Paashazadeh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)
Between
Neinoush Paashazadeh, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent
Neinoush Paashazadeh, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent
[2015] F.C.J. No. 327
2015 FC 327
Docket: IMM-6532-13
Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario
Zinn J.
Heard: January 28, 2015.
Judgment: March 16, 2015.
Docket: IMM-6532-13
Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario
Zinn J.
Heard: January 28, 2015.
Judgment: March 16, 2015.
(29 paras.)
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
1 ZINN
J.:-- The applicant asks the court to quash a decision of the Program Manager
at the Canadian Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, which held that she was inadmissible
for misrepresentation pursuant to paragraph 40(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC
2001, c 27. For the reasons that follow, this application must be dismissed.
Background
2 The
applicant is a citizen of Iran residing in Tehran. From May 2005 to January
2009, she was employed as an advertising consultant at Nikyari Air Service
[Nikyari] and she has been employed by Chi Chast Construction Company [Chi
Cast] as a marketing coordinator since September 2009. On September 14, 2010,
she was offered employment at Petro-Ex Canada Inc. as a marketing and
advertising specialist.
3 Relevant
to this application, on September 28, 2011, the applicant began working
part-time with Apadana Caravan Tourism Company [Adapana] as a means, she says,
to earn additional income to support her family.
4 When
the applicant applied on June 18, 2012, for permanent residence under the
Federal Skilled Worker [FSW] category she listed the Nikyari and Chi Chast
positions as her employment experience. Her evidence on this application is
that, due to the nature of the Adapana employment, she did not believe that
this "side" job was significant enough to disclose.
5 When
on June 30, 2012, the applicant became a full-time employee of Adapana, she
says that she did not believe that it was necessary to report this employment
since she had already fulfilled the employment experience requirements of the
FSW class.
6 To
verify her employment, the applicant was asked by an officer to provide her
Social Security Organization certificate [SSO]. The applicant provided
additional documentation from her employer but not the requested SSO.
7 On
June 18, 2013, a procedural fairness letter was sent to advise the applicant
that she would be receiving zero points for work experience because the officer
was not satisfied that she had been employed as stated in the application due
to her failure to provide the SSO.
8 On
July 5, 2013, the applicant wrote to the Embassy and provided the requested
SSO, which showed that she had been employed at Adapana since September 2011.
It is her evidence that the officer's request for proof of insurance prompted
her to disclose the Adapana employment because before this point, she did not
believe that this information was either necessary or material to her
application.
9 On
August 7, 2013, the applicant received an email from an officer at the Embassy
alleging that she had misled the officer and misrepresented her employment by
failing to disclose her employment with Adapana at the time of her application.
The officer advised that the matter would be forwarded to his supervisor, the
Program Manager, for final determination. The Applicant was given 30 days to
provide additional information.
10 On
September 5, 2013, the applicant sent another letter to the Embassy explaining
that she had already fulfilled the employment requirements of the FSW class at
the time of the application, so she did not think it was necessary to disclose
her part-time employment. She expressed that she did not intentionally withhold
this information and had honestly believed that it was immaterial to her
application.
11 The
Program Manager refused the application on the basis that the applicant had
misrepresented her employment under subsection 40(1) of the Act and therefore
did not qualify for permanent residence in Canada. The Program Manager did not
believe the explanation that the applicant did not know that she had to submit
her employment at Adapana since it is clear on the form that all activities
must be listed. The Program Manager found that the "misrepresentation or
withholding of this/these materials fact(s) induced or could have induced
errors in the administration of the Act because a complete and accurate
employment history is material the assessment of your eligibility and your
admissibility."
Issues
12 The
applicant submits that the following issues arise:
Is mens rea required under subsection 40(1) of
the Act; and
Did the applicant's
omission constitute a "material fact" for the purpose of subsection
40(1) of the Act?
Mens Rea
13 The
applicant submits that the first issue regarding mens
rea under subsection 40(1) of the Act should be
reviewed on the standard of correctness. I agree with the respondent that this
is a question of law related to the interpretation of the officer's home
statute and is therefore reviewable on the reasonableness standard: See Oloumi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2012 FC 428 at para 13 [Oloumi], citing Alberta (Information and Privacy
Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers' Association, 2011 SCC
61 at paras 46, 48).
14 The
applicant submits that the fact that the word "knowingly" is absent
in subsection 40(1) suggests that having knowledge of misrepresentation should
not play a role in finding misrepresentation. On the other hand, she points out
that section 127 of the Act states that no person shall knowingly directly or indirectly misrepresent
or withhold material facts related to a relevant matter that induces or could
induce an error. Contravening section 127 of the Act is an offence. The
applicant submits that removing knowledge as a prerequisite of an
inadmissibility finding under subsection 40(1) means that the liberty interest
of an applicant could be impacted even if they had not intended to commit a
misrepresentation. The applicant cites Osianwo v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 378
[Osianwo] wherein Justice Hughes
allowed the application based on the lack of mens rea in making a misrepresentation.
15 The
applicant here submits that she did not knowingly or intentionally withhold a
material fact that would induce an error because she honestly believed it was
not necessary to report the information. Therefore, she argues that this is the
type of case that falls within the exception to the general rule.
16 I
agree with the respondent that the applicant was clearly aware that she was
employed at Adapana at the time of the application, so her statement that she
did not know she was making a misrepresentation within the meaning of section
40 of the Act lacks merit.
17 Moreover,
I agree that the applicant failed to discharge the onus of ensuring the
completeness and accuracy of her application. The instructions on the form
require an applicant to provide details of their personal history and
specifically indicate that detailed information is to be provided for the
previous 10-year period. Moreover, the instructions indicate that letters of
reference from all employers
for the past ten years must be provided, so the applicant was informed that all
of her employment experience for that period was relevant to her application.
In addition, the form requires a "solemn declaration" from an
applicant "that the information I have given in the foregoing application
is truthful, complete and correct."
18 Even
if the applicant's omission could be characterized as an innocent mistake, it
would still fall within subsection 40(1) of the Act because it has been held to
encompass innocent failures to provide material information: Baro v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1299 at para 15; Canada (Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Abdallah,
2013 FC 1053 at para 17; Gobordhun v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 971 at para 28;
and Sayedi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FC 420 at paras 40, 42, 44, 52.
19 Moreover,
I accept the submission of the respondent that because it has been held that
the provision also covers misrepresentation made by another party - intention
of the applicant is not required for this provision to apply: See Oloumi; Singh v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 378
at paras 16, 18; Mahmood v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 433 at para 22; Jiang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 942 at para 35; and Wang v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1059
at paras 55-58.
20 The
court in Oloumi (and in eight
similar cases decided on the same day by Justice Tremblay-Lamer) considered the
proposition from Osisanwo relied
on by the applicant and held that the general rule is that a misrepresentation
can occur without the applicant's knowledge. The court noted that there is a
narrow exception for "truly exceptional
circumstances where the applicant honestly and
reasonably believed they were not misrepresenting a material fact."
21 This
is not one of those truly exceptional cases referred to in Oloumi as the applicant was aware the
information was being withheld and she chose not to include it because she
thought it was not significant. Given the application instructions and
correspondence with the Embassy, this was not an honest and reasonable belief.
Material Fact
22 The
applicant submits that her employment at Adapana was not a "material
fact" because the outcome would have been the same, regardless of whether
she had worked at Adapana or not, since her listed employment experience
allotted her the maximum points that could be awarded under the experience
category. Because her work at Adapana has no effect on her eligibility to the
FSW class, it was not material.
23 Further,
the applicant says that she disclosed this information as soon as it came to
her attention that it was or could have been relevant to her application. This
submission I reject completely. The applicant failed to provide the requested
documentation until she was told that she was being awarded zero points for her
work experience.
24 The
applicant cites Taei v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No 203 for the
principle that "[the] rule of law does not require statutes be read and
interpreted in a robotic mindless manner" and that common sense may still
be applied. She submits that the purpose of the Act is to permit immigration,
not prevent it and she argues that it makes no sense to prevent her from
immigrating when she has arranged employment and has already obtained the
necessary scores to qualify.
25 It
has been held that the purpose of paragraph 40(1)(a) is to ensure that
applicants provide complete, honest and truthful information and to deter
misrepresentation: Bodine v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 848 at para 44;
and Kobrosli v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FC 757 at paras 46-48. It has
further been held that full disclosure is fundamental to the proper and fair
administration of the immigration scheme: Khan v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 512
at para 25; and Oloumi at para
23.
26 A
misrepresentation need not be decisive or determinative to be material; it must
only be important enough to affect the process: See Sayedi
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2012 FC 420 at paras 26-27. I agree with the respondent that a failure
(innocent or otherwise) to supply a "truthful, complete and correct"
application is material because it prevents the reviewing officer from
assessing all of the
applicant's personal facts and to verify all of the information concerning an
applicant to determine whether he or she is properly admissible to Canada.
27 The
applicant proposed two questions for certification:
· Question 1: Is mens rea required for a finding of misrepresentation per s. 40(1) where such
a finding results in application of s. 127 of the IRPA, with possible enforcement of imprisonment upon the applicant who
misrepresented material facts?
· Question 2: Is a self-serving purpose a required element in
misrepresentation of material facts that may "induce or could induce an
error in the administration of [IRPA]", pursuant to s. 40(1) of the IRPA? Alternatively, if there
is no benefit in misrepresenting a material fact, should the Applicant who,
whether indirectly or directly, misrepresented said fact be found inadmissible
under s. 40(1)?
28 I
agree with the respondent that Question 1 is not certifiable because it cannot
be said to be determinative of any appeal. Section 127 does include a
requirement that the person does the act "knowingly." Section 127 is
not at play in the impugned decision as there was no finding made by the
Program Manager that this applicant made the misrepresentation knowingly;
rather she states that the applicant "misrepresented or withheld"
information.
29 The
second question is also not certifiable because the law is well established as
to the proper interpretation of subsection 40(1) of the Act. It is irrelevant
whether the misrepresentation is self-serving or not as that is not a stated
requirement in the legislative provision.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that the application is dismissed and no question is certified.
ZINN J.
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