do not fall under the exemption in ss. 30(2) of the IRPA, to apply for a study permit from within the country. However, the applicants have provided no compelling support for this premise.

30     The applicants disagree with the Officer's interpretation of the statute, but this is not a basis to overturn the decision. The interpretation of the Officer still renders subsection 215(1)(f)(i) of the IRPR remedial, albeit in a narrower way than the interpretation suggested by the applicants. This does not mean that the Officer's interpretation falls outside the "range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law" (Dunsmuir, at para 47).

VI. Conclusion

31     Given the reasons above, and the Court's resulting conclusion that the Officer's interpretation of the relevant provisions is reasonable, the applications for judicial review are dismissed.

VII. Certified Question

32     The applicants requested that the following question be certified for appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal as a serious question of general importance:

·        Whether the provision in section 215(1)(f)(i) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, which states: 

·        215. 

(1) A foreign national may apply for a study permit after entering Canada if they ... (f) are a temporary resident who (i) is studying at the preschool, primary or secondary level (emphasis added) 

·        should be restricted to those students who are actually/ physically studying at a preschool, primary or secondary institution in Canada (as per a literal, restrictive interpretation of the words "is studying") or whether the section is to be interpreted to define the exemption to cover the study "level" of the individuals who are granted an exemption by virtue of this section from the requirement to apply for a study permit from outside Canada because they study at "the preschool, primary or secondary level". 

33     Pursuant to ss. 74(d) of the IRPA, only a "serious question of general importance" can be certified. As submitted by the applicants in reliance on Zhang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FCA 168 at paragragh 9, to be certified a question must (i) be dispositive of the appeal and (ii) transcend the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation, as well as contemplate issues of broad significance or general importance.

34     The applicants submit that this test is met because (i) the applications would be allowed if the interpretation of ss. 215(1)(f)(i) for which the applicants contend were to be adopted; and (ii) such interpretation will affect applications for study permits beyond those of the three applicants.

35     The respondent opposes the request for certification on the basis that the question is not one of general importance but rather is a question of construction, confined to just one component of the regulatory amendments made by SOR/2014-14, which can be addressed by well-established principles of statutory interpretation.

36     While I agree with the applicants that their proposed interpretation of ss. 215(1)(f)(i) of the IRPR would be dispositive of an appeal, I agree with the respondent's position that the proposed question is not a serious question of general importance. In so concluding, I note Justice Strayer's description, in Gittens v Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2008 FC 526 at para 6, of serious questions being those that raise matters of significant doubt. I am not convinced that the question proposed by the applicants raises such a matter.

37     Rather, I find this matter to be similar to that considered by Justice Mainville in Jin v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1234, which turned on the interpretation of a ministerial instruction that was given legislative effect pursuant to the IRPA and published in the Canada Gazette. The Court observed at para 24 that ss. 74(d) of the IRPA is not to be invoked lightly (Varela v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FCA 145 at para 23) and concluded that the interpretation of the ministerial instruction on the narrow facts of that case was not of general importance.

JUDGMENT

THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that the applications for judicial review are dismissed. No question is certified for appeal.

SOUTHCOTT J.