Showing posts with label Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 23, 2016

U.S. CRIMINAL CONVICTION, DEPORTATION DID NOT ENGAGE CHARTER

This is an interesting decision . The Federal COurt held that a Permanent Resident convicted in the US who was reported for inadmissibility to Canada upon his return from India, did not have his Charter rights breached by the report referring him to deportation proceedings.

Brar v. Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness)


Between
Hardeep Singh Brar, Applicant, and
The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness, Respondent
[2016] F.C.J. No. 1241
2016 FC 1214

Docket: IMM-1325-16

 Federal Court
Vancouver, British Columbia

A.L. Mactavish J.


Heard: October 27, 2016.
Judgment: November 2, 2016.
(34 paras.)


JUDGMENT AND REASONS
1     A.L. MACTAVISH J.:-- Hardeep Singh Brar is a permanent resident of Canada. After he was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in the United States, a Minister's Delegate referred Mr. Brar to an admissibility hearing to determine whether he was inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality, as well as organized criminality and involvement in transnational crime.
2     Mr. Brar seeks judicial review of the referral decision, asserting that it was unreasonable as it contained serious factual errors, and failed to consider important evidence. Mr. Brar further submits that the Minister's Delegate failed to properly take "Charter values" into account in deciding whether to refer him to an admissibility hearing.
3     For the reasons that follow, I am not persuaded that the Minister's Delegate erred as alleged. I am further satisfied that the decision to refer Mr. Brar to an admissibility hearing was entirely reasonable. Consequently, his application for judicial review will be dismissed.
I. Background
4     Mr. Brar is a citizen of India who came to Canada in 1998 when he was 15 years old.
5     In 2009, Mr. Brar agreed to take a rental car from Canada to the United States and to drop it off there for use by a drug courier. After meeting with the drug courier in the United States, Mr. Brar was arrested and charged with being part of a conspiracy to distribute 15 kilograms of cocaine, which was intended to be shipped to Canada.
6     Mr. Brar expressed remorse for his actions, and he co-operated with US law enforcement during the investigation and prosecution processes. Mr. Brar evidently told investigators about others involved in the drug trafficking scheme, which led to the indictment of two other individuals.
7     Mr. Brar subsequently pled guilty to the conspiracy offence. He was deemed by the prosecution to have accepted responsibility for his actions, and he was sentenced to 24 months in prison. After serving 21 months of his sentence, Mr. Brar was deported to India. He returned to Canada a month later, admitting to his criminal conviction when he was interviewed by a Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) Officer at the Vancouver International Airport.
8     Mr. Brar was subsequently given notice that reports may be prepared declaring him to be inadmissible to Canada for serious criminality, organized criminality and transnational crime. He was then interviewed by a CBSA Inland Enforcement Officer, and was given the opportunity to provide written submissions to the Officer prior to a decision being made as to whether to refer him for an admissibility hearing. In support of his request not to be referred to an admissibility hearing, Mr. Brar and his counsel provided the Officer with several sets of submissions and supporting materials over a three and a half year period.
9     Among other things, Mr. Brar submitted that even though his offence was serious, it had not involved violence or firearms. Several years had passed since his one criminal offence, and he had not engaged in any further criminal activity. A psychologist's report provided by Mr. Brar had, moreover, indicated that he posed a low risk of re-offending. Mr. Brar also noted that he had come to Canada as a child, that he had lived in Canada for many years, and that he had minimal ties to India. All of Mr. Brar's immediate family, including his wife, were in Canada, and he was gainfully employed.
10     An initial decision to refer Mr. Brar to an admissibility hearing was set aside on consent, after he sought judicial review of that decision. After receiving further submissions from Mr. Brar, the Inland Enforcement Officer once again recommended that he be referred for an admissibility hearing in relation to his serious criminality, as well as his involvement in organized criminality and transnational crime. A Minister's Delegate subsequently adopted that recommendation, and referred Mr. Brar's case to the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, and it is this decision that underlies this application for judicial review.
11     Mr. Brar has never claimed that he would be at risk if he were returned to India. He further concedes that he is inadmissible to Canada as a result of his American drug conviction, and that he would inevitably be found to be inadmissible by the Immigration Division. He notes, however, that if his case goes to an admissibility hearing, the Immigration Division would have no equitable jurisdiction to consider humanitarian and compassionate factors before issuing a removal order against him.
12     Moreover, because the punishment for Mr. Brar's offence could have exceeded 10 years, had the offence been committed in Canada, he is not entitled to appeal the Immigration Division's finding to the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board. Mr. Brar is also permanently barred from seeking humanitarian and compassionate relief under section 25 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, because he is inadmissible to Canada under section 37 of the Act for organized criminality and transnational crime. Consequently, the only place where Mr. Brar's humanitarian and compassionate considerations can be considered is at the referral stage.
II. Analysis
13     Before addressing Mr. Brar's arguments with respect to the alleged deficiencies in the referral decision, I would start by observing that there is some debate as to the scope of the discretion conferred on Minister's Delegates in deciding whether to refer an individual for an admissibility hearing. Some cases suggest that a Minister's Delegate has no discretion in this regard, while other cases indicate that a Minister's Delegate does possess some, albeit it limited discretion not to refer cases for admissibility hearings: Faci v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 693 at paras. 22-31, [2011] F.C.J. No. 893.
14     I do not need to resolve this question in this case, as it is clear that the Minister's Delegate considered that he had discretion to decide whether or not Mr. Brar's case should be referred for an admissibility hearing. The Minister's Delegate determined, however, that the circumstances of Mr. Brar's case did not justify the exercise of that discretion in his favour.
15     In his submissions to the Inland Enforcement Officer, Mr. Brar made brief reference to the potential breach of his rights under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. It will be recalled that section 7 states that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice".
16     Because of the serious consequences that removal from Canada would have for him, Mr. Brar submits that his section 7 rights were engaged in the referral process. As a consequence, Mr. Brar submitted that the Officer had to exercise his discretion in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. According to Mr. Brar, this required that his case not be referred for an admissibility hearing on the basis that there are sufficient compelling humanitarian and compassionate grounds to permit him to retain his permanent resident status, and removal would violate his constitutional rights.
17     Citing the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12 at paras. 55-57, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, Mr. Brar argues that the Supreme Court has held that in considering Charter values in the exercise of statutory discretion, administrative decision-makers must balance the Charter values with the statutory objectives. The decision-maker must then ask how the Charter value at issue can best be protected in view of those statutory objectives. According to Doré, "[t]his is at the core of the proportionality exercise, and requires the decision-maker to balance the severity of the interference of the Charter protection with the statutory objectives": at para. 56.
18     The Supreme Court went on in Doré to note that on judicial review, the question for the reviewing Court is "whether, in assessing the impact of the relevant Charter protection and given the nature of the decision and the statutory and factual contexts, the decision reflects a proportionate balancing of the Charter protections at play". This determination is to be made applying the reasonableness standard of review: at para. 57.
19     According to Mr. Brar, because Charter values were at play in this case, the Minister's Delegate was required to exercise his discretion in a manner that best protected Mr. Brar's security of the person. This required that the Minister's Delegate not refer Mr. Brar's case to the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing.
20     There are several reasons why I do not accept Mr. Brar's submission.
21     First of all, I have serious doubts that Mr. Brar's section 7 rights were engaged in this process. The jurisprudence is clear that deportation per se does not engage section 7 of the Charter, and that section 7 is, moreover, not engaged at the stage of determining admissibility to Canada: see, for example, B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58 at paras. 74-75, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 704; Torre v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 591, [2015] F.C.J. No. 601; Stables v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1319, [2013] 3 F.C.R. 240.
22     The Supreme Court teaches that in determining whether section 7 of the Charter is engaged, regard has to be had to the nature of the interests at stake: Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para. 18, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350.
23     There has never been any suggestion that Mr. Brar is at risk in India. Indeed, the types of harm that Mr. Brar asserts will befall him if he is removed from Canada are typical consequences of deportation including family separation, loss of establishment and the need to become re-established in a country left years before. This distinguishes Mr. Brar's situation from cases such as Charkaoui, above, where the named individual's liberty interests had been affected by his detention under a Security Certificate, and Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, where individuals faced the prospect of deportation to torture.
24     Indeed, as Justice de Montigny noted in Stables, above at para. 42, "[i]t was the risk of torture on removal, though, and not the fact of removal itself, that engage the applicant's section 7 interests in [Suresh]".
25     Similarly, in Torre, above, Justice Tremblay-Lamer concluded that section 7 of the Charter was not engaged where a long-term resident of Canada was being deported for having been convicted of trafficking in cocaine, because the individual in question was not being deported to a country where he faced torture: at para. 71.
26     Even if I were to accept that Mr. Brar's section 7 rights were engaged in the process at issue in this application, however, that would not be the end of the matter. Section 7 Charter rights are not absolute: individuals can be deprived of their life, liberty or security of the person, provided that this occurs through a process that accords with the principles of fundamental justice.
27     In this case, Mr. Brar had a face-to-face interview with the Inland Enforcement Officer. He was repeatedly afforded the opportunity to provide written submissions in support of his request not to be referred for an admissibility hearing, and he provided the Officer with copious submissions that had been prepared with the assistance of counsel. Mr. Brar was provided with draft recommendations prepared by the Inland Enforcement Officer for consideration by a Minister's Delegate, and he was given the right to comment on them. Any errors in the draft reports that were identified by Mr. Brar were corrected, and a thorough analysis of Mr. Brar's case was provided to the Minister's Delegate. This analysis is considered to be part of the Minister's Delegate's reasons: Huang v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 28 at para. 88, 473 F.T.R. 91.
28     Moreover, the Minister's Delegate had regard to the objectives of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the seriousness of Mr. Brar's criminal offence. He then weighed these considerations against Mr. Brar's humanitarian and compassionate factors, as he was required to do by both Canadian and international law.
29     In other words, the Minister's Delegate balanced the severity of the interference with what Mr. Brar asserts was his Charter-protected right to security of the person right against the statutory objectives and the nature of Mr. Brar's criminal conviction. He then came to the conclusion that the seriousness of Mr. Brar's criminal conviction outweighed the humanitarian and compassionate factors that supported the exercise of discretion in Mr. Brar's favour.
30     This was a conclusion that was reasonably open to the Minister's Delegate on the record before him. I am, moreover, satisfied that it represents a proportionate balancing of the competing interests at stake: Doré, above at para. 57, Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96 at para. 57, [2016] F.C.J. No. 315.
31     Mr. Brar has not identified any further information that he was unable to provide to either the Inland Enforcement Officer or the Minister's Delegate that could possibly have assisted his case. Nor has he identified any principle of fundamental justice that was not complied with in relation to the Minister's Delegate's determination that Mr. Brar should be referred to the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing.
32     In essence, what Mr. Brar says is that the Minister's Delegate gave too much weight to the seriousness of his criminal conviction and not enough weight to his humanitarian and compassionate factors, and that this breached principles of fundamental justice. It is not, however, this Court's role to usurp the role of the Minister's Delegate and reweigh the evidence to reach a different conclusion.
33     Mr. Brar also argued in his memorandum of fact and law that the Minister's Delegate made certain findings of fact that were unsupported by the evidence. The respondent's memorandum of fact and law identified the evidence in the record that supported the findings in question, and no reviewable error has been demonstrated by Mr. Brar in this regard. Indeed, the fact that evidence from the psychologist's report was referred to in the Inland Enforcement Officer's analysis simply confirms the thoroughness that was applied to the review of Mr. Brar's submissions.
III. Conclusion
34     For these reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed. I agree with the parties that the case is fact-specific, and does not raise a question for certification.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is dismissed.

A.L. MACTAVISH J.

Thursday, June 6, 2013

LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS NOT DISCRIMINATORY AGAINST DEAF APPLICANT

This is a very unusual set of facts and a very interesting decision. The court rejected the argument that the requirement to pass a language test was discriminatory against applicants who were deaf. and scored poorly in the test.


Smirnov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)


Between Dmitri Alexandrovich Smirnov, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2013] F.C.J. No. 585

2013 FC 554

Docket IMM-12568-12

 Federal Court
Ottawa, Ontario

Boivin J.


Heard: May 15, 2013.
Judgment: May 27, 2013.

(37 paras.)
 




REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

1     BOIVIN J.:-- This is an application for judicial review pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (the Act) of a decision of a Citizenship and Immigration Canada case officer (the officer), dated November 29, 2012, wherein the applicant's application for a permanent resident visa as a member of the Canadian experience class was refused. The officer was not satisfied that the applicant met the official language proficiency requirements prescribed in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (the Regulations). For the following reasons, the application for judicial review will be dismissed.

Facts

2     Mr. Dmitri Smirnov (the applicant) is a citizen of Russia and is deaf since birth. He primarily uses sign language to communicate (Application Record, Affidavit of the Applicant, p 8). According to the applicant, primary and secondary education for the deaf in Russia was not adequately adapted to deaf students' needs, and the applicant left high school at what he deems to be the equivalent of grade ten (10) in Canada, but perceives that the materials learned are equivalent to that of grade eight (8) in Canada (Application Record, Affidavit of the Applicant, pp 9-10). The applicant is now fluent in American Sign Language (ASL), which he learned upon his arrival in the United States (Application Record, Affidavit of the Applicant, p 10). The applicant lived in the United States as a permanent resident prior to moving to Canada in February 2006 (Respondent's Record, Affidavit of Jennifer Carlile, Tab 2, para 6; Tribunal Record, p 95). The applicant has worked in Canada as a painter since his arrival in 2006 (Tribunal Record, pp 81-83). His current work permit in Canada is valid until June 2014 (Respondent's Record, Affidavit of Jennifer Carlile, Tab 2, para 5).

3     The applicant submitted a Generic Application Form (IMM 0008) for permanent residence on December 3, 2011 (Tribunal Record, pp 81-92). The applicant indicated he was applying as a "skilled worker" (Tribunal Record, p 81), a Division in the Regulations that encompasses both the federal skilled workers and Canadian experience classes, amongst others. The applicant submitted a Schedule 8 form for the Canadian experience class, where he indicated having more than two (2) years of experience working full-time in Canada under the National Occupational Classification (NOC) code 7294, "Painter", since February 2006 (Tribunal Record, pp 99-101). He did not submit a Schedule 3 form for the federal skilled worker class. He was assessed under the Canadian experience class.

4     Along with his application, the applicant submitted a report from the International English Language Testing System (IELTS), indicating test results of 3.5 on both reading and writing abilities (Tribunal Record, p 107). A test result of 3.5 in reading converts to a Canadian Language Benchmark (CLB) score of less than 4, while a test result of 3.5 in writing converts to a CLB score of 4 (Respondent's Book of Authorities, Tab 4, p 14, Operational Manual 25: Canadian Experience Class). The IELTS report included comments to the effect that due to the applicant's extreme speaking and hearing difficulties, he was exempt from the speaking and listening tests. The applicant was nonetheless given scores of 3.5 on both speaking and listening abilities, scores which were "notionalized on the basis of the average of the other two bandscores" (Tribunal Record, p 107).

5     The applicant also included test results from the Canadian Hearing Society for his abilities in American Sign Language (ASL), for which the applicant scored 9.2 out of 10 for Expressive skills (analogous to "speaking") and 9 out of 10 for Receptive skills (analogous to "listening") (Tribunal Record, pp 116-17). The applicant also submitted a letter from his representative explaining that he was deaf since birth and commenting on his ability to communicate in a very detailed manner using ASL (Tribunal Record, pp 109-10).

Impugned decision

6     In a decision dated November 29, 2012, the officer refused the applicant's application for a permanent resident visa as a member of the Canadian experience class. The officer explained that applicants in the Canadian experience class are assessed on a pass/fail basis as set out in paragraph 87.1(2) of the Regulations. The officer assessed the applicant's application based on his work experience as a painter (NOC 7294).

7     The officer's notes indicate that the supporting documents submitted by the applicant were sufficient to demonstrate his experience under his declared NOC 7294 Painter category. The notes also reveal that the officer was aware that the applicant is deaf, and obtained scores of 9.2 and 9.0 on ASL proficiency assessments for Expressive and Receptive tests, respectively (Tribunal Record, p 2).

8     However, the officer was not satisfied that the applicant met the official language proficiency requirement, having received IELTS scores of 3.5 on both reading and writing, equivalent to Canadian Language Benchmarks (CLB) of 4 or less. The officer explained that, based on his occupation and his application in the Canadian experience class, the applicant was required to obtain either CLBs of 5 in each ability (reading, writing, speaking and listening), or the following combination: a CLB of 4 in one (1) ability, 5 or more in two (2) abilities, and 6 or more in the remaining ability. Since the applicant has two (2) CLBs of 4 or less, he did not meet the official language requirement and his application was refused.

Issues

9     The Court is of the view that the issues raised in this application for judicial review are as follows :

 

·        a. 

Did the officer err by not taking into account the applicant's ASL scores? 

·        b. 

Did the officer err by not assessing the applicant's application under the federal skilled workers class, but only under the Canadian experience class? 

·        c. 

Did the officer's decision refusing the applicant's application for permanent residence and the Regulations violate the right to equality guaranteed by subsection 15(1) of the Charter

Relevant legislation

10     The relevant dispositions from the Act and its Regulations are set out in the Annex to this judgment. The Regulations have been modified since the officer's November 29, 2012 decision. The Regulations in force at the time specifically provided that a foreign national who acquired work experience in an occupation listed in Skill Level B of the National Occupational Classification matrix, as is the applicant's case, had to have their abilities to speak, listen, read and write assessed by a designated organization or institution and meet the following benchmarks: i) either a CLB score of 5 or higher on each of the four (4) abilities, or ii) a CLB score of 4 for any one (1) ability, a CLB score of 5 or higher for any other two (2) abilities, and a CLB score of 6 or higher for the remaining ability. These are the benchmarks the officer used to evaluate the applicant.

11     The Regulations now provide, through section 74 which was not in force at the time the impugned decision was rendered, that the Minister shall fix, by class or by occupation, minimum language proficiency thresholds on the basis of the number of applications processed in all classes, the number of immigrants who are projected to become permanent residents, and the potential for the establishment in Canada of applicants in the federal skilled worker class, the Canadian experience class, and the federal skilled trades class, taking into account their linguistic profiles, economic factors and other relevant factors.

Standard of review

12     The applicant contends that the applicable standard of review in the present case is correctness. The respondent, on the other hand, submits that an officer's determination under the Canadian experience class involves findings of fact and law, and is therefore reviewable on a standard of reasonableness (Anabtawi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 856 at para 28, 11 Imm LR (4th) 302; Arachchige v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1068 at para 8, [2012] F.C.J. No. 1150 (QL)).

13     The Court agrees with the respondent that the issues pertaining to the officer's determination of the applicant's application for permanent residency are subject to the deferential standard of reasonableness. The Court should therefore not intervene unless the officer's decision in that regard is not transparent, justifiable and intelligible and within the range of acceptable outcomes based on the evidence (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir]).

14     Issues of procedural fairness, on the other hand, do not require deference from this Court with regards to the approach adopted by the officer (Dunsmuir, above at para 50; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 43, [2009] 1 SCR 339).

15     The Court notes that the approach put forth by the Supreme Court of Canada in Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395 [Doré], states that questions involving the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter], do not necessarily automatically mandate for the application of the correctness standard. Such an approach would result in applying the correctness standard to, and in effect retrying, every case that involves Charter values. The Supreme Court of Canada indicated the following in Doré, above at paras 36, 43:

 

·        [36] As explained by Chief Justice McLachlin in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 SCR 567, the approach used when reviewing the constitutionality of a law should be distinguished from the approach used for reviewing an administrative decision that is said to violate the rights of a particular individual (see also Bernatchez). When Charter values are applied to an individual administrative decision, they are being applied in relation to a particular set of facts. Dunsmuir tells us this should attract deference (para. 53; see also Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3, at para. 39). When a particular "law" is being assessed for Charter compliance, on the other hand, we are dealing with principles of general application

 

·        ... 

 

·        [43] What is the impact of this approach on the standard of review that applies when assessing the compliance of an administrative decision with Charter values? There is no doubt that when a tribunal is determining the constitutionality of a law, the standard of review is correctness (Dunsmuir, at para. 58). It is not at all clear to me, however, based on this Court's jurisprudence, that correctness should be used to determine whether an administrative decision-maker has taken sufficient account of Charter values in making a discretionary decision. 

 

 
[Emphasis added]
 
 

16     The issue of whether or not the Regulations violate the applicant's rights to equality pursuant to subsection 15(1) of the Charter was not before the officer, and is therefore not being "reviewed" by this Court. It also concerns a general application of the law, an analysis the Court can undertake without deference.

Arguments

Applicant's arguments

17     The applicant submits that the officer erred by ignoring significant evidence; namely, his ASL scores, which he submitted along with his application. According to the applicant, the officer failed to consider this important evidence, and failed to explain how she dealt with the speaking and listening abilities in her decision. According to the applicant, this is problematic in the application of subparagraph 87.1(2)(b)(ii) of the Regulations in force at the time, which requires a score of 5 on all four (4) abilities, or a score of 4 for any one (1) ability, a score of 5 or higher for any other two (2) abilities, and a score of 6 or higher for the remaining ability.

18     The applicant also argues that the officer erred by not considering him under the federal skilled workers class. Although he acknowledges having submitted only a Schedule 8 form for the Canadian experience class, he contends that the officer should have followed up with him and clarified under which class he wanted to be assessed. The applicant contends that this is particularly the case because of the ambiguity on his Generic Application Form IMM 0008, where he simply indicated "skilled worker" (a Division in the Regulations which encompasses both the federal skilled workers class and the Canadian experience class, amongst others). The applicant submits that he could have benefited from the more nuanced evaluation provided in the legislative framework for federal skilled workers, along with subsection 76(3) of the Regulations which provides for a substituted evaluation when the points are an insufficient indicator of the likelihood of economic establishment. The applicant claims this constitutes a breach in procedural fairness.

19     With regards to the Charter issue, the applicant contends that both the officer's decision applying the Regulations, as well as the Regulations themselves as they are drafted, violate his subsection 15(1) Charter rights to equality:

 

·        EQUALITY RIGHTS 

 

·        Equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law 

 

·        15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 

* * *

 

·        DROITS A L'ÉGALITÉ 

 

·        Égalité devant la loi, égalité de bénéfice et protection égale de la loi 

 

·        15. (1) La loi ne fait acception de personne et s'applique également à tous, et tous ont droit à la même protection et au même bénéfice de la loi, indépendamment de toute discrimination, notamment des discriminations fondées sur la race, l'origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l'âge ou les déficiences mentales ou physiques. 

20     The applicant argues that the officer violated his section 15 rights by not subsuming his ASL results into the official language proficiency required by the Regulations and that the requirements to read, listen, speak and write contained in paragraph section 87.1(2)(b) of the Regulations in force at the time of the decision violate his subsection 15(1) Charter rights.

21     The applicant argues that deaf persons have been repeatedly recognized by the courts as a disadvantaged minority in Canada (citing Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577). He claims that the law creates a distinction based on disability due to the requirement to speak and listen in former paragraph 87.1(2)(b) of the Regulations, and that no deaf person could ever succeed in obtaining permanent residency under the Canadian experience class as the Regulations are drafted. The applicant claims that the other two (2) assessed abilities, "read" and "write", are also necessarily impaired by the inability to speak and listen in a society predominantly disposed towards hearing persons, particularly when learning a second language. The applicant also indicates that the respondent has failed to designate any institution or organization such as the Canadian Hearing Society, which could assess a deaf person's expressive and receptive ASL abilities. According to the applicant, the respondent has infringed his Charter rights by failing to draft or interpret legislation that treats his fluency in ASL as equivalent to fluency in English.

22     The applicant finally raises Charter issues with regards to sections of the Act relating to the federal skilled workers class, under which he was not assessed because he did not apply under that class (sections 75 to 83 of the Regulations).

Respondent's arguments

23     According to the respondent, the sole issue in this case is whether the officer's decision was reasonable. The respondent argues that the applicant's application contained a clear indication of which class he wished to be considered for since it included a Schedule 8, mandatory for the Canadian experience class, and not a Schedule 3, which is mandatory for the federal skilled workers class. According to the respondent, it is CIC's policy to accept applications for processing despite minor errors, and the officer was therefore required to accept the application as a complete Canadian experience class application.

24     The respondent argues that the officer did not consider the applicant's ASL results because they were irrelevant since he had already failed the language requirements on the basis of the reading and writing tests. Since the Regulations do not provide a points scheme whereby two (2) scores below a CLB of 5 can result in a successful application, it was not necessary to consider the ASL results. Because the applicant's failure to meet the reading and writing standards were fatal to his claim, the respondent contends that it was reasonable for the officer to reject the claim on that basis.

25     Relying on the observations of this Court in Worthington v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1546, 258 FTR 102, aff'd 2006 FCA 30, 346 NR 312 [Worthington]), the respondent submits that this application does not raise a Charter issue because there was no evidence before the officer that the applicant's abilities to read and write were negatively impacted by his deafness. Indeed, the respondent argues that the applicant's argument is predicated on the notion that he was treated adversely as a result of being deaf, but that the evidentiary basis for this argument was not established. Since no evidence was placed before the officer that his inability to meet the standards in reading and writing was due to his deafness, the respondent submits that there was no need for the officer to consider how to accommodate the applicant, and no need for this Court to evaluate whether the officer failed in doing so.

26     The respondent contends that the officer had no discretion to ignore the requirements imposed by the Regulations, and that the applicant did not request consideration on humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) grounds before the officer. Because the applicant did not provide information regarding Russian schooling to the officer, but only in his affidavit before this Court, the officer was not required to consider H&C grounds and was without evidence that the applicant would suffer unusual, undeserved or disproportionate hardship if required to return to Russia. According to the respondent, it is not open to the applicant to raise this argument now in his application for judicial review.

Analysis

Administrative law issues

27     The Court will first examine the administrative law issues raised by the applicant. The applicant's argument according to which the officer did not take into consideration an important element of evidence - namely, his ASL scores - must fail. Indeed, the officer's notes clearly show that she was aware of the applicant's deafness and of his high ASL scores (Tribunal Record, p 2). The officer's notes are part of her reasons for decision (Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th) 193). The officer considered the ASL scores, as well as the reading and writing scores, which were equal to and lower than the prescribed CLB of 4, respectively. It was reasonable for the officer to come to the conclusion that the applicant did not meet the language requirements based on these two (2) results alone. Indeed, given the points system prescribed by the regulatory framework at the time, and the absence of discretion under the Canadian experience class, it was impossible for the officer to accept the applicant's application with the scores he obtained on the reading and writing tests, regardless of his score on speaking/expressive and listening/receptive abilities. The record also shows that the applicant's representative's letter enclosed with the application acknowledges that the ASL results are equivalent to spoken and comprehended English (Tribunal Record, p 109).

28     The Court notes that the applicant only submitted a Schedule 8 form for an application under the Canadian experience class, and no Schedule 3 form for the federal skilled workers class. The Court can therefore find no error in the officer's decision to assess the applicant under the Canadian experience class - the only class for which the applicant provided a complete application. It would be imposing a heavy administrative burden on immigration officers to require them to assess applicants not only under the class for which they applied, but also under possible other classes to determine if the outcome there would be more successful. Contrary to the applicant's assertion, the officer did not engage in "cherry picking" of a class under which to evaluate the applicant, but evaluated the applicant in the only class for which his application was complete.

29     The Court finds that the officer did not err by assessing the applicant under the Canadian experience class, and only under the Canadian experience class, since this was the only form submitted by the applicant (Tribunal Record, Schedule 8, pp 99-101). The presence of this form, and the absence of the mandatory Schedule 3 for the federal skilled workers class, dispelled any ambiguity that might have arisen from the applicant's use of imprecise wording on his general application form. The applicant has not convinced this Court that the officer had a duty to contact him to perfect his application. There is no breach in procedural fairness.

Subsection 15(1) Charter violation

30     A subsection 15(1) claim involves a two-part test established by jurisprudence as follows: i) Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground? and ii) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? (Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12 at para 30, [2011] 1 SCR 396 [Withler]; R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para 17, [2008] 2 SCR 483). The Supreme Court of Canada in Withler, above at para 2, also stated that "[a]t the end of the day there is only one question: Does the challenged law violate the norm of substantive equality in s. 15(1) of the Charter?"

31     The Court first recalls the importance of a strong factual background for allegations of Charter violations, as illustrated by the following comment set forth by Justice Layden-Stevenson in Worthington, above at paras 24-25 :

 

·        [24] The mere existence of a constitutional question does not mean that the court is obliged to determine it. It is an established practice in Canadian law that, if a judge can decide a case without dealing with a constitutional issue, he or she should do so: R.J. Sharpe, K.E. Swinton and K. Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) at p. 97. It is incumbent on the court to ensure that a proper factual foundation exists before measuring legislation against the provisions of the Charter, particularly where the effects of impugned legislation are the subject of the attack: Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086 at 1099. Adjudicative facts are those that concern the immediate parties. They are specific and must be proved by admissible evidence: ibid. Charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual vacuum. To do so would trivialize the Charter and inevitably result in ill-considered opinions. The absence of a factual base is not just a technicality that can be overlooked, it is a flaw that is fatal: MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357 at 361. 

 

·        [25] This application is fraught with difficulties, the nature of judicial review being one of them. Judicial review proceedings are narrow in scope. Their essential purpose is the review of decisions for the purpose of assessing their legality. The reviewing court [absent exceptional circumstances not applicable here] is bound by the record that was before the judge or the board. Fairness to the parties and the court or tribunal under review dictates such a limitation: Bekker v. Canada (2004), 323 N.R. 195 (F.C.A.) (Bekker). The reviewing court must proceed on the record as it exists, confining itself to the criteria for judicial review: McKenna, supra, at paragraph 6. 

 

 
[Emphasis added.]
 
 

32     In MacKay v Manitoba, [1989] 2 SCR 357, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88 (QL) at para 9, referred to in the excerpt above, the Supreme Court of Canada had indicated the following:

 

·        [9] Charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual vacuum. To attempt to do so would trivialize the Charter and inevitably result in ill-considered opinions. The presentation of facts is not, as stated by the respondent, a mere technicality; rather, it is essential to a proper consideration of Charter issues. A respondent cannot, by simply consenting to dispense with the factual background, require or expect a court to deal with an issue such as this in a factual void. Charter decisions cannot be based upon the unsupported hypotheses of enthusiastic counsel. 

33     In the present case, the Court is of the view that the evidence in support of the applicant's Charter argument is insufficient.

34     For instance, the applicant presented this Court with no evidence as to why the ASL scores should replace, or have more weight than the reading and writing abilities. Also, the applicant argues that the Regulations do not "take into account the impairment on written language skills suffered by some Deaf persons due to an education system that disadvantages them due to attitudinal barriers" (Application Record, Applicant's Memorandum of Fact and Law, p 25, para 23). However, there is no evidence that deaf persons would have greater difficulty reading and writing than non-deaf persons, other than the applicant's personal experience with the primary school system in Russia.

35     Accordingly, the Court will not examine the applicant's arguments in that regard since the officer did not apply these provisions to him. Arguments of Charter violations will not be examined in a legal and factual vacuum (Worthington, above).

36     Given the factual pattern of this case and the lack of evidence adduced by the applicant with regard to the alleged violation of his section 15 Charter right to equality, the Court must decline to address the Charter question raised by the applicant.

37     The parties did not propose any question of general importance to be certified.

JUDGMENT

THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is dismissed. No question of general importance is certified.

BOIVIN J.

* * * * *

Annex

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27:

Selection of Permanent Residents

...

Economic immigration

 

·        12. (2) A foreign national may be selected as a member of the economic class on the basis of their ability to become economically established in Canada. 

* * *

Sélection des résidents permanents

[...]

Immigration économique

 

·        12. (2) La sélection des étrangers de la catégorie "immigration économique" se fait en fonction de leur capacité à réussir leur établissement économique au Canada. 

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 in force at the time of the decision:

Canadian Experience Class

Class

 

·        87.1 (1) For the purposes of subsection 12(2) of the Act, the Canadian experience class is prescribed as a class of persons who may become permanent residents on the basis of their experience in Canada and who intend to reside in a province other than the Province of Quebec. 

 

·        Member of the class 

 

·        (2) 

A foreign national is a member of the Canadian experience class if 

 

·        ... 

 

·        (b) they have had their proficiency in the English or French language assessed by an organization or institution designated under subsection (4) and have obtained proficiencies for their abilities to speak, listen, read and write that correspond to benchmarks, as referred to in Canadian Language Benchmarks 2000 for the English language and Niveaux de compétence linguistique canadiens 2006 for the French language, of 

 

·        (i) 

in the case of a foreign national who has acquired work experience in one or more occupations that are listed in Skill Type 0 Management Occupations or Skill Level A of the National Occupational Classification matrix, 

 

·        (A) 

7 or higher for each of those abilities, or 

·        (B) 

6 for any one of those abilities, 7 or higher for any other two of those abilities and 8 or higher for the remaining ability, and 

 

·        (ii) 

in the case of a foreign national who has acquired work experience in one or more occupations that are listed in Skill Level B of the National Occupational Classification matrix, 

 

·        (A) 

5 or higher for each of those abilities, or 

·        (B) 

4 for any one of those abilities, 5 or higher for any other two of those abilities and 6 or higher for the remaining ability. 

...

Designated organization

 

·        (4) 

The Minister may designate organizations or institutions to assess language proficiency for the purposes of this section and shall, for the purpose of correlating the results of such an assessment by a particular designated organization or institution with the benchmarks referred to in subsection (2), establish the minimum test result required to be awarded for each ability and each level of proficiency in the course of an assessment of language proficiency by that organization or institution in order to meet those benchmarks. 

* * *

Catégorie de l'expérience canadienne

Catégorie

 

·        87.1 (1) Pour l'application du paragraphe 12(2) de la Loi, la catégorie de l'expérience canadienne est une catégorie réglementaire de personnes qui peuvent devenir résidents permanents du fait de leur expérience au Canada et qui cherchent à s'établir dans une province autre que le Québec. 

 

·        Qualité 

 

·        (2) 

Fait partie de la catégorie de l'expérience canadienne l'étranger qui satisfait aux exigences suivantes : 

 

·        [...] 

 

·        b) il a fait évaluer sa compétence en français ou en anglais par une institution ou organisation désignée aux termes du paragraphe (4) et obtenu, pour les aptitudes à parler, à écouter, à lire et à écrire, selon le document intitulé Niveaux de compétence linguistique canadiens 2006, pour le français, et le Canadian Language Benchmarks 2000, pour l'anglais, les niveaux de compétence suivants : 

 

·        (i) 

s'il a une expérience de travail dans une ou plusieurs professions appartenant aux genre de compétence 0 Gestion ou niveaux de compétences A de la matrice de la Classification nationale des professions

 

·        (A) 

7 ou plus pour chacune des aptitudes, 

·        (B) 

6 pour l'une des aptitudes, 7 ou plus pour deux des aptitudes et 8 ou plus pour l'aptitude restante, 

 

·        (ii) 

s'il a une expérience de travail dans une ou plusieurs professions appartenant au niveau de compétences B de la matrice de la Classification nationale des professions

 

·        (A) 

5 ou plus pour chacune des aptitudes, 

·        (B) 

4 pour l'une des aptitudes, 5 ou plus pour deux aptitudes et 6 ou plus pour l'aptitude restante. 

[...]

Organisme désigné

 

·        (4) 

Le ministre peut désigner les institutions ou organisations chargées d'évaluer la compétence linguistique pour l'application du présent article et, en vue d'établir des équivalences entre les résultats de l'évaluation fournis par une institution ou organisation désignée et les niveaux de compétence mentionnés au paragraphe (2), il fixe le résultat de test minimal qui doit être attribué pour chaque aptitude et chaque niveau de compétence lors de l'évaluation de la compétence linguistique par cette institution ou organisation pour satisfaire aux niveaux mentionnés à ce paragraphe. 

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, currently in force:

General

Criteria

 

·        74. (1) For the purposes of paragraphs 75(2)(d), 79(3)(a), 87.1(2)(d) and (e) and 87.2(3)(a), the Minister shall fix, by class prescribed by these Regulations or by occupation, and make available to the public, minimum language proficiency thresholds on the basis of 

 

·        (a) the number of applications in all classes under this Part that are being processed; 

 

·        (b) the number of immigrants who are projected to become permanent residents according to the report to Parliament referred to in section 94 of the Act; and 

 

·        (c) the potential, taking into account the applicants' linguistic profiles and economic and other relevant factors, for the establishment in Canada of applicants under the federal skilled worker class, the Canadian experience class and the federal skilled trades class. 

 

·        Minimum language proficiency thresholds 

 

·        (2) 

The minimum language proficiency thresholds fixed by the Minister shall be established in reference to the benchmarks described in the Canadian Language Benchmarks and the Niveaux de compétence linguistique canadiens

 

·        Designation for evaluating language proficiency 

 

·        (3) 

The Minister may designate, for any period specified by the Minister, any organization or institution to be responsible for evaluating language proficiency if the organization or institution has expertise in evaluating language proficiency and if the organization or institution has provided a correlation of its evaluation results to the benchmarks set out in the Canadian Language Benchmarks and the Niveaux de compétence linguistique canadiens

...

Canadian Experience Class

Class

 

·        87.1 (1) For the purposes of subsection 12(2) of the Act, the Canadian experience class is prescribed as a class of persons who may become permanent residents on the basis of their ability to become economically established in Canada, their experience in Canada, and their intention to reside in a province other than the Province of Quebec. 

 

·        Member of the class 

 

·        (2) 

A foreign national is a member of the Canadian experience class if 

 

·        (a) they have acquired in Canada, within the three years before the date on which their application for permanent residence is made, at least one year of full-time work experience, or the equivalent in part-time work experience, in one or more occupations that are listed in Skill Type 0 Management Occupations or Skill Level A or B of the National Occupational Classification matrix, exclusive of restricted occupations; and 

 

·        (b) during that period of employment they performed the actions described in the lead statement for the occupation as set out in the occupational descriptions of the National Occupational Classification; 

 

·        (c) during that period of employment they performed a substantial number of the main duties of the occupation as set out in the occupational descriptions of the National Occupational Classification, including all of the essential duties; 

 

·        (d) they have had their proficiency in the English or French language evaluated by an organization or institution designated under subsection 74(3) and have met the applicable threshold fixed by the Minister under subsection 74(1) for each of the four language skill areas; and 

 

·        (e) in the case where they have acquired the work experience referred to in paragraph (a) in more than one occupation, they meet the threshold for proficiency in the English or French language, fixed by the Minister under subsection 74(1), for the occupation in which they have acquired the greater amount of work experience in the three years referred to in paragraph (a). 

* * *

Dispositions générales

Critères

 

·        74. (1) Pour l'application des alinéas 75(2)d), 79(3)a), 87.1(2)d) et e) et 87.2(3)a), le ministre établit, par catégorie réglementaire ou par profession, les niveaux de compétence linguistique minimaux en se fondant sur les éléments ci-après et en informe le public : 

 

·        a) le nombre de demandes en cours de traitement au titre de toutes les catégories prévues à la présente partie; 

 

·        b) le nombre d'immigrants qui devraient devenir résidents permanents selon le rapport présenté au Parlement conformément à l'article 94 de la Loi; 

 

·        c) les perspectives d'établissement au Canada des demandeurs au titre de la catégorie des travailleurs qualifiés (fédéral), de la catégorie de l'expérience canadienne et de la catégorie des travailleurs de métiers spécialisés (fédéral), compte tenu de leur profil linguistique, des facteurs économiques et d'autres facteurs pertinents. 

 

·        Niveaux de compétence linguistique minimaux 

 

·        (2) 

Les niveaux de compétence linguistique minimaux établis par le ministre sont fixés d'après les normes prévues dans les Niveaux de compétence linguistique canadiens et dans le Canadian Language Benchmarks

 

·        Désignation pour l'évaluation de la compétence linguistique 

 

·        (3) 

Le ministre peut désigner, pour la durée qu'il précise, toute institution ou organisation chargée d'évaluer la compétence linguistique si l'institution ou l'organisation possède de l'expertise en la matière et si elle a fourni une équivalence des résultats de ses tests d'évaluation linguistique avec les normes prévues dans les Niveaux de compétence linguistique canadiens et dans le Canadian Language Benchmarks

[...]

Catégorie de l'expérience canadienne

Catégorie

 

·        87.1 (1) Pour l'application du paragraphe 12(2) de la Loi, la catégorie de l'expérience canadienne est une catégorie réglementaire de personnes qui peuvent devenir résidents permanents du fait de leur capacité à réussir leur établissement économique au Canada et de leur expérience au Canada et qui cherchent à s'établir dans une province autre que le Québec. 

 

·        Qualité 

 

·        (2) 

Fait partie de la catégorie de l'expérience canadienne l'étranger qui satisfait aux exigences suivantes : 

 

·        a) l'étranger a accumulé au Canada au moins une année d'expérience de travail à temps plein, ou l'équivalent temps plein pour un travail à temps partiel, dans au moins une des professions, autre qu'une profession d'accès limité, appartenant au genre de compétence 0 Gestion ou aux niveaux de compétence A ou B de la matrice de la Classification nationale des professions au cours des trois ans précédant la date de présentation de sa demande de résidence permanente; 

 

·        b) pendant cette période d'emploi, il a accompli l'ensemble des tâches figurant dans l'énoncé principal établi pour la profession dans les descriptions des professions de la Classification nationale des professions; 

 

·        c) pendant cette période d'emploi, il a exercé une partie appréciable des fonctions principales de la profession figurant dans les descriptions des professions de la Classification nationale des professions, notamment toutes les fonctions essentielles; 

 

·        d) il a fait évaluer sa compétence en français ou en anglais par une institution ou organisation désignée en vertu du paragraphe 74(3) et obtenu, pour chacune des quatre habiletés langagières, le niveau de compétence applicable établi par le ministre en vertu du paragraphe 74(1); 

 

·        e) s'il a acquis l'expérience de travail visée à l'alinéa a) dans le cadre de plus d'une profession, il a obtenu le niveau de compétence en anglais ou en français établi par le ministre en vertu du paragraphe 74(1) à l'égard de la profession pour laquelle il a acquis le plus d'expérience au cours des trois années visées à l'alinéa a). 

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.

GUARANTEE OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

Rights and freedoms in Canada

 

·        1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 

 

·        ... 

 

·        EQUALITY RIGHTS 

 

·        Equality before and under law and equal protection and benefit of law 

 

·        15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 

 

·        ... 

* * *

GARANTIE DES DROITS ET LIBERTÉS

Droits et libertés au Canada

 

·        1. La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés garantit les droits et libertés qui y sont énoncés. Ils ne peuvent être restreints que par une règle de droit, dans des limites qui soient raisonnables et dont la justification puisse se démontrer dans le cadre d'une société libre et démocratique. 

 

·        [...] 

 

·        DROITS A L'ÉGALITÉ 

 

·        Égalité devant la loi, égalité de bénéfice et protection égale de la loi 

 

·        15. (1) La loi ne fait acception de personne et s'applique également à tous, et tous ont droit à la même protection et au même bénéfice de la loi, indépendamment de toute discrimination, notamment des discriminations fondées sur la race, l'origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l'âge ou les déficiences mentales ou physiques. 

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