Showing posts with label spousal sponsorship. Show all posts
Showing posts with label spousal sponsorship. Show all posts

Thursday, February 5, 2015

FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETS WHEN SPOUSAL RELATIONSHIP HAS ENDED

The case below is the first to interpret the meaning of when a relationship has broken down for the purposes of immigration law, as found in Section 23(b)(i) of the Immolation and Refugee Protection Act Regulations.

Suo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between
Wei Wei Suo, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent
[2015] F.C.J. No. 49
2015 FC 81

Docket: IMM-3213-14

 Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario

Annis J.


Heard: November 12, 2014.
Judgment: January 21, 2015.
(33 paras.) 


JUDGMENT AND REASONS

·        ANNIS J.:-- 
I. Introduction
1     This is an application for judicial review pursuant to section 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA or the Act] of a February 26, 2014 decision by a Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC] visa officer of the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong, China [the officer] rejecting the applicant's application for permanent residence. The substantive basis for the officer's refusal of the application was the fact that the applicant was unable to provide evidence that his relationship with his non-accompanying wife had been legally severed.
2     The applicant was seeking to have the decision quashed and referred back to a different visa officer for re-determination on a number of grounds. These included that the officer unreasonably requested information related to his spouse's employment (which he submitted was not relevant to the application), that procedural fairness was not accorded in respect of a request for an extension of time to provide materials in respect of his spouse, and that the officer fettered his discretion in refusing to reconsider the application when evidence was furnished of the applicant's divorce.
3     However, in the course of the proceedings, the issue arose as to whether, in the circumstances, the applicant was required to demonstrate that the relationship was legally severed, when he had indicated that it had broken down "in fact."
4     In consideration of this issue, I allow the application inasmuch as I find that, pursuant to the Act, the applicant was entitled to establish that the relationship with his spouse had broken down "in fact" and he was denied the opportunity to demonstrate this to the officer.
II. Background
5     The applicant is a citizen of China. He married Ms. Hongxia Li on May 1, 1999.
6     The applicant arrived in Canada on September 17, 2008 under a closed work permit and worked at New Tang Dynasty TV until December 2010. He then received a new work permit in January 2011 and began working at Heaven's Taste Chinese Cuisine [Heaven's Taste].
7     In August 2011 the applicant applied to the Saskatchewan Immigration Nominee Program [SINP]. His application was approved on or about November 15, 2012 and he was nominated by the Province of Saskatchewan under the National Occupation Code 6242 (Cook) in the "Workers With Job Offers" category.
8     The applicant continued working at Heaven's Taste until January 2013.
9     In May 2013, the applicant submitted an application to CIC for permanent residence as a provincial nominee [the application]. A notice dated September 13, 3013 advised that CIC had received the application on June 14, 2013. He later received a second notice from CIC, dated August 12, 2013, advising that his file was considered complete and that it would be forwarded to a local visa office for processing.
10     On October 8, 2013, the applicant received two emails from the Hong Kong visa office [the visa office]. The first email [Email 1] was a procedural fairness letter stating that it appeared that the applicant may not meet the requirements for immigration to Canada. These concerns were eventually resolved.
11     The second CIC email [Email 2], dated October 8, 2013, requested a number of specific documents for the applicant, all of which were later supplied by the applicant. However, it also requested that Ms. Li provide the following documents: police clearance certificates from the PRC and Macau, newly completed AFI, newly completed Schedule A, and employment reference letter, records and job contract from her employer in Macau for a number of years. Email 2 noted that these documents were required in order for CIC to continue processing the application and must be received by November 7, 2013.
12     In his reply, with respect to the information requested on his wife, the applicant stated that he and Ms. Li had been formally separated since September 30, 2013. The applicant indicated that there was no hope for reconciliation and that Ms. Li no longer wished to reside in Canada. Accordingly, he did not provide any of the requested documents related to Ms. Li and requested that she be removed from the application. Counsel attached an "IMM-0008" form to reflect the applicant's change in marital status and address changes.
13     The applicant received an email from the visa office on November 19, 2013 [Email 3], requesting the applicant to provide the requested documents pertaining to Ms. Li. The officer stated that Ms. Li remained an eligible dependent on the application because their relationship had not been legally severed, so it was still necessary for the visa office to establish that she is not inadmissible to Canada and meets the requirements of the Act.
14     In responding to another email from the visa office on November 20, 2013 [Email 4], requesting further information regarding the documentation for Ms. Li, the applicant's counsel indicated that she was "only...willing to cooperate with [the officer's] request for examination to a limited extent." Ms. Li had obtained the PRC police clearance since this "posed little inconvenience" to her and the applicant included a copy of that document, requesting a further 30-day extension to provide the original document. The applicant stated that Ms. Li was not willing to obtain the Macau police clearance because it would require her to personally travel to Macau and she had no local contacts there to make the request on her behalf. The applicant and his counsel had prepared the Schedule A and AFI forms for Ms. Li but she had not yet returned the signed forms, so counsel attached copies of the unexecuted forms to the letter. The applicant requested a further 60-day extension to provide the Macau police clearance and executed forms for Ms. Li, submitting that this was warranted in the circumstances as Ms. Li intended on divorcing from the applicant and no longer wished to be included on the application.
15     On December 31, 2013, the applicant submitted the original PRC clearance certificates for himself and Ms. Li to the visa office.
III. Impugned Decision
16     In a notice dated February 26, 2014, the officer refused the application for permanent residence for failure to provide the documentation for Ms. Li that was requested in the October 8, 2013 and November 19, 2013 emails. The officer cited subsections 11(1) and 16(1) of the Act and paragraph 70(1)(e) of the Regulations as the statutory basis for this decision.
17     The officer summarized the communications between the applicant and the visa office, noting in particular that no evidence had been submitted by the applicant's immigration consultant to show that he and Ms. Li had legally severed their relationship or that they were in that process and they were "not just physically separated from each other as a result of [the applicant's temporary] employment in Canada."
18     The officer stated that the visa office had not received "any information or reliable evidence ... clarifying your dependent wife's past employment as a "Worker" in Macau nor her Macau police certificate" to date. The officer noted that the applicant had been provided with a link to a CIC webpage containing instructions on how to apply for police certificates from various countries (including Macau) and that that webpage clearly indicates that one may apply for a Macau police certificate via a representative with written permission.
19     The officer concluded as follows:

·        In conclusion, you have been provided with ample time and opportunities to submit your dependent wife's Macau police certificate and to clarify her employment as a "Worker" in Macau from JUN08 to JUL09. I am not satisfied with the reasons provided for your dependent wife's reluctance to apply for a Macau police certificate as requested by this office. You have been advised in our emails sent to you that failure to submit the requested documentation and/or information could result in the refusal of your application. Based on all available documentation and information, I am not satisfied that your dependent wife is not inadmissible to Canada. As a result, I am not satisfied that you and your dependents meet the requirements of this Act for the reasons set out above. I am therefore refusing your application pursuant to subsection 11(1) of the Act. 

·        [Emphasis added.] 
20     On May 2, 2014, the applicant submitted a request for reconsideration to the visa office on the basis that his divorce from Ms. Li had been finalized on March 26, 2014. In support of this request, the applicant included a covering letter from counsel explaining the situation, as well as a copy of the PRC Certificate of Divorce and an English translation thereof.
21     On June 22, 2014, the officer refused the request for reconsideration on the basis that the applicant had numerous opportunities to comply with the officer's requests and that the applicant had at no time advised the visa office that he had undertaken divorce proceedings.
IV. Statutory Provisions
22     The following provisions of the Act are applicable in these proceedings:

·        Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 

·        2. (2) Unless otherwise indicated, references in this Act to "this Act" include regulations made under it and instructions given under subsection 14.1(1). 
[...]

·        11. (1) A foreign national must, before entering Canada, apply to an officer for a visa or for any other document required by the regulations. The visa or document may be issued if, following an examination, the officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act.
[...]

·        16. (1) A person who makes an application must answer truthfully all questions put to them for the purpose of the examination and must produce a visa and all relevant evidence and documents that the officer reasonably requires.
[...]

·        42. (1) A foreign national, other than a protected person, is inadmissible on grounds of an inadmissible family member if 

·        (a) 
their accompanying family member or, in prescribed circumstances, their non-accompanying family member is inadmissible;
[...]
[Emphasis added.]
* * *

·        Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés, LC 2001, ch 27 

·        2. (2) Sauf disposition contraire de la présente loi, toute mention de celle-ci vaut également mention des règlements pris sous son régime et des instructions données en vertu du paragraphe 14.1(1). 
[...]

·        11. (1) L'étranger doit, préalablement à son entrée au Canada, demander à l'agent les visa et autres documents requis par règlement. L'agent peut les délivrer sur preuve, à la suite d'un contrôle, que l'étranger n'est pas interdit de territoire et se conforme à la présente loi.
[...]

·        16. (1) L'auteur d'une demande au titre de la présente loi doit répondre véridiquement aux questions qui lui sont posées lors du contrôle, donner les renseignements et tous éléments de preuve pertinents et présenter les visa et documents requis.
[...]

·        42. (1) Emportent, sauf pour le résident permanent ou un personne protégée, interdiction de territoire pour inadmissibilité familiale les faits suivants: 

·        a) 
l'interdiction de territoire frappant tout membre de sa famille qui l'accompagne ou qui, dans les cas règlementaires, ne l'accompagne pas
[...]
[Je souligne.]
23     The following provisions of the Immigration and Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [the Regulations] are applicable in these proceedings:

·        Immigration and Protection Regulations, SOR/ 2002-227 

·        23. For the purposes of paragraph 42(1)(a) of the Act, the prescribed circumstances in which the foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of an inadmissible non-accompanying family member are that

·        (a) 
the foreign national is a temporary resident or has made an application for temporary resident status, an application for a permanent resident visa or an application to remain in Canada as a temporary or permanent resident; and 

·        (b) 
the non-accompanying family member is

·        (i) 
the spouse of the foreign national, except where the relationship between the spouse and foreign national has broken down in law or in fact, 

·        (ii) 
the common-law partner of the foreign national, 
[...]

·        70. (1) An officer shall issue a permanent resident visa to a foreign national if, following an examination, it is established that 
[...]

·        (e) 
the foreign national and their family members, whether accompanying or not, are not inadmissible. 
[...]

·        87. (12) A foreign national who is an accompanying family member of a person who makes an application as a member of the provincial nominee class shall become a permanent resident if, following an examination, it is established that 

·        a) 
the person who made the application has become a permanent resident; and 

·        b) 
the foreign national is not inadmissible.
Emphasis added.]
* * *

·        Règlement sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés, DORS/2002-227 

·        23. Pour l'application de l'alinéa 42(1)a) de la Loi, l'interdiction de territoire frappant le membre de la famille de l'étranger qui ne l'accompagne pas emporte interdiction de territoire de l'étranger pour inadmissibilité familiale si

·        a) 
l'étranger est un résident temporaire ou a fait une demande de statut de résident temporaire, de visa de résident permanent ou de séjour au Canada à titre de résident temporaire ou de résident permanent; 

·        b) 
le membre de la famille en cause est, selon le cas

·        (i) 
l'époux de l'étranger, sauf si la relation entre celui-ci et l'étranger est terminée, en droit ou en fait, 

·        (ii) 
le conjoint de fait de l'étranger, 
[...]

·        70. (1) L'agent délivre un visa de résident permanent à l'étranger si, à l'issue d'un contrôle, les éléments suivants sont établis: 
[...]

·        e) 
ni lui ni les membres de sa famille, qu'ils l'accompagnent ou non, ne sont interdits de territoire. 
[...]

·        87. (12) L'étranger qui est un membre de la famille et qui accompagne la personne qui présente une demande au titre de la catégorie des candidats des provinces devient résident permanent si, à l'issue d'un contrôle, les éléments ci-après sont établis: 

·        a) 
la personne qui présente la demande est devenue résident permanent; 

·        b) 
il n'est pas interdit de territoire.
[Je souligne.]
V. Issues
24     I find for the purpose of disposing of this matter that there is only one issue, namely whether the officer misdirected himself on the law in respect of an inadmissible accompanying member, and thereby, in requesting that the applicant demonstrate that his relationship with Ms. Li had been legally severed.
VI. Standard of Review
25     The interpretation of a provision of the Act specifically providing for an exemption concerning the inadmissibility of a category of applicants seeking permanent residency in Canada by an officer exercising administrative functions with limited discretion and bearing a minimal judicial content would attract a standard of correctness: Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Shpati, 2011 FCA 286, 343 DLR (4th) 128 at para 27; Patel v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FCA 187 at paras 26-27.
VII. Analysis
26     The applicant originally submitted that the officer's request for information and documentation regarding Ms. Li's employment in Macau was unreasonable because it would not impact her admissibility to Canada and that the officer breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to respond to his reasonable requests for an extension of time. However, during the course of reviewing this case, the Court raised the issue as to whether the officer had misdirected himself by limiting the exemption to an inadmissible non-accompanying family member to demonstrating that the relationship had been "legally" severed.
27     By direction, the Court sought the submissions of the parties with respect to the interpretation of the prescribed exemption for an inadmissible non-accompanying spouse member in section 42(a) of the Act, as described in section 23(b)(i) of the Regulations. In particular, the Court sought the parties' assistance with respect to the interpretation of the wording of a relationship being "broken down in law or in fact" in section 23(b)(i).
28     In reply to the direction, the applicant submitted that the grounds of the exemption were not limited to situations where the relationship had been legally severed, but also included situations where the relationship had broken down "in fact." Because the officer never considered whether the applicant's statements about the breakdown of the relationship sufficiently demonstrated that the relationship had broken down in fact, he wrongly rejected the application for the applicant's failure to demonstrate that the relationship had been legally severed. The applicant submitted that the judicial review should be granted on that basis alone. The respondent did not reply to the specific issue of the interpretation of section 23(b)(i) of the Regulations raised by the Court's direction.
29     I agree with the submissions of the applicant. It is apparent from the ordinary meaning to be attributed to section 23(b)(i) that it was intended to provide an exemption for an inadmissible non-accompanying spouse where the relationship has broken down. This provision, which specifically refers to a spouse, is distinguishable from section 23(b)(ii), which refers to a common law partner. The distinction between these two terms is consistent throughout the Act. For example, subsection 12(1) of the Act states that a foreign national may be a member of the family class based on their relationship as a spouse or a common-law partner of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident.
30     Inasmuch as a "spouse" refers to a married person, the exemption from the inadmissibility requirement for a non-accompanying spouse may be "broken down" either in law (i.e. by a divorce) or in fact (i.e. to be determined by the circumstances described by the applicant and other evidence in support). In the latter case, the focus of the evidentiary inquiry is whether the relationship that is the basis of the marriage has come to an irreconcilable end. In my view, the intention of permitting an exemption for a non-accompanying spouse when the relationship has broken down "in fact" is to respond to the situation of the applicant, where the marriage relationship has ended, but the parties have not yet taken the formal steps to obtain a divorce. The inclusion of the words "in fact" in the section 23(b)(i) exemption contemplates the practical reality of relationship breakdowns and indicates that a certain degree of flexibility is required on the part of the officer.
31     The officer misinterpreted section 23(b)(i) by limiting its application to marriage breakdowns "in law", and in failing to consider the inclusion of the words "in fact" in the administration of the provision. In light of the evidence provided by the applicant that he and Ms. Li had formally separated since September 30, 2013, that there was no hope for reconciliation, and that Ms. Li intended on divorcing from the applicant and no longer wished to be included on the application or to reside in Canada, the officer's insistence that the applicant provide further information on Ms. Li on the basis that it had not been demonstrated that the relationship was legally severed, was clearly unreasonable. This approach reflects the officer's misapprehension of the scope of the exemption under section 23(b)(i).
32     Accordingly, the decision must be set aside and returned to another visa officer for re-determination. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the applicant's other submissions. There was no suggestion in the parties' reply to the Court's direction that a question of overriding importance was raised and none exists. There is no question for certification.
VIII. Conclusion
33     The application is allowed. The February 26, 2014 decision by the officer rejecting the applicant's application for permanent residence is set aside and the matter referred back to another officer for re-determination. There are no questions for certification.
JUDGMENT

·        THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that:

·        1. 
The application is allowed and the decision is set aside; 

·        2. 
The application for permanent residence is to be returned before another officer for reconsideration; and 

·        3. 
There are no questions for certification. 

ANNIS J.

Tuesday, March 12, 2013

MISREPRESENTATIONS KEEP FAMILY APART IN SPONSORSHIP REFUSAL

In the case below, the IAD was willing to consider H&C factors due to the criminality  of the applicant, but unfortunately his misrepresentations were considered more serious and ultimately the cause of the refusal being upheld. Applicants should never misrepresent.

Zanchetta v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between
Nadia Zanchetta, Applicant, and
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent
[2013] F.C.J. No. 215
2013 FC 195

Docket IMM-7573-12

 Federal Court
Montréal, Quebec

Shore J.


Heard: February 26, 2013.
Judgment: February 28, 2013.
(35 paras.)
Counsel:
Debbie Mankovitz, for the Applicant.
Michèle Joubert, Sonia Bédard, for the Respondent.



REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
SHORE J.:--

·       I. 
Introduction
1     The Applicant is a Canadian citizen whose spouse applied for permanent residence as a member of the family class on the basis of his relationship to the Applicant pursuant to subsection 12(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. The Applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Appeal Division [IAD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board, wherein it was determined that humanitarian and compassionate [H&C] considerations did not warrant an exemption from the inadmissibility criteria in paragraphs 36(1)(b), 36(2)(b) and 40(1)(a) of the IRPA.

·       II. 
Judicial Procedure
2     This is an application under subsection 72(1) of the IRPA for judicial review of the decision of the IAD, dated June 29, 2012.

·       III. 
Background
3     The Applicant, Ms. Nadia Zanchetta, was born in 1968 and her spouse, a citizen of the United States, was born in 1975. The Applicant and her spouse married in 2001. They have three children together, aged ten (10), six (6), and three (3), who are Canadian citizens.
4     The Applicant's spouse was convicted in New Jersey of burglary in 1995 and possession of a weapon in 1996. At the hearing, he testified that he was convicted for burglary when caught in an unattended store, the door of which was open when he entered. He alleges that he plead guilty to the offence to avoid a prison sentence. He testified that the weapon for which he was convicted of possessing was a dart pen.
5     The Applicant's spouse entered Canada as a visitor in 2005 and has been living and working illegally since 2005.

·       IV. 
Decision under Review
6     The IAD found that H&C considerations did not warrant an exemption from the inadmissibility criteria pursuant to: (i) paragraph 36(1)(b) of the IRPA, which deems foreign nationals inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality if they have been convicted of an offence outside Canada that would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten (10) years if committed in Canada; (ii) paragraph 36(2)(b) of the IRPA, which deems foreign nationals inadmissible on grounds of criminality if they have been convicted outside Canada of an offence that would constitute an indictable office under an Act of Parliament if committed in Canada or of two offences not arising out of a single occurrence that would constitute offences under an Act of Parliament if committed in Canada; and, (iii) paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA, which deems foreign nationals inadmissible for misrepresentation for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in administering the IRPA.
7     The IAD noted that paragraphs 36(1)(b) and 36(2)(b) applied because: (i) committing burglary (of a dwelling-house) is an indictable offence subject to imprisonment for life or (of a place other than a dwelling-house) an indictable offence subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years under section 348 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Code]; and, (ii) possessing weapons or devices knowing one does not hold a license is an indictable offence subject to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years under subsection 92(2) of the Code.
8     The IAD did not accept that the Applicant's spouse was convicted of possessing a dart pen as the Applicant did not present evidence supporting this allegation.
9     The IAD held that paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA applied due to the following misrepresentations and withholdings of material fact that did or could have induced an error in the administration of the IRPA: (i) giving false residential information and cohabitation dates and information concealing that the Applicant's spouse was living illegally in Canada; (ii) giving false employment information concealing his illegal employment; and, (iii) giving false information with regard to travelling between Canada and the United States.
10     The IAD held that, if criminality were the only ground of inadmissibility, the family situation of the Applicant's spouse would militate in his favour, despite his crimes; however, as he came without "clean hands", "demonstrated a blatant disregard for the law" (para 14), and intentionally sought to mislead immigration authorities, the IAD would not grant discretionary relief. The IAD was persuaded by his failure to correct his immigration status earlier and pay taxes in Canada or the United States.
11     On the best interests of the Applicant's spouse's children, the IAD accepted that they would benefit from the continued presence of their father and would be prejudiced by his removal. This factor, however, was insufficient since the Applicant's spouse could continue to provide for his family in the United States and there was no evidence before the IAD that the family could not live with him in the United States or that they could not visit him. The IAD stressed that the best interests of any child directly affected by a decision is a factor to be considered seriously but was not dispositive.
12     On the basis of the misrepresentations and withholdings of material fact, the IAD found that the Applicant lacked credibility. The IAD did not believe the Applicant's explanation that her spouse did not understand the distinction between his mailing and residential addresses when completing his forms or her characterization of his misrepresentations as mistakes.

·       V. 
Issues
13     

·       (1) 
Was the IAD's equivalency analysis reasonable? 
·       (2) 
Was the IAD's analysis of the H&C factors reasonable? 

·       VI. 
Relevant Legislative Provisions
14     The following legislative provisions of the IRPA are relevant:

·       25. (1) Subject to subsection (1.2), the Minister must, on request of a foreign national in Canada who applies for permanent resident status and who is inadmissible or does not meet the requirements of this Act, and may, on request of a foreign national outside Canada who applies for a permanent resident visa, examine the circumstances concerning the foreign national and may grant the foreign national permanent resident status or an exemption from any applicable criteria or obligations of this Act if the Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by humanitarian and compassionate considerations relating to the foreign national, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected. 

·       ... 

·       36. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for 

·       ... 

·       (b) having been convicted of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or 

·       ... 

·       (2) 
A foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of criminality for 

·       ... 

·       (b) having been convicted outside Canada of an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an indictable offence under an Act of Parliament, or of two offences not arising out of a single occurrence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute offences under an Act of Parliament; 

·       ... 

·       40. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible for misrepresentation 

·       (a) for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act; 

·       ... 
* * *

·       25. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (1.2), le ministre doit, sur demande d'un étranger se trouvant au Canada qui demande le statut de résident permanent et qui soit est interdit de territoire, soit ne se conforme pas à la présente loi, et peut, sur demande d'un étranger se trouvant hors du Canada qui demande un visa de résident permanent, étudier le cas de cet étranger; il peut lui octroyer le statut de résident permanent ou lever tout ou partie des critères et obligations applicables, s'il estime que des considérations d'ordre humanitaire relatives à l'étranger le justifient, compte tenu de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant directement touché. 

·       [...] 

·       36. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité les faits suivants : 

·       [...] 

·       b) être déclaré coupable, à l'extérieur du Canada, d'une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans; 

·       [...] 

·       (2) 
Emportent, sauf pour le résident permanent, interdiction de territoire pour criminalité les faits suivants : 

·       [...] 

·       b) être déclaré coupable, à l'extérieur du Canada, d'une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable par mise en accusation ou de deux infractions qui ne découlent pas des mêmes faits et qui, commises au Canada, constitueraient des infractions à des lois fédérales; 

·       [...] 

·       40. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour fausses déclarations les faits suivants : 

·       a) directement ou indirectement, faire une présentation erronée sur un fait important quant à un objet pertinent, ou une réticence sur ce fait, ce qui entraîne ou risque d'entraîner une erreur dans l'application de la présente loi; 

·       [...] 

·       VII. 
Position of the Parties
15     The Applicant submits that the IAD's decision is unreasonable because it does not analyze the factors [Ribic factors] in Ribic v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] IABD No 4, and endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Chieu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 SCR 84. The Applicant also contends that the IAD failed to apply the relevant H&C factors, a balancing of which operates in her spouse's favour.
16     The Applicant claims the IAD minimized the best interests of the children by paying lip service to this factor without examining and weighing it. According to the Applicant, her spouse's criminal history and the misinformation on his immigration forms does not outweigh the best interests of the children, nor does his illegal employment militate against relief since he was employed to support his family.
17     Finally, the Applicant claims that the IAD was not open to hearing further evidence as to whether her family could relocate to the United States and in regard to her father's illness.
18     The Respondent counters that the IAD implicitly examined the Ribic factors but was not obliged to conduct a point-by-point analysis, that the Applicant merely disagrees with the weight the IAD gave to the Ribic factors and the evidence, and that this Court is not permitted to reweigh the evidence. The Respondent further submits that the IAD was required to consider the immigration history of the Applicant's spouse.

·       VIII. 
Analysis
Standard of Review
19     The IAD's equivalency analysis of the New Jersey law under which the Applicant's spouse was convicted is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness (Sayer v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 144). The IAD's analysis of the H&C factors, including the best interests of the child, is also reviewable on this standard (Sinniah v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1285).
20     Where reasonableness applies, the Court may only intervene if the IAD's reasons are not "justified, transparent or intelligible". A reasonable decision must fall in the "range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law" (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 at para 47).

·       (1) 
Was the IAD's equivalency analysis reasonable
21     The Applicant's spouse was convicted of burglary pursuant to Article 2C:18-2 of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice [Jersey Code] and possessing certain weapons under Article 2C:39-3(e) of the Jersey Code (Certified Tribunal Record [CTR] at p 73).
22     Article 2C:18-2 of the Jersey Code defines burglary to mean entering or surreptitiously remaining in, and with a purpose to commit an offence, a research facility, structure, or a separately secured or occupied portion thereof (CTR at p 76). It was reasonable to find this prohibition analogous to section 348 of the Code, which prohibits breaking and entering a place with intent to commit an indictable offence therein. Since section 348 is an indictable offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten (10) years, the IAD reasonably found the Applicant's spouse criminally inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 36(1)(b) of the IRPA.
23     Article 2C:39-3(e) of the Jersey Code prohibits knowingly possessing any gravity knife, switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, metal knuckle, sandclub, slingshot, cestus or similar leather band studded with metal filings of razor blades imbedded in wood, ballistic knife, without any explainable lawful purpose (CTR at p 77). It would be reasonable to consider this analogous to subsection 92(2) of the Code, which prohibits possessing a prohibited weapon or device by a person knowing they do not hold a license. Subsection 92(2) Code is an indictable offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten (10) years. It was reasonable to determine the Applicant's spouse criminally inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 36(1)(b) of the IRPA.
24     The Applicant's submission that her husband was convicted for having a dart pen, which is not a prohibited weapon or device under the Code, was not supported by other evidence. It would be reasonable to accord little weight to this submission.

·       (2) 
Was the IAD's analysis of the H&C factors, including the best interests of the child, reasonable
25     The Ribic factors apply to determine if H&C considerations warrant an exemption from the inadmissibility provisions in paragraphs 36(1)(b) and 36(2)(b) of the IRPA and paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA (Tabuyo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 425 at para 10; Palmer v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 1277). The IAD, however, is not obliged to conduct an express, point-by-point analysis of the Ribic factors (Iamkhong v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 355, 286 FTR 297 at para 43).
26     While the IAD did not expressly cite the Ribic factors, it considered them implicitly by noting the seriousness of the spouse's offences and misrepresentations, the hardship on him and his family that would result from his removal, and the possibility of reunion in the United States (Decision at para 12 and 29).
27     In reviewing the IAD's implicit analysis of the Ribic factors, this Court recalls that these factors are non-exhaustive and their weight, discretionary and that the "weight to be accorded to any particular factor will vary according to the particular circumstances of a case" (Philistin v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 1333 at para 17; Chieu, above at para 40).
28     The Ribic factors require the IAD to consider the seriousness of the criminal offences, likelihood of rehabilitation and the seriousness of the misrepresentations (Tabuyo, above, at para 12-14; Patel v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 686 at para 32). The criminal offences at issue occurred almost twenty (20) years ago, when the Applicant's spouse was young, and are not of such severity to find that he could not have rehabilitated. It would be reasonable to conclude that the seriousness of the criminal offences would militate in his favour. In finding that these offences on their own, attract "leniency", the IAD essentially made this finding (at para 12).
29     It was, however, reasonable to conclude that the misrepresentations of the Applicant and her spouse are serious since they undermine the integrity of the IRPA.
30     While the Applicant's spouse had been illegally living, working, and cohabiting with the Applicant since 2005, he stated on his application for permanent residence that: (i) his residential address was in North Carolina; (ii) he had been unemployed since 2005; (iii) he lived from 2000 until the date of the application in North Carolina and omitted any Canadian addresses held in this period; (iv) he lived with his brother and parents in the United States but traveling to live with his wife in Canada between 1999 and 2009; and (v) he cohabited with his spouse in the 1998 - 1999 period but was not currently living with the Applicant on the date of the application (CTR at pp 40, 43, 45, 53 and 120). From these representations, it was reasonable to conclude that the Applicant's spouse was directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding the material facts of his illegal sojourn and employment in Canada, matters that could induce an error in the administration of the IRPA. Even the fourth misrepresentation engages paragraph 40(1)(a) of the IRPA since it suggests that the Applicant's spouse only lived with his wife in Canada occasionally and that he lived permanently in the United States; this misrepresentation withholds the material fact of his illegal sojourn in Canada. In light of this pattern of misrepresentations, the IAD could reasonably disbelieve the Applicant's explanation that her spouse misunderstood the distinction between mailing and residential addresses.
31     It was reasonable to give little weight to the length of time the Applicant's spouse spent in Canada, his degree of establishment, the degree of community support for him, the impact of his deportation on his family, and the hardship that his removal would cause. Since the Applicant can return to the United States, it was reasonable to conclude that none of these factors establish disproportionate hardship. While the Applicant's family depends economically on her spouse, it was reasonable to find this a neutral factor since he can legally work in the United States. Similarly, it is in the acceptable spectrum of choices to infer from the geographic and cultural proximity of the United States that his removal would cause some hardship but not unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship. The jurisprudence is clear that hardship must rise to a level of unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship (Ambassa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 158 at para 46).
32     As for the Applicant's father's health issues, this Court observes that decision-makers may reasonably give little weight to health issues unsupported by medical evidence (Koonjoo v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 1211, 298 FTR 255 at para 22). The Applicant mentioned her father's health issues at the hearing before the IAD but the record shows that no attempt was made on her part to present medical evidence in support of her allegations.
33     Finally, the IAD must be "alert, alive and sensitive" to the best interests of affected children in disposing of H&C requests (Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 75). In Hawthorne v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 475, [2003] 2 FC 555, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the best interests of the child under subsection 25(1) of the IRPA is applied "by considering the benefit to the child of the parent's non-removal from Canada as well as the hardship the child would suffer from either her parent's removal from Canada or her own voluntary departure should she wish to accompany her parent abroad" and weighing hardship "with other factors, including public policy considerations, that militate in favour of or against the removal of the parent" (at para 4 and 6). The Federal Court of Appeal stated, in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Legault, 2002 FCA 125, [2002] 4 FC 358, that the presence of children is not dispositive and only one factor a decision-maker must consider and weigh (at para 12).
34     The IAD was reasonable to conclude that "in the circumstances of this case, [the best interests of the child] factor in and of itself, [was] an insufficient [H&C] consideration" (at para 28). The panel member found that there would be a benefit to the children in having their father in Canada and that his removal would be to their prejudice. Nonetheless, the IAD was entitled to weigh this factor against the strong public policy considerations militating in the disfavour of the Applicant's spouse; namely, his misrepresentations that undermined the integrity of Canadian immigration laws. In light of the geographic and cultural proximity of Canada and the United States, it would not be unreasonable to find that these public policy considerations outweighed the best interests of the children. In any event, this Court is not permitted to re-weigh the H&C factors that have been considered and weighed by a decision-maker (Kisana v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FCA 189, [2010] 1 FCR 360 at para 24).

·       IX. 
Conclusion
35     For all of the above reasons, the Applicant's application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicant's application for judicial review be dismissed. No question of general importance for certification.
SHORE J.
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