Showing posts with label medical inadmissibility excessive demand. Show all posts
Showing posts with label medical inadmissibility excessive demand. Show all posts

Saturday, February 23, 2013

FAILURE TO PRESENT CREDIBLE CARE PLAN RESULTS IN REFUSAL FOR STROKE PATIENT

Medical grounds refusals are very complex, but the bottom line is this: an applicant beard the burden of proving that he has a credible medical plan to pay for expenses associated with his care in Canada. The Federal Court case below illustrates this point:



Ma v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between Ma, Yan Bin, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2013] F.C.J. No. 135

2013 FC 131

Docket IMM-5178-12

 Federal Court
Montréal, Quebec

Noël J.


Heard: January 22, 2013.
Judgment: February 7, 2013.

(33 paras.)


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

1     NOEL J.:-- This is an application by Yan Bin Ma, challenging a decision by a Visa Officer dated April 10, 2012, dismissing his application for a permanent resident visa for Canada in the Economic Immigration Class on the ground that his health condition might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services.

I. Facts

2     The Applicant is a 49 year-old Chinese citizen, married, father of two children aged 18 and 25. He applied for landing in Canada as an investor and satisfied the Visa Officer that he has assets worth 3,81 million dollars. His application was received on January 30, 2008 at the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong.

3     On September 12, 2008, the Applicant and his family were required to undertake a medical examination. On August 28, 2009, the Visa Officer received a copy of a Medical Notification dated August 26, 2009 indicating that the Applicant has a medical condition (Cerebrovascular Disease - Late Effects). In November 2008, he suffered a stroke that resulted in walking difficulties and that affected his speech. In the report, the medical officer concluded that he has a "health condition that might reasonably be expected to require services, the costs of which would likely exceed the average Canadian per capita costs over 5 years and would add to existing waiting lists and delay or deny the provision of these services to those in Canada who need and are entitled to them." The medical officer added that as a result of his condition, the Applicant will need respite care, speech and language, occupational and vocational training which will incur costs of $6500. The medical officer concluded that the Applicant is inadmissible on the basis of section 38 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 ["IRPA"].

4     The Applicant was sent a fairness letter dated September 8, 2009 advising him of the medical officer's assessment. He was invited to submit additional information relating to his health condition, which he did. In response to the letter, on October 21, 2009, the Applicant sent additional documentation consisting of a notarized declaration dated October 12, 2009 and a Diagnosis Examination Report issued by the Linyi City People's Hospital dated October 17, 2009. Such report was sent to the Respondent's medical officer for assessment, who indicated that the new material had no impact on his initial assessment of the Applicant's health condition.

5     The notarized declaration reads as follows:

 

·       "In light of my current health condition, I hereof make the solemn statement that if I pass the immigration application and get the immigration visa, I would bear all the medical costs and other expenses related to the stroke in my future life in Canada and will not burden the Canadian government." 

6     On May 12, 2010, a second procedural fairness letter was sent to the Applicant, addressing the deficiencies of the previous procedural fairness letter, inviting the Applicant to submit additional evidence with regard to his medical condition, the social services needed in Canada, an individualized plan to offset the excessive demand on social services and a signed Declaration of Ability and Intent.

7     On July 7, 2010, the Applicant sent to the Visa Officer a proof of assets in his name and his dependant wife's name, a signed Declaration of Ability and Intent, a written statement dated July 7, 2010 jointly signed by them, in which he explains that his wife will assist him in rehabilitation, that he is responding well to the treatments as he is making constant efforts and exercises to improve his health condition. He also adds that he is willing and has the ability to pay all the expenses arising from professional services. He also submitted a Diagnosis Certificate issued by a physician from the Linyi City People's Hospital on June 25, 2010. The Diagnosis Certificate was sent to the medical officer who concluded that it did not change the assessment of medical inadmissibility.

II. Decision under review

8     The decision by the Officer consists of the refusal letter dated April 10, 2012 as well as his CAIPS notes.

9     In the refusal letter, the Visa Officer explained that the Applicant is inadmissible because he has a medical condition, Cerebrovascular Disease - Late Effects: Status post-cerebrovascular accident, and therefore needs respite care and outpatient day programs in the nature of physiotherapy, speech and language, occupational and vocational training, the current estimated annual cost of which, in Canada, is $6500, the "excessive demand cost threshold" for him being of $6141. The social services costs required for the Applicant therefore exceed the threshold by $359 per year.

10     The Visa Officer recognized that the Applicant has assets controlled by him or his wife amounting to 3,81 million dollars and that he would have the financial ability to pay for the costs of the social services. However, he refused the Applicant's plan by concluding that the Applicant has not demonstrated that he has a "reasonable and workable plan to offset the excessive demand" on Canadian social services nor "the actual intention to implement such a plan mitigating these costs."

III. Relevant statutory provisions

11     The relevant statutory provisions read as follows:

 

·       Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 

 

·       Health Grounds

 

·       38. (1) A foreign national is inadmissible on health grounds if their health condition 

 

·       [...] 

 

·       (c) might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services 

 

·       [...] 

 

·       Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 

 

·       Definitions

 

·       1. 

(1) The definitions in this subsection apply in the Act and in these Regulations. 

[...]

"excessive demand" means

 

·       (a) 

a demand on health services or social services for which the anticipated costs would likely exceed average Canadian per capita health services and social services costs over a period of five consecutive years immediately following the most recent medical examination required under paragraph 16(2)(b) of the Act, unless there is evidence that significant costs are likely to be incurred beyond that period, in which case the period is no more than 10 consecutive years; or 

·       (b) 

a demand on health services or social services that would add to existing waiting lists and would increase the rate of mortality and morbidity in Canada as a result of an inability to provide timely services to Canadian citizens or permanent residents. 

[...]

Assessment of inadmissibility on health grounds

 

·       20. An officer shall determine that a foreign national is inadmissible on health grounds if an assessment of their health condition has been made by an officer who is responsible for the application of sections 29 to 34 and the officer concluded that the foreign national's health condition is likely to be a danger to public health or public safety or might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand. 

* * *

 

·       Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés, LC 2001, ch 27 

 

·       Motifs sanitaires

 

·       38. (1) Emporte, sauf pour le résident permanent, interdiction de territoire pour motifs sanitaires l'état de santé de l'étranger constituant vraisemblablement un danger pour la santé ou la sécurité publiques ou risquant d'entraîner un fardeau excessif pour les services sociaux ou de santé. 

 

·       [...] 

 

·       Règlement sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés, DORS/2002-227 

 

·       Définitions

 

·       1. 

(1) Les définitions qui suivent s'appliquent à la Loi et au présent règlement. 

[...]

"fardeau excessif" Se dit :

 

·       a) 

de toute charge pour les services sociaux ou les services de santé dont le coût prévisible dépasse la moyenne, par habitant au Canada, des dépenses pour les services de santé et pour les services sociaux sur une période de cinq années consécutives suivant la plus récente visite médicale exigée en application du paragraphe 16(2) de la Loi ou, s'il y a lieu de croire que des dépenses importantes devront probablement être faites après cette période, sur une période d'au plus dix années consécutives; 

·       b) 

de toute charge pour les services sociaux ou les services de santé qui viendrait allonger les listes d'attente actuelles et qui augmenterait le taux de mortalité et de morbidité au Canada vu l'impossibilité d'offrir en temps voulu ces services aux citoyens canadiens ou aux résidents permanents. 

[...]

Évaluation pour motifs sanitaires

 

·       20. L'agent chargé du contrôle conclut à l'interdiction de territoire de l'étranger pour motifs sanitaires si, à l'issue d'une évaluation, l'agent chargé de l'application des articles 29 à 34 a conclu que l'état de santé de l'étranger constitue vraisemblablement un danger pour la santé ou la sécurité publiques ou risque d'entraîner un fardeau excessif. 

IV. Applicant's submissions

12     The Applicant generally submits that the Visa Officer's decision is unreasonable as he has established that he is in a financial position to mitigate the costs of the social services needed whether they amount to $6,500 or only $359 a year. The Applicant bases his argument on the fact that in Hilewitz v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 57, [2005] 2 SCR 706 [Hilewitz], the Supreme Court of Canada established that "excessive demand" is "inherently evaluative and comparative" and that therefore, the financial ability of the Applicant to cover the excessive costs needs to be taken into account. As the Visa Officer recognized that the Applicant has established having assets worth 3,81 million dollars, it is unreasonable to find that he has not submitted a detailed plan of action to defray the excessive costs of social services while in Canada.

13     Indeed, the Applicant submits that contrary to the Visa Officer's conclusion, he has demonstrated that he has "taken action" to develop a cost mitigation plan by submitting a notarized declaration confirming his intention to allocate his assets to his recovery as well as a list of assets which establish his financial ability to do so. Therefore, his plan is lengthy and detailed and he relies on Velasquez Perez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1336 at para 33, 215 ACWS (3d) 185 [Velasquez Perez] to argue that his plan should be considered sufficient.

14     Second, the Applicant is of the view that the fact that the Applicant's wife will assist him has not been given proper consideration by the Visa Officer.

15     Third, the Applicant argues that the Visa Officer's finding that he did not contact Canadian physicians in order to understand the "medical" services that he will be needing in Canada and that he did not provide a list of the services required while in Canada is erroneous as he explained that he contacted a physician from Vancouver.

16     Finally, the Applicant submits that the Visa Officer made an error in his decision as he did not make a distinction between social services and health services, which is important as some social services are not covered by the state.

V. Respondent's submissions

17     The Respondent generally submits that a mere undertaking by the Applicant that he will defray the excessive demand on social services as he has enough funds available to him is insufficient. Indeed, a plan to mitigate the excessive costs of social services needed by an Applicant with a health condition must be complete, developed and certain and must not be speculative in order to satisfy the government that likely "excessive demand" will be avoided. The plan provided by the Applicant was rightly found insufficient for the following reasons.

18     First, the Applicant did not submit concrete evidence to support his intention to arrange and pay for social services and he did not demonstrate that he has researched the types of services needed, the availability of such services and the costs of such services or that he has made arrangements with service providers in Canada.

19     Moreover, the Applicant adds that it has been recognized by this Court that personal undertakings not to use public social services are not enforceable in Canada and that a mere statement is therefore insufficient.

20     Finally, even if his own resources would allow him to offset the excessive demand, the Applicant has not established that the private sector does provide such services.

21     With regard to the Applicant's assertion that his wife will assist him and that this will reduce the demand on social services, the Applicant has not explained in details to what extent the help provided by his wife would reduce or eliminate the role, function and contributions of the trained and specialized professionals.

VI. Issue

22     Does the Visa Officer's decision, through the assessment of the medical officer, constitute a reasonable finding that the Applicant is inadmissible pursuant to aparagraph 38(1)a(c) of the aIRPAa?

VII. Standard of review

23     The Visa Officer's factual findings should be reviewed under the standard of reasonableness (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir]).

VIII. Analysis

24     The decision rendered by the Visa Officer is reasonable and therefore, the intervention of this Court is not warranted.

25     The Applicant's request for permanent residence was refused on the basis that the Applicant was not able to satisfy the Visa Officer that he had a concrete plan to offset the excessive costs of social services required by his health condition and that he did not demonstrate having the intention to do so. Considering the evidence submitted to the Visa Officer which formed the basis of his decision, such conclusion falls within "a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law" [see Dunsmuir, above]. Indeed, the documents submitted by the Applicant were rightly found to be insufficient to demonstrate that there is less than a reasonable probability that the public system will have to incur excessive demand (Hilewitz v Canada (Minister Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 SCC 57 at para 46, [2005] 2 SCR 706 [Hilewitz]).

26     First, it has been recognized that a letter of intent that confirms one's intention not to burden the public system, when that individual has the financial capacity to pay for all services publicly accessible to all is insufficient as such document is not enforceable in Canada (see Deol v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 271 at para 46, 215 DLR (4th) 675; Choi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 29 Imm LR (2d) 85 at para 33, 98 FTR 308). Therefore, a mere personal undertaking to waive all rights to social services cannot be considered to be sufficiently reliable so that the application should be granted.

27     The Applicant's Personal Plan and other documents submitted were not found to be satisfactory by the Visa Officer as they did not demonstrate a clear intention not to burden the public system with the excessive costs of social services. Indeed, there is no indication that he has made arrangements with professionals who work in the private sector and who could provide the services that he needs. In his Personal Plan, the Applicant indicated that he contacted a physician in Vancouver for professional advices but he did not provide detailed information.

28     Moreover, the argument by the Respondent that the Applicant has not demonstrated to which extent the help provided by his wife will reduce the work required from trained professionals is accepted by this Court. Indeed, the Applicant states in his Personal Plan that his wife will provide assistance to him but this does not establish clearly that it will reduce the Applicant's demand for social services provided by trained professionals.

29     Contrary to what is alleged by the Applicant, the issue is not about whether or not the Visa Officer disregarded the Applicant's financial situation but about whether or not he submitted a plan that demonstrates that there is less than a reasonable probability that the public system will incur the excessive costs of social services required by him. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hilewitz, above, the financial situation of an applicant is a relevant factor to be examined when determining the probabilities that an Applicant's presence would place excessive demands on our social services. However, unlike the Applicant's argument, this case does not stand for the proposition that financial capacity is the most important factor to be considered. Therefore, the Officer's concern is not restricted to an assessment of the Applicant's financial capacity to incur costs of $359 for social services. The issue at play is whether the Applicant has demonstrated that he has the intention to allocate his resources to pay for those services with a precise, serious and comprehensive multi-service health recovery plan.

30     The Applicant relies on Velasquez Perez, above, a decision where the Federal Court decided that the Visa Officer's conclusion was unreasonable as he had ignored the Applicant's financial ability to pay for social services and that the decision was not based on all the available information. In the case at bar, the Visa Officer gave proper consideration to the Applicant's established ability to defray the social services that are required but however concluded that his application did not establish clearly that he would not burden the excessive demand on social services.

31     Finally, it is important to underline that it is the Applicant who bears the onus of demonstrating that he is not inadmissible, once a negative medical assessment has been completed (Zhang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1093 at para 20, 2012 CarswellNat 3526). In the present case, the Applicant was given two fairness letters which allowed him to make clear additional submissions and to submit additional documents. Therefore, the Applicant was asked repeatedly by the Officer to submit convincing evidence demonstrating a clear intention not to burden the public system but no additional, satisfactory evidence was provided.

32     In conclusion, the Visa Officer properly assessed the Applicant's health condition to conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the public system will incur the excessive costs of social services required by him.

33     No questions for certification were proposed by the parties and none will be certified.

JUDGMENT

THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is dismissed. No question is certified.

NOEL J.

Friday, March 5, 2010

COURTS STRUGGLE WITH MEDICAL INADMISSIBILITY, HIV AND EXCESSIVE DEMAND ISSUES

This is a just released, very interesting case, summarizing the state of the law with respect to the issue of "Excessive demand on medical services". This is part of the ongoing saga where courts continue to struggle to define what constitutes "excessive demand" on the health care system. In this case, the court refused to review the application by an HIV positive Skilled Worker whose medication now costs US $ 10,000 a year, but could potentially cost more in the future if his response to current medication diminishes. As I noted in my interview with Canwest News Service ( see article posted last week), the court correctly notes that a promise to pay for medical costs conflicts with the availability of medical coverage in Canada's provincial health plans, to which all residents are entitled, and once the applicant becomes a resident, there is nothing to prevent him or her from seeking coverage by the public plan, thus making its promise to pay meaningless and unenforceable. Therefore the Federal Court (Trial Division) dismissed the applicant's judicial review but agreed to certify a question to be decided shortly by the Federal Court of Appeal, as follows:

"When a medical officer has determined that an applicant will be in need of prescription drugs, the cost of which would place the applicant over the threshold of "excessive demand" as set out in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, must a visa officer assess the applicant's ability to pay for the prescription drugs privately when those same drugs are covered by a government program for which the applicant would be eligible in the province/territory of intended residence? "


Rashid v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

BetweenAl-Karim Ebrahim Rashid, Applicant,
and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2010] F.C.J. No. 183

2010 FC 157Docket IMM-4737-08 Federal CourtToronto, OntarioMosley J.Heard: January 26, 2010.Judgment: February 16, 2010.

(36 paras.)


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

1 MOSLEY J.:-- This is an application for judicial review pursuant to section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) of the decision made on September 18, 2008 at the High Commission of Canada in Nairobi, Kenya, by visa officer C. Glover who found the applicant to be medically inadmissible to Canada. For the reasons that follow, the application will be dismissed.
Background
2 Mr. Al-Karim Ebrahim Rashid, the applicant, applied for a permanent resident visa under the Federal Skilled Worker Program at the High Commission in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 13, 2004.
3 The applicant is HIV positive and asymptomatic, meaning the virus is present but does not manifest any visible symptoms. He contracted HIV in 1996 from contaminated blood in Tanzania.
4 The High Commission found that while the applicant had met the requirements of the Federal Skilled Worker Program, he was inadmissible pursuant to subsection 38(1) of the IRPA. A medical officer determined that the costs of the treatment required for the applicant's condition would likely exceed the amount spent on the average Canadian and would delay or deny provision of those services to those in Canada who might need them.
5 In reply to the medical officer's findings, the applicant submitted additional documents on March 21, 2007 and on May 1, 2008. These documents consisted of statements of the applicant's financial resources, a letter of support and financial documents from the applicant's sister who agreed to support him for his first five years in Canada, letters from two Canadian doctors who also agreed to contribute to his support and a medical report from the Aga Khan Hospital in Nairobi.
6 In September 2008, medical officer Dr. Kerry Kennedy reviewed the additional documents and concluded that the information provided by the applicant did not alter the opinion that the applicant's admission to Canada might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health services.
7 Acknowledging that some HIV-infected applicants will not cross the threshold for excessive demand and thereby qualify for admittance into Canada, Dr. Kennedy found that Mr. Rashid was on a regimen of medication that cost about USD 10,000.00 per year. There is no dispute between the parties that this amount is well in excess of the health cost threshold.
8 Dr. Kennedy also found that should Mr. Rashid's positive response to the medication diminish, he would likely be placed on newer anti-viral medications which are, generally, as expensive or more expensive that the drugs that he is presently taking.
Decision Under Review
9 On September 18, 2008, the visa officer found that the applicant was medically inadmissible to Canada and rejected his visa application. The visa officer's letter, dated September 18, 2009, constitutes his reasons for decision together with Computer Assisted Immigration Processing System notes, dated September 16-17, 2008.

Issues

10 The sole issue is whether the visa officer's decision, through the assessment of the medical officer, constitutes a reasonable finding that the applicant is inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 38(1) (c) of the IRPA.

Analysis

11 Several decisions of this Court have held that Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, has not changed the law in respect of factual findings subject to the limitation in paragraph 18.1(4)(d) of the Federal Courts Act: De Medeiros v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 386, [2008] F.C.J. No. 509; Obeid v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 503, [2008] F.C.J. No. 633; Naumets v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 522, [2008] F.C.J. No. 655.
12 It has also been held that a tribunal's decision concerning questions of fact is reviewable upon the standard of reasonableness: Sukhu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 427, [2008] F.C.J. No. 515, see also Navarro v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 358, [2008] F.C.J. No. 463, at paras. 11-15.
13 The visa officer's factually intensive analysis and application of discretion are central to the officer's role as a trier of fact. As such, these findings are to be given significant deference by the reviewing Court. The visa officer's factual findings should stand unless the reasoning process was flawed and the resulting decision falls outside the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law: Dunsmuir, supra, at para. 47.
14 In Gao v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1993), 61 F.T.R. 65, [1993] F.C.J. No. 114, at pp. 317-318, Justice Dubé had discussed the standard of review of a finding of fact made by a medical officer in the following terms:
Most of the case law relating to medical inadmissibility decisions by visa or Immigration Officers has issued from appellate bodies. The general principles arising from these cases are of course relevant to a judicial review application seeking to quash an Immigration Officer's decision.
The governing principle arising from this body of jurisprudence is that reviewing or appellate courts are not competent to make findings of fact related to the medical diagnosis, but are competent to review the evidence to determine whether the medical officers' opinion is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. Canada (M.E.I.) v. Jiwanpuri (1990), 109 N.R. 293 (F.C.A.). The reasonableness of a medical opinion is to be assessed not only as of the time it was given, but also as of the time it was relied upon by the Immigration Officer, since it is that decision which is being reviewed or appealed, Jiwanpuri. The grounds of unreasonableness include incoherence or inconsistency, absence of supporting evidence, failure to consider cogent evidence, or failure to consider the factors stipulated in section 22 of the Regulations. [some citations removed].
15 In Barnash v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 842, [2009] F.C.J. No. 990, at para. 20, Justice Mandamin referred to Gao in holding that given the specialized nature of the medical officer's opinion, reasonableness is the appropriate standard of review for the factual component of the decision. I agree with that conclusion.
16 No deference is due if the Court determines that an administrative decision-maker has failed to adhere to the principles of procedural fairness: Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, at para. 100. Such matters continue to fall within the supervising function of the Court on judicial review: Dunsmuir, supra, at paras. 129 and 151.
17 In a case such as this one, there might be more than one reasonable outcome. However, as long as the process adopted by the visa officer and its outcome fits comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility, it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its own view of a preferable outcome: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12, para. 59.
18 Mr. Rashid relies on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Hilewitz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration); De Jong v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 57, [2005] S.C.J. No. 58 (Hilewitz) to argue that, as in the case of social services, a person in the applicant's position can pay for his own medical health services: in this case, the cost of out-patient prescription anti-viral drugs.
19 Noting that Justice Campbell found a distinction between social and health services, in Lee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1461, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1841, the respondent submits that the Hilewitz principles cannot be read as automatically extending to the health services context as the applicant suggests: Lee, at para. 6.
20 Justice Harrington recently held in Companioni v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1315, [2009] F.C.J. No. 1688, at paragraph 10, that Hilewitz was equally applicable to any consideration as to whether the cost of out-patient drugs would constitute an excessive demand on health services. He considered that the Minister's reliance, in that case, on the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Deol v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 271, [2003] 1 F.C. 301 as supporting a general principle that ability to pay for health services should never be considered, was misplaced.
21 Justice Harrington found, however, that there was a fundamental distinction between social services, the cost of which the province was entitled to recover, as a matter of law, from those who can afford to pay and the supply of out-patient drugs. In Ontario, by virtue of the provincial Trillium Drug Program, most of the cost of the drugs in question would be paid by the province. The visa officer had properly considered that factor but had failed, in conducting the personalized assessment required by Hilewitz, to determine whether the applicant had a viable plan to cover the costs, such as a personal insurance plan or an employer-based group policy. For that reason, the application was granted and the matter was sent back for reconsideration: Companioni, above, at para. 27.
22 In the case of Mr. Rashid, I am not satisfied that the applicant has met the burden of demonstrating that the visa officer, through the medical officer's assessment, made an erroneous finding: Vazirizadeh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 807, [2009] F.C.J. No. 919, at para. 26.
23 The facts of this matter are distinguishable from those in Companioni, in my view. In that case, one of the two applicants had a personal insurance policy that covered prescription drug costs and the second was covered by an employer-based group policy, either or both of which might have continued to apply if the applicants relocated to Canada. In the present matter, the applicant is relying on the personal commitments of his sister and two others. It is trite law that they can't be held to those commitments: Companioni, at para. 30. As stated by Justice Evans for the Federal Court of Appeal in Deol, above, at paragraph 46:
46 ... As has been held in several previous cases, it is not possible to enforce a personal undertaking to pay for health services that may be required after a person has been admitted to Canada as a permanent resident, if the services are available without payment. The Minister has no power to admit a person as a permanent resident on the condition that the person either does not make a claim on the health insurance plans in the provinces, or promises to reimburse the costs of any services required. See, for example, Choi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1995), 98 F.T.R. 308 at para. 30; Cabaldon v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1998), 140 F.T.R. 296 at para. 8; Poon, supra, at paras. 18-19. [My Emphasis]
24 Mr. Rashid would be eligible for coverage under the provincial Trillium Drug Program if he was to become resident in Ontario, as intended, once a valid Ontario Health Card is issued to him and upon demonstrating high prescription drug costs in relation to his net household income.
25 The visa officer did not ignore the new financial support documents submitted by the applicant in March 2007 and May 2008, nor did the medical officer make any unreasonable error of fact when he found that the new documents did not change the notification of medical inadmissibility previously signed by his colleague. The medical officer's opinion, adopted by the visa officer, that the estimated cost of Mr. Rashid's medication would be well in excess of the health cost threshold and that it would constitute an excessive demand was a personalized assessment based on the evidence.
26 Even if I were to find that the visa officer did err in assessing the applicant's financial ability to pay for his own prescription drugs, this is not a case in which it would be appropriate to send the matter back to a different visa officer for reconsideration. The plan that was put forward by the applicant was based upon personal commitments to pay for the required health services. Given the non-enforceability of those commitments and the expected eligibility of the applicant under Ontario's Trillium Drug Program, I do not see how a different visa officer could reach any other conclusion than excessive demand in this case.
27 I conclude that the visa officer's determination that the applicant does not meet the requirements for immigration to Canada, pursuant to paragraph 38(1)(c) of the IRPA, was reasonable and within the range of possible and acceptable outcomes: Dunsmuir, supra, at para. 47.
28 As I find the overall result in this case to be reasonable, and given the specialized nature of the medical officer's opinion in this case, it is not open to this reviewing court to substitute its own view of a preferable outcome: Dunsmuir, supra, at para. 47; Barnash, supra, at para. 20; Khosa, supra, at para. 59. Accordingly, this application will be dismissed.
29 The parties were given an opportunity to propose questions for certification. As set out in paragraph 74(d) of the IRPA and Rule 18(1) of the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules/ SOR 93-22, as amended, there can be no appeal of this decision if the Court does not certify a question.
30 The applicant submits that the question certified by Justice Harrington in Companioni, above, should also be certified in this application for judicial review. That question is as follows:
Is the ability and willingness of applicants to defray the cost of their out-patient prescription drug medication (in keeping with the provincial/territorial regulations regulating the government payment of prescription drugs) a relevant consideration in assessing whether the demands presented by an applicant's health condition constitute an excessive demand?
31 The respondent submits the following question for certification:
When a medical officer has determined that an applicant will be in need of prescription drugs, the cost of which would place the applicant over the threshold of "excessive demand" as set out in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, must a visa officer assess the applicant's ability to pay for the prescription drugs privately when those same drugs are covered by a government program for which the applicant would be eligible in the province/territory of intended residence?
32 In Zazai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 89, [2004] F.C.J. No. 368, the threshold for certification was articulated by the Federal Court of Appeal as: "is there a serious question of general importance which would be dispositive of an appeal" (paragraph 11).
33 In Kunkel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FCA 347, [2009] F.C.J. No. 170, at para. 8, citing its 2006 decision in Boni v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 68, [2006] F.C.J. No. 275, at para.10, the Federal Court of Appeal determined that a certified question must lend itself to a generic approach leading to an answer of general application. That is, the question must transcend the particular context in which it arose.
34 In Boni, supra, the Federal Court of Appeal stated that "it would not be appropriate for the Court to answer the certified question because the answer would not do anything for the outcome of the case (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Liyanagamage, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1637, (1994) 176 N.R. 4)."
35 I am of the view, in light of the particular facts in this case, that the certification of a question on the applicant's ability and willingness to defray the cost of his anti-viral medication would not meet the test articulated in Kunkel and Boni and would not be dispositive of an appeal. Such a question would not lend itself to a generic approach leading to an answer of general application.
36 In contrast, the respondent's proposed question lends itself to a generic approach leading to an answer of general application as it is not focused on the ability and willingness of the applicant to defray the cost of his current drug regimen. The question addresses the duty of the visa officer to assess the applicant's ability to pay for the prescription drugs privately when those same drugs are covered by a government program. The answer would be dispositive of an appeal and transcends the particular context in which it arose.

JUDGMENT

IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT that the application is dismissed. The following question is certified:

When a medical officer has determined that an applicant will be in need of prescription drugs, the cost of which would place the applicant over the threshold of "excessive demand" as set out in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, must a visa officer assess the applicant's ability to pay for the prescription drugs privately when those same drugs are covered by a government program for which the applicant would be eligible in the province/territory of intended residence?

MOSLEY J.

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