Showing posts with label inadmissibility. Show all posts
Showing posts with label inadmissibility. Show all posts

Thursday, November 8, 2012

FEDERAL COURT DEALS WITH VISA APPLICATION BY FORMER SOVIET ARMY OFFICER

A very interesting case on inadmissibility. It seems that the n never fully goes away


Afanasyev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
Between Dmytro Afanasyev, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2012] F.C.J. No. 1361

2012 FC 1270

Docket IMM-8457-11

 Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario

Barnes J.


Heard: October 1, 2012.
Judgment: October 31, 2012.
(23 paras.)




REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

1     BARNES J.:-- This is an application brought by Dmytro Afanasyev challenging a decision by an Immigration Officer (Officer) by which his application for a permanent resident visa was rejected. The basis of this decision was a finding by the Officer that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Afanasyev was inadmissible to Canada for having engaged in acts of espionage against a democratic government contrary to subsection 34(1) of the Immigration Refugee and Protection Act, SC 2001, c27 (IRPA).

2     This is the second application for judicial review brought by Mr. Afanasyev in connection with the rejection of his claim for a visa. In an earlier decision of this Court in Afanasyev v Canada (MCI), 2010 FC 737, [2010] FJC no 848, Justice Yves de Montigny set aside an inadmissibility finding made on October 2, 2008 by a different Officer. The decision now under review was made as a consequence of Justice de Montigny's Judgment.

Preliminary Issue

3     As in the earlier application, the Respondent brought a motion before me under section 87 of the IRPA to protect by redaction certain confidential security intelligence information contained in the Certified Tribunal Record (Record). I took the opportunity to review the redacted information in the context of a confidential hearing held at Ottawa on September 5, 2012 and like Justice de Montigny, I have concluded that the portions of the Record that have been redacted by the Respondent are not material to the substance of the Officer's decision. Nothing has been withheld from Mr. Afanasyev that would inhibit his ability to fully understand the decision or to challenge it on the merits.

Background

4     Mr. Afanasyev's personal history is well described in Justice de Montigny's decision at paragraphs 2 to 5 and need not be repeated here.

5     Justice de Montigny was concerned by an apparent unexplained discrepancy between the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) brief and Mr. Afanasyev's description of his functions. Justice de Montigny held that "it was imperative for the Officer to explain why he rejected [Mr. Afanasyev's] explanations, thereby impugning his credibility". Justice de Montigny also noted the Officer's failure to explain the basis of the finding that Mr. Afanasyev had been engaged in "espionage" as that term is used in subsection 34(1)(a) of the IRPA. Because the reasons provided failed to address the major points in issue, they did not fulfill the procedural fairness requirements. Justice de Montigny also held that the Officer overstepped her authority by declining to submit Mr. Afanasyev's claim for relief under subsection 34(2) of the IRPA to the Minister for consideration.

6     Following Justice de Montigny's decision, Mr. Afanasyev's visa application was remitted for redetermination on the merits by the Officer. Mr. Afanasyev was advised in a letter dated August 11, 2010 that his file was being reopened for reassessment. On October 5, 2010 the Officer wrote to Mr. Afanasyev setting out the following concerns and inviting a response to them:

 

·       Your application has been re-opened and rev[ie]wed in light of the Federal Court decision IMM-213-09. Upon review, it appears that you are still a member of the inadmissible class of persons described in Sections 34(1)(a) and 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. In order that your application be treated in the fairest possible manner, I am going to outline my concerns to you and offer you an opportunity to respond. 

 

·       The following information has been provided by you during the course of your application: 

 

·       - that you served in the Soviet Army from June 1985 to May 1987, 

 

·       - that you spent 6 months at a training centre for military translators to work in radio intelligence, 

 

·       - that you were posted to the 82nd Special Communications Brigade, 11th Company, 1st Platoon 

 

·       - that during the time of your service, this unit was located in Torgau, German Democratic Republic, 

 

·       - that your duties included listening to English language communications coming from US bases in the Federal Republic of Germany and identifying / debriefing various frequencies and telegraph codes, 

 

·       - you further elaborated that you would listen with headphones and identify radio frequencies and that your unit was responsible for intercepting a chain of codes, letters and figures. You further stated that you would prepare a report and would send it to the duty officer but you did not know what happened to that this report, 

 

·       - that in your two years with t[h]e 82nd Special Communications Brigade approximately 1,000 military personne[l] worked there and that interception was the main function of the unit and 

 

·       - that your unit was not subordinate to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU). 

 

·       I have attached a research document to this letter that that shows that the 82nd Special Communications Unit was part of the GRU. 

 

·       Therefore this establishes that you were acting directly on behalf of the GRU. 

 

·       It has been recognised for quite some time in Canada that the GRU is an organization that engages or has engaged in acts of espionage against democratic governments. For example, I refer you to the Federal Court case of Viatcheslav Gariev. 

 

·       I also refer you to the recent Federal Court case of Danish Haroon Peer for an examination of what type of activity constitutes espionage. 

 

·       I invite you to review this information and address my concerns. I will set a 120 day limit for your response. 

7     Counsel for Mr. Afanasyev responded to the Officer, taking strenuous issue with the quality of his research and by describing the Officer's stated concerns as "an awkward ex post facto argument designed to get a second kick at the judicial can". Counsel took the position that the Officer was bound by the content of the initial record and that it could not be supplemented by further research - all of which he described as "on-line chatter".

8     The Officer replied on April 15, 2011 in the form of a second fairness letter. He acknowledged the weakness of one of his internet sources, corrected some of the previous web addresses and referred to two additional historical texts in support of his continued view that Mr. Afanasyev's army unit "was part of the GRU".

9     Mr. Afanasyev's counsel replied as follows:

 

·       I have received your letter, dated April 15, 2011, and have little to add beyond what I wrote to you in my response of January 26, 2011. 

 

·       It remains my position that the Minister is attempting to introduce additional evidence and arguments regarding the very issues that were decided by the Federal Court of Canada on July 8, 2010. The Court specifically ruled on the questions pertinent to s.34(1) of IRPA as to whether Mr. Afanasyev had engaged in a form of "espionage" and whether he belonged to an organisation that was engaged in espionage. Please recall that the "organisation" considered by the Court, the 82nd Brigade of the Soviet Army in which Mr. Afanasyev had been a private, was the very organisation named by the Minister in determining inadmissibility under s34(1 )(f). The Minister is not in a position to reargue this case or to introduce additional evidence ex post facto, particularly given that the evidence on which he now relies was available at the time of the initial refusal of this application. 

 

·       The "evidence" now being advanced would not have assisted the Minister even had it been introduced in a timely manner. The revised rationale suggests that Mr. Afanasyev could be imputed to have had "membership" in the GRU because (according to some bloggers) his Soviet Army unit had a reporting relationship to the GRU. The GRU, the Soviet military intelligence agency is alleged, in turn, to have had a role in some much earlier espionage activities, notably the "Gouzenko affair" in 1946. Hence, through various degrees of separation, Private Afanasyev is now redefined as having been a "member" of the GRU, an organisation involved in "espionage". It would be an understatement to categorise the logic as stretched. 

 

·       With all due respect, I would recommend that you seek legal advice on the implications of ignoring the clear decision and direction of the Honourable Justice de Montigny of the Federal Court of Canada. In doing do so we request that you issue forthwith the permanent resident visa to Mr. Afanasyev who filed his application eleven years ago. 

Issues

10     Mr. Afanasyev's principal argument is that the decision under review is essentially unchanged from the earlier decision that Justice de Montigny set aside and ought to be set aside again for the same reasons. In addition it is argued that the Officer was bound by the principle of res judicata to apply Justice de Montigny's view of what constitutes "espionage" and was estopped from applying a different legal test. Of additional concern to Mr. Afanasyev is the similarity between the two decisions insofar as they outline the details of Mr. Afanasyev's military service. Mr. Afanasyev also complains that the decision was unreasonable because it was based on unreliable evidentiary sources - a point the Officer is said to have acknowledged at least in part.

Analysis

11     The Officer adopted documentary evidence that described a link between military units that intercepted foreign military communications and the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye, or the GRU. In response to the initial fairness letter from the Officer, counsel for Mr. Afanasyev was highly critical of the reliability of the evidence relied upon. The Officer, in turn, recognized that there were valid concerns about some of the internet sources he had cited. In a second fairness response to counsel, he provided two additional internet references and reiterated his position that Mr. Afanasyev's military unit "was part of the GRU".

12     It was strenuously argued before me that all of the internet sources that the Officer cited in support of this finding were unreliable, including the two references that were noted in the second fairness letter. The problem with this argument is that counsel's response to the second fairness letter failed to take issue with the reliability of the new evidence the Officer had presented. The only point that was raised was that it was not open to the Minister to supplement the initial record by relying on additional documentary evidence that was available at the time of the first inadmissibility decision. This, of course, is not a correct statement. Having had the initial decision set aside it was open to either party to rely on additional evidence and to create a new record. What is not permitted on judicial review is for an applicant to complain to the Court about the reliability of evidence when no such complaint was made to the decision-maker.

13     The Officer relied upon documentary evidence that stated that Soviet Military communications units were subordinate to GRU. One of those sources described the relationship as follows:

 

·       Before the collapse of the Soviet Union OSNAZ troops were subordinated by the first radio monitoring division of the 6th department of the GRU. This department headed the so-called OSNAZ divisions, which were part of the military units and groups of Soviet troops in Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Under the supervision of the radio intelligence department, OSNAZ served as the interceptor of information from communications networks of foreign states - subjects of radio intelligence monitoring by the GRU. 

 

·       (...) 

 

·       Operational duties, such as listening to the frequencies of the enemy deserve separate description. Imagine a large hall, with two rows of about thirty most powerful radio receivers and about fifteen tape recorders. For each post, where two or three soldiers serve taking turns, there were two radios and one recorder. Officers were located in the "aquarium" (glass room) and supervised their soldiers from the outside. What did the soldiers do on duty? Of course, listen to the radio frequencies in order to intercept conversations between NATO aircraft and their base or the broadcasting station of the NATO headquarters in Brussels. 

 

·       (...) 

14     Although Mr. Afanasyev had told the Officer that his unit was not subordinate to GRU, he also admitted that he had no idea how his reports were used once they left his desk. This claim of operational ignorance was the basis for the Officer's rejection of Mr. Afanasyev's exculpatory evidence.

15     I accept the point that open-source or wiki-type websites are, like blogs, notoriously unreliable and should rarely, if ever, be used as evidentiary sources. But in this case, two of the principal documentary sources relied upon by the Officer were not challenged before him. In the decision letter, the Officer observed that one of those sources had been authored by two well-known historians specializing in the study of Soviet intelligence services and the other source had been praised by many sources including the New York Times. This point was never raised before the Officer and it cannot now be used to challenge the decision on judicial review.

16     I agree with counsel for the Respondent that this aspect of the complaint is simply an invitation to the Court to reweigh the evidence. That, of course, is not a proper function of the Court on judicial review.

17     Mr. Afanasyev also asserts that the Officer's decision is unreasonable because it fails to explain how the identified link between Mr. Afanasyev's military unit and GRU amounted to a membership in the GRU. This is essentially the same concern that was considered by Justice Anne Mactavish in Vukic v Canada, 2012 FC 370, [2012] FCJ no 407. In that decision Justice Mactavish presented the issue before her as follows:

 

·       38 Insofar as the test for membership is concerned, it is clear that actual or formal membership in an organization is not required - rather the term is to be broadly understood: see Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 2 F.C. 642 at para. 34. Moreover, there will always be some factors that support a membership finding, and others that point away from membership: see Poshteh, above at para. 36. 

18     There is no doubt that Mr. Afanasyev's work as a radio surveillance officer with the 82nd Special Communications Brigade of the Soviet Army constituted a form of espionage, albeit at a low functional level. By his own acknowledgement his work involved the gathering of military intelligence emanating from NATO and American forces in West Germany. His legal counsel described the nature of his duties in the following terms:

 

·       The facts as to Mr. Afanasyev's duties as a soldier (private) who was part of a military intelligence unit in the (then) Soviet army and stationed in East Germany are not in dispute and were accepted by both parties. 

...

 

·       Mr. Afanasyev's activities over 20 years ago as a private conscript in the Soviet Army were part of lawful and routine military intelligence exercises ordered by his supervisors in his (then) country of citizenship. 

 

·       Refusal to obey assigned duties as a conscripted soldier would have constituted an offence in the Soviet Union as it would in most other countries. The commission of such [an] offence might itself have rendered Mr. Afanasyev inadmissible to Canada on these grounds. 

 

·       Mr. Afanasyev's duties involved translating English words emanating from NATO communications without an understanding or knowledge of the codes attached to the words. In any event NATO military codes used in the mid-80s would no longer be relevant today to Canada or to any other country. 

 

·       There is no issue or allegation that any of Mr. Afanasyev's activities in an intelligence unit in the Soviet army for one year in the mid-1980s ever had any impact on Canada or Canadians or was even directed towards Canada. The intercepted correspondence originated from military communications of a Canadian ally. 

...

 

·       Although Mr. Afanasyev performed the general duties of a private in the armed forces, his duties in this unit primarily involved sitting next to a radio receiver and listening to English language military transmissions on various radio frequencies. These messages were in English but were encrypted and Mr. Afanasyev simply passed them to others in encrypted form without any knowledge of their coding. Hence, Mr Afanasyev was not privy to any secrets, if indeed any were being conveyed. Mr. Afanasyev was transferred to the reserves in 1987 and returned to university in Kiev. 

19     Counsel for Mr. Afanasyev described this work as a form of military intelligence and not espionage; but this is a semantic distinction that was rejected by Justice Russel Zinn in Peer v Canada, 2010 FC 752, [2010] FCJ no 916, affirmed in Peer v Canada, 2011 FCA 91, [2011] FCJ no 338. In that decision Justice Zinn held that espionage was simply the covert or surreptitious act of gathering information. Espionage does not require any element of hostile intent and can be occasioned even when carried out lawfully on behalf of a foreign government or agency. I would add to this that it does not require a detailed appreciation of how the information may be put to later use by higher authorities. The job of listening in on western military radio signals while in the employ of the Soviet Army is, by this definition, an act of espionage. I accept that the incidental acquisition of military intelligence may not amount to espionage but in this case Mr. Afanasyev was directly employed in the covert gathering of western military telecommunication information on behalf of his military intelligence unit - or, as counsel for the Respondent put it, "his main task was to eavesdrop" on NATO communications. The facts that Mr. Afanasyev was a conscripted soldier working at the rank of a private and that his military employment is now more than 20 years past are of no relevance except to a request for ministerial relief for exemption from an inadmissibility finding.

20     I do not agree with counsel's argument that the Officer was required to set out a precise legal definition for the term "espionage". It is sufficient if the activities described amount to a form of espionage, and here they did. I do not read Justice de Montigny's decision to recognize a larger obligation. His decision was based on a finding that the Officer's reasons were procedurally inadequate and that a breach of fairness had occurred. It has since been held by the Supreme Court of Canada in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 SCR 708, that the adequacy of reasons is not a stand-alone basis for setting aside a decision on fairness grounds. It is enough if, when read in light of the evidence and the issues, the reasons adequately explain the bases of the decision, and here they do.

21     It is also of no consequence that the two decision letters contain many similarities. Indeed, it would be surprising if they did not. The overlapping historical passages relied upon in both instances are mere recitals of Mr. Afanasyev's undisputed military history. The issue that was central to the inadmissibility finding was whether the Officer had reasonable grounds to believe that, by virtue of Mr. Afanasyev's admitted role in the interception of NATO radio communications, he was a member of an organization that engaged in espionage. There was an evidentiary foundation for the Officer's decision and deference requires that the Court respect that finding.

22     Mr. Afanasyev's additional fairness complaint that the Officer had a duty to translate all of the Russian language references into English is without merit. Mr. Afanasyev is fluent in Russian and English and quite capable of understanding the entire record.

23     The parties requested an opportunity to consider a certified question. The Applicant will have seven days to submit his position in writing. The Respondent will have three days to respond. Neither submission shall exceed five pages in length.

JUDGMENT

THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that this application for judicial review is dismissed.

BARNES J.

Wednesday, April 25, 2012

QUOTED IN TODAY'S NATIONAL POST ON SERBIAN ALLEGED SPY CASE

I an quoted in today's National Post story:

Serbian barred from Canada over alleged Soviet-era espionage | News | National Post

Serbian barred from Canada over alleged Soviet-era espionage

Sarah Boesveld Apr 24, 2012 – 11:16 PM ET | Last Updated: Apr 24, 2012 11:18 PM ET

A Serbian man has been barred from entering Canada on suspicion that he belongs to a secret police service in the former Yugoslavia that spied on Western governments and institutions during the Communist era.

In a case that casts an unusually wide net, setting a precedent to keep anyone with even remote links to suspicious groups from entering the country, the Federal Court of Canada denied permanent residency to Zoran Vukic who worked as a communications attaché for the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) in Ottawa between 1998 and 2002.

Mr. Vukic, whose job it was to receive and transmit secret communications between the embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, has since returned to Serbia. But his wife Zorica, who was also deemed inadmissible to Canada, remains in Ottawa on a temporary resident work permit and challenged the government on its decision late last month.

She and her husband were both refused permanent residency because a visa officer decided there were “reasonable grounds” to believe Mr. Vukic was inadmissible because he “is or was” a member of an “organization engaged in espionage,” Madam Justice Anne Mactavish ruled on March 29.

The organization in question, Sluzba za istrazavanje dokumentacije (SID), is accused of spying on Western governments and establishments during the Communist era and participating in the deaths of enemies of the state and nationals within Yugoslavia and beyond.

Mr. Vukic said his job with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to transmit encrypted messages between their government office and the Embassy in Ottawa.

That correspondence was often sent by diplomatic bag or courier; that was co-ordinated by a different embassy official, court documents said.

‘It’s also noteworthy that the interpretation of who is a member is fairly wide as well’
He was first interviewed at the Canadian embassy in Belgrade in August 2005 about his family’s application for permanent residence in Canada. In December of that year, the family was told the visa section in Vienna had new information about them that needed further probing. Mr. Vukic was interviewed again in March 2006.

Mrs. Vukic was told by letter in May 2007 that there were “reasonable grounds to believe” Mr. Vukic was inadmissible to Canada under section 34 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which states foreign nationals cannot be accepted into Canada on security grounds for engaging in an act of espionage or an act of subversion against a government, or for being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages in such acts.

The Vukics provided the visa officer with more information, including documents relating to Mr. Vukic’s employment. The officer reviewed them and still decided there were reasonable grounds to deny them residency, mostly because Mr. Vukic couldn’t prove it was impossible to work for both the SID and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the same time.

In fact, in an interview with the visa office in February 2011, he “appears to acknowledge the possibility that one could work for both the SID and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the same time,” the court documents said.

Ms. Vukic alleged she and her husband had been treated unfairly by the visa officer, a claim Judge Mactavish said she was “not persuaded” by.

Toronto immigration lawyer Sergio Karas, who is not involved in the case, said inadmissibility based on membership in an organization accused of espionage is fairly rare.


“The court interpreted the scope of this particular section of the legislation pretty widely and accorded the visa officer great deference in his conclusions that the person was in fact a member of this organization,” he said.


“It’s also noteworthy that the interpretation of who is a member is fairly wide as well.”

The case is also not as obvious as that of ex-KGB officer Mikhail Lennikov, who worked mostly as a Japanese translator with the Russian national security agency for six years until he quit in 1988. He has sought sanctuary at a Vancouver church for more than three years.

National Post

Thursday, January 12, 2012

ASSAULT CONVICTION IN NEW YORK MAKES PERSON INADMISSIBLE TO CANADA

When a person has been convicted of a nay criminal offence abroad and seeks entry to Canada, an assessment will be made as to the equivalency between the offence abroad and that in Canada. The case below is a good summary of the test to be applied:

Wang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
Between

Ru Wang, Applicant, and

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2011] F.C.J. No. 1832

2011 FC 1510
Docket IMM-4226-11
Federal Court

Toronto, Ontario
Mactavish J.


Heard: December 20, 2011.

Judgment: December 22, 2011.

(36 paras.)
________________________________________

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

1 MACTAVISH J.:-- Ru Wang's Canadian wife's application to sponsor him was put on hold pending the determination of whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that he was inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 36(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA ]. The Immigration Appeal Division found that Mr. Wang was inadmissible as he had been convicted of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years.

2 Mr. Wang now seeks judicial review of the Board's decision, asserting that the Board erred in its equivalency analysis. For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the Board did not err as alleged. As a consequence, the application for judicial review will be dismissed.

Background

3 Mr. Wang is a citizen of China, although he lived for some time in the United States. He married a Canadian citizen on December 19, 2006, and the couple has one American-born son.

4 On August 30, 2000, Mr. Wang was arrested in New York City and was charged with gang assault in the first degree and assault in the first degree. He subsequently pled guilty to assault in the second degree pursuant to Article 120.5 of the New York Penal Code [NYPC ]. He was sentenced by the Supreme Court of New York to 10 months imprisonment. This sentence was subsequently reduced to eight months.

5 Mr. Wang came to Canada on August 26, 2009, and filed a claim for refugee protection. He has since withdrawn his refugee claim and applied for permanent residence as a member of the family class.

6 On May 14, 2010, a report was issued under subsection 44(1) of IRPA alleging that Mr. Wang was inadmissible under paragraph 36(1)(b) of IRPA for having committed an offence in the United States that, if committed in Canada, would be equivalent to an offence under subsection 267(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code], namely assault causing bodily harm.

7 The question of Mr. Wang's admissibility was initially referred to the Immigration Division for determination. In a decision dated September 15, 2010, the Immigration Division declared that Mr. Wang was not a person described in paragraph 36(1)(b) of IRPA. The Immigration Division determined that article 120.5(1) of the NYPC was not equivalent to section 267 of the Criminal Code, and that section 265 of the Code was the equivalent Canadian offence. Section 265 creates the offence of simple assault.

8 On appeal, the Immigration Appeal Division found Mr. Wang to be inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph 36(1)(b) of IRPA. Applying, amongst other things, the test for aiding and abetting set out in section 21 of the Criminal Code, the Board found that a conviction under article 120.5(1) of the NYPC was equivalent to offences described under sections 267, 268 and 269 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Standard of Review

9 Although Mr. Wang raised an issue of procedural fairness in his memorandum of fact and law, that issue was not pursued at the hearing. Consequently, the only matter in issue is the Board's equivalency finding.

10 Findings of equivalency are factual determinations which attract deference and are to be reviewed on the reasonableness standard: Abid v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 164, 384 F.T.R. 74 at para. 11.

11 In reviewing a decision against the reasonableness standard, the Court must consider the justification, transparency and intelligibility of the decision-making process, and whether the decision falls within a range of possible acceptable outcomes which are defensible in light of the facts and the law: see Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para. 47, and Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 at para. 59.

Statutory Framework

12 Mr. Wang was found to be inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 36(1)(b) of IRPA which provides that:



• 36. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for



• [...]



• (b)

having been convicted of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years;

* * *



• 36. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité les faits suivants



• [...]



• b)

être déclaré coupable, à l'extérieur du Canada, d'une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans;

13 In accordance with section 33 of IRPA, the facts underlying admissibility findings include facts "for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred".

14 The Supreme Court of Canada described the "reasonable grounds to believe" evidentiary standard as requiring "something more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of probabilities". Reasonable grounds will exist "where there is an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information": Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 at para. 114.

Information Regarding the Offence

15 The evidentiary record with respect to the events giving rise to Mr. Wang's conviction is sparse. We do not have a copy of the indictment, and thus do not know what acts he was charged with having committed. Nor do we have Mr. Wang's plea agreement, the judgment convicting him or the reasons for imposing sentence.

16 According to a police report in the file, Mr. Wang and four of his friends were sitting on a bench when a stranger came by. The five individuals approached the victim from behind, punched him in the head and face and shot him in the left thigh. I do not understand there to be any claim by the Minister that Mr. Wang actually fired the shots. In considering police report it must be recognized that it only contains allegations, and does not necessarily reflect the facts that actually formed the basis of Mr. Wang's conviction.

17 However, Mr. Wang's own rehabilitation application states that while walking around in a park with his friends, one of Mr. Wang's friends got into an argument with a stranger. When the argument became worse, Mr. Wang says that his friend "forced him" to go and get a gun at the friend's home. Mr. Wang says that he "reluctantly" followed his friend's order, and brought the gun back to him. The friend then "lost control" and fired twice, hitting the victim and Mr. Wang himself. It is noteworthy that in discussing the events giving rise to his criminal conviction, Mr. Wang makes no mention of having struck the victim in the head, leading to the clear inference that it was his role in the shooting that formed the basis of the conviction.

Analysis

18 Mr. Wang's first argument is that although it had been established that he had been convicted of assault in the second degree contrary to Article 120.5 of the NYPC, it was not established under which of the nine subsections of Article 120.5 he had been convicted.

19 The Board's finding that Mr. Wang had been convicted of an offence under Article 120.5(1) of the NYPC was reasonable. The Certificate of Disposition Indictment issued by the Supreme Court of the State of New York makes it quite clear that Mr. Wang's conviction of assault was entered under Article 120.5(1) of the NYPC. This subsection provides that a person is guilty of assault when the person "with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person ... causes injury to such person or to a third person".

20 The parties agree that in Hill v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1987), 1 Imm. L.R. (2d) 1, 73 N.R. 315 [Hill ], the Federal Court of Appeal determined that equivalency can be determined in one of three ways.

21 The first is "by a comparison of the precise wording in each statute both through documents and, if available, through the evidence of an expert or experts in the foreign law and determining therefrom the essential ingredients of the respective offences".

22 The second way that equivalency can be established is "by examining the evidence adduced before the adjudicator, both oral and documentary, to ascertain whether or not that evidence was sufficient to establish that the essential ingredients of the offence in Canada had been proven in the foreign proceedings, whether precisely described in the initiating documents or in the statutory provisions in the same words or not". Finally, equivalency can be established by a combination of the first two tests: all quotes from Hill, above at para. 16.

23 In this case, the Board appears to have applied a combination of the first two Hill tests, concluding that both the New York and the Canadian statutes require intent or knowledge, that the accused be a party to the offence, and that injury be caused to the victim.

24 The Board weighed the evidence before it and was satisfied that the Minister had established reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Wang had committed acts amounting to aiding and abetting an assault causing bodily harm. In my view, this was a conclusion that was reasonably open to the Board on the record before it and does not fall outside the range of reasonable defensible outcomes on the facts and the law.

25 Based upon Mr. Wang's own admissions, the Board found that while involved in a five-on-one altercation, Mr. Wang had retrieved a firearm at the behest of a co-participant, who then used the gun to shoot the victim causing injury. The Board considered Mr. Wang's role in the offence, and whether he could have been deemed to be a party to the offence under Canadian law.

26 After examining the evidence, including Mr. Wang's admissions as to his role in the shooting incident, the Board concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Wang had the requisite knowledge of the shooter's intent to bring him within the definition of an aider or abettor under section 21 of the Criminal Code. This was a reasonable conclusion. If Mr. Wang did not intend to assist in the commission of the offence, why did he go and get the gun?

27 While Mr. Wang now claims that he was acting under duress, the mens rea or mental element required under section 21 of the Criminal Code to deem a person to be a party to an offence in which he or she was not directly involved is not negated by duress: see R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, [1995] S.C.J. No. 63 (Q.L.), at para. 39.

28 The Board concluded that, based upon Mr. Wang's own admissions, there were reasonable grounds to believe that he had pled guilty for his active involvement (bringing a gun to the principal actor) which he knew was to be used in the shooting of the victim. While the events surrounding Mr. Wang's plea are not entirely clear, I am satisfied that there was sufficient evidence before the Board to support its findings, having regard to the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard applicable to factual matters under section 36 of IRPA.

29 Finally, the Board's conclusion that Article 120.5(1) of the NYPC was equivalent to assault causing bodily harm under section 267 of the Criminal Code was also reasonable, having regard to the essential elements of each offence.

30 Both offences require the commission of an assault, as well as a mental element or intention. As previously discussed, the Board reasonably concluded that Mr. Wang's conviction for assault in New York, and his admitted involvement in the shooting, were sufficient to make him party to the offence under Canadian law, and to satisfy the requisite mental element of the offence.

31 Both the Canadian and the American offences also require the infliction of a significant injury.

32 The New York offence requires a "serious physical injury", which is defined in Article 10 of the NYPC as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ".

33 The Canadian offence requires "bodily harm", which is defined at section 2 of the Criminal Code as "any hurt or injury to a person that interferes with the health or comfort of the person and that is more than merely transient or trifling in nature".

34 The law does not require that offences be identical in every respect. As the Federal Court of Appeal observed in Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1060 at para. 18, what is required is "essentially the similarity of definitions of offences". In my view, the definition of the degree of injury required in the two offences is sufficiently similar as to render the offences equivalent for the purposes of a section 36 analysis. If anything, the "serious physical injury" element of the NYPC offence is more onerous that the "bodily harm" of the Canadian offence. That is, harm that qualifies as the "serious physical injury" for the purposes of the NYPC offence would necessarily qualify as "bodily harm" for the purposes of section 267 of the Criminal Code.

Conclusion

35 For these reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

Certification

36 Neither party has suggested a question for certification, and none arises here.

JUDGMENT

• THIS COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:


• 1. This application for judicial review is dismissed; and

• 2. No serious question of general importance is certified.

MACTAVISH J.
Visalaw International CS CBA OBA-ABO AILA IPBA NYSRA ABA IBA