Showing posts with label Canada Immigration citizenship. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Canada Immigration citizenship. Show all posts

Saturday, May 9, 2015

ADOPTED CHILDREN DENIED CITIZENSHIP AS IMMIGRATION HISTORY CONSIDERED

Adoption cases are rare, and this one is even more rare. Not one but four children  are in the limelight in this case. 

Dela Roca v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between
Cristeta L. Dela Roca, Agapito Manalo Dela
Roca, James Russel Dela Roca, Mac
Marlo Dela Roca, Joseph Mari Dela
Roca, Julius Stephen Dela Roca,
Applicants, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent
[2015] F.C.J. No. 524
2015 FC 555

Docket: T-1790-14

 Federal Court
Vancouver, British Columbia

Harrington J.


Heard: April 22, 2015.
Judgment: April 28, 2015.
(19 paras.)



JUDGMENT AND REASONS
1     HARRINGTON J.:-- In 2005, Cristeta L. Dela Roca and her husband Agapito Manalo legally adopted her brother's four sons in the Philippines. They are: Mac Marlo born in 1988; Joseph Mari born in 1990; James Russel born in 1992; and Julius Stephen born in 1994.
2     Mrs. Dela Roca and her husband first tried to bring their four adopted sons to Canada as members of the family class in accordance with the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act [IRPA] and Regulations thereunder. The visa applications were denied and Mrs. Dela Roca's appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division [IAD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board was dismissed. They did not apply for leave and judicial review of that decision.
3     The Citizenship Act has been amended so that adopted children need not become permanent residents before applying for citizenship. They applied. However, their applications were denied as the citizenship officer was not satisfied that the adoptions were in their best interests, that a genuine relationship of parent and child was created and that the adoptions were not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege in relation to immigration or citizenship. As such, the requirements of s. 5.1 of the Citizenship Act were not met. This is the judicial review of that decision.
4     Although there were four separate appeals under Court docket numbers T-1790-14, T-1791-14, T-1792,-14 and T-1793-14, by order dated 26 January 2015, they were consolidated under the lead file T-1790-14, and the style of cause was amended so that the adoptive parents and all four adopted sons are shown as applicants.
I. Judicial Review Dismissed
5     As I am of the view that it was reasonably open to the citizenship officer to determine that the adoption was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege in relation to citizenship, this judicial review is dismissed. Consequently, it is not necessary to discuss in any detail whether the adoptions were in the best interests of the children and whether a genuine relationship of parent and child was created.
II. Analysis
6     Mrs. Dela Roca's brother and his wife, the birth parents of the four boys, and the four boys themselves, were all interviewed by the visa officer in 2007. The officer's notes are quite detailed. Apart from establishing that daily life continued just as it had before, with the birth parents and their children continuing to live under the same roof, the birth parents and the four boys are reported to have said that the boys would enjoy a better life in Canada. The visa applications were denied as the officer was not satisfied that the adoption was not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege under IRPA. The officer's notes record the following exchanges at the interview:

·       Do you know why your spr want to adopt the 4 of you? Yes. Why? So that we can have a better future. Do you think you will have a better future if you are in cda? Yes. Because the govt supports students there. Because they can support all our needs. We can find jobs there. 

·       ... 

·       Your children wants to be adopted by the spr? Yes. Why? Because they know that they will have a better future there. They want to go to cda. 
7     Mrs. Dela Roca, a Canadian citizen, appealed to the IAD. Apart from herself, she only called one of her adopted sons as a witness, Joseph Mari. He was found not to be credible in that he was trying to retreat from what he had said to the visa officer the year before, particularly as regards living arrangements with his birth parents. The appeal was dismissed, again on the grounds that the primary purpose was to gain status or advantage under IRPA and that the adoption did not create a genuine parent-child relationship.
8     As mentioned above, no application for leave and judicial review of that decision was filed.
9     In 2007, the Citizenship Act was amended to add section 5.1, subsection (1) of which reads:

·       5.1 (1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), the Minister shall, on application, grant citizenship to a person who was adopted by a citizen on or after January 1, 1947 while the person was a minor child if the adoption 

·       (a) was in the best interests of the child; 

·       (b
created a genuine relationship of parent and 
·       child; 
  

·       (c) was in accordance with the laws of the place where the adoption took place and the laws of the country of residence of the adopting citizen; and 

·       (d) was not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege in relation to immigration or citizenship. 
* * *

·       5.1 (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (3) et (4), le ministre attribue, sur demande, la citoyenneté à la personne adoptée par un citoyen le 1er janvier 1947 ou subséquemment lorsqu'elle était un enfant mineur. L'adoption doit par ailleurs satisfaire aux conditions suivantes: 

·       a
elle a été faite dans l'intérêt supérieur de 
·       l'enfant; 
  

·       b) elle a créé un véritable lien affectif parent-enfant entre l'adoptant et l'adopté; 

·       c) elle a été faite conformément au droit du lieu de l'adoption et du pays de résidence de l'adoptant; 

·       d) elle ne visait pas principalement l'acquisition d'un statut ou d'un privilège relatifs à l'immigration ou à la citoyenneté. 
10     The citizenship officer relied heavily on the notes taken by the visa officer in 2007. In addition, new evidence by way of affidavit was rejected as being after the fact and self-serving.
11     It was submitted that the visa officer's notes should not have been taken into consideration at all because:

·       a. 
there was no affidavit from the officer who took the notes; 

·       b. 
the four boys, three of whom were still minors in 2007, were interviewed together; 

·       c. 
part of the interview was in English, even though the four boys only had a tenuous grasp thereof; 

·       d. 
there was no interpreter present; and 

·       e. 
the notes were inaccurate in some respects. 
12     The citizenship officer was quite entitled to take into consideration the visa officer's notes and the decision of the IAD. There is no requirement that they had to be accompanied by an affidavit. Issues of procedural fairness in respect of the 2007 interview should have been raised before the IAD and were not. It is quite improper to raise them before this Court several years later (Uppal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 338 at para 52).
13     The citizenship officer had issued a fairness letter stating that she was not satisfied that the adoptions were in the children's best interests, that a genuine relationship of parent and child was created and that the adoptions were not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring status or privilege in relation to immigration or citizenship. The applicants were given an opportunity to address those concerns. Although they now say the letter was procedurally unfair in that it was too vague, they did file further evidence, rather than request particulars.
14     It was not unreasonable for the citizenship officer to discount the affidavits on the basis that they were after the fact (obviously, after the 2007 interview) and self-serving. Clearly, the four sons wish they had not said what they did in 2007.
15     The applicants have been backtracking ever since.
16     I might well have come to a different conclusion had the only two grounds for refusing citizenship been the best interests of the children and whether or not a genuine relationship of parent and child was created.
17     Mrs. Dela Roca takes strong issue with the officer's view that she only did what a loving and generous aunt would do. She says she did far more, and she may well be right. However, what could she do as an adoptive mother which she could not do as an aunt? The answer is straightforward -- bring her adopted sons to Canada!
18     It was not unreasonable for the citizenship officer to form the view that the adoptions were primarily for the purpose of gaining status or privilege in relation to citizenship. As citizens, the four sons could have come to Canada, and left, as they pleased.
19     There is no serious question of general importance to certify.
JUDGMENT

·       THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that

·       1. 
The application for judicial review is dismissed. 

·       2. 
There is no serious question of general importance to certify. 

·       3. 
A copy of this decision shall be placed in Court File Nos. T-1791-14, T-1792-14 and T-1793-14. 
HARRINGTON J

Friday, February 27, 2015

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA REFUSED TO HEAR OATH TO THE QUEEN CASE

The Supreme Court of Canada yesterday refused to hear the case where several individualist objected to taking the Oath to the Queen to become citizens. Here is the brief decision:

McAteer v. Canada (Attorney General)

Michael McAteer, Simone E.A. Topey, Dror Bar-Natan
v.
Attorney General of Canada
[2014] S.C.C.A. No. 444
[2014] C.S.C.R. no 444
File No.: 36120

 Supreme Court of Canada

Record created: October 8, 2014.
Record updated: February 26, 2015.
Appeal From:
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

Status:
Application for leave to appeal dismissed without costs (without reasons) February 26, 2015.

Catchwords:


 Charter of Rights -- Freedom of expression -- Freedom of religion -- Freedom of conscience -- Right to equality -- Citizenship -- Legislation -- Interpretation -- Does a statutory requirement that compels a ceremonial oath or pledge have the purpose of "controlling expression" -- Does this Court's Amselem test apply to a freedom of conscience claim and, if so, how -- What evidence or rationale does the government need to constitutionally justify its requirement for a ceremonial oath or pledge -- Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, ss. 3(1)(c) and 12(3) -- Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 2004 SCC 47.
Case Summary: 
The three applicants are permanent residents of Canada. Although they wish to become Canadian citizens, they each object to the statutory requirement under the Citizenship Act to take an oath of allegiance to the Queen. Michael McAteer emigrated from Ireland and argues taking the oath would be a betrayal of his republican heritage and impede his activities in support of ending the Canadian monarchy. Simone Topey emigrated from Jamaica and claims that it would violate her religious beliefs as a Rastafarian to make an oath to the person who is the head of Babylon. Dror Bar-Natan emigrated from Israel and argued that it would violate his belief in equality of all persons to swear allegiance to a symbol of inequality where some must bow to others for reasons of ancestry. They seek a declaration that an oath requiring them to bear true allegiance to "Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors" violates their rights under sections 2(a), (b) and 15(1) of the Charter and are not saved by s. 1.
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding: i) there was no violation of sections 2(a) and 15(1) of the Charter; ii) the oath was a form of compelled speech that prima facie violates s. 2(b) Charter rights; and iii) the violation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the applicants' appeal but allowed the respondent's cross-appeal and set aside that part of the lower court judgment holding that the oath violates s. 2(b) of the Charter.



Chronology:

·        1. 
Application for leave to appeal: 

·        FILED: October 8, 2014.
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT: January 26, 2015.
DISMISSED WITHOUT COSTS: February 26, 2015 (without
reasons).
Before: Abella, Karakatsanis and Côté JJ. 
Procedural History:
Judgment at first instance: Applicants' application for a
declaration dismissed.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Morgan J.), September
20, 2013.
2013 ONSC 5895.

Judgment on appeal: Appeal dismissed; respondent's
cross-appeal allowed.
Court of Appeal for Ontario (Weiler, Lauwers and Pardu
JJ.A.), August 13, 2014.
2014 ONCA 578; [2014] O.J. No. 3728.

Friday, November 21, 2014

SERGIO R. KARAS QUOTED IN TODAY'S NATIONAL POST CITIZENSHIP STORY

I was quoted in today's National Post story on a very strange case concerning the erroneous grant of citizenship to a person who failed the test twice.

http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/11/20/comedy-of-errors-let-woman-become-canadian-citizen-despite-abysmal-results-on-citizenship-tests/

November 20, 2014

'Comedy of errors' lets woman become Canadian citizen despite abysmal results on citizenship tests

By Adrian Humphreys 

The judge noted in writing that Ms. Afzal failed the tests and did not qualify but mistakenly checked the 'Granted' box on the decision form, court...

TORONTO - A would-be Canadian who received a grade of zero out of six on her citizenship language test and four out of 20 on the test's knowledge component was nonetheless granted a Canadian citizenship certificate.
A "series of administrative errors" put Haheen Afzal - despite her abysmal results on the tests - before a citizenship judge in Hamilton, Ont., swearing an oath to the Queen and being issued a citizenship certificate.
When the mistake was discovered, Ms. Afzal did not want to surrender her citizenship and fought to keep it.
The errant ceremony took place on Sept. 26, 2013, but the legal dispute - leading to its cancellation - was only recently resolved in the Federal Court of Canada.
Ms. Afzal failed the citizenship test twice before being awarded a citizenship certificate: the first time she scored 2/6 on language and 8/20 on knowledge. When she appeared before a citizenship judge and tried again, she scored even worse.
The citizenship judge noted in writing that Ms. Afzal failed the tests and did not qualify but mistakenly checked the "Granted" box on the decision form, court heard.
The next day, an official at the Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) office acknowledged that the judge's decision had been "seen" and checked "Citizenship Granted" before sending the form along for processing.
A few days later, Ms. Afzal was asked to appear for a citizenship ceremony and she took the Oath of Citizenship.
After the ceremony a citizenship clerk finally noticed the mistake. He twice phoned Ms. Afzal and left messages.
The calls were not returned.
Two months later, CIC cancelled the certificate.
In court, her lawyer argued CIC bureaucrats did not have authority to cancel citizenship, only the Governor-in-Council, which acts on behalf of the Crown, has such power.
'It is unclear how often these mistakes happen. This situation merits a thorough investigation'
To accept that, Federal Court Justice Donald Rennie said in his ruling, would rise to the level of "absurdity."
Before someone can become a Canadian citizen, they are required to demonstrate linguistic competence in either of Canada's official languages and show an adequate knowledge of Canada's social, civic and political norms.
"These competencies must be established before citizenship can be granted," Judge Rennie ruled.
Based on those criteria, even though a citizenship certificate was issued, the pre-conditions to citizenship had never been met, he said. Therefore, citizenship was not so much being revoked as a certificate that had not been legally issued was being cancelled. And that was within the power of CIC bureaucrats.
"This interpretation also ensures that the privilege of Canadian citizenship is granted only as intended by Parliament," said Judge Rennie.
Neither Ms. Afzal nor her lawyer could be reached for comment Wednesday.
The case reveals troubling problems with CIC officials, said Sergio Karas, an immigration lawyer and analyst who is a former chair of the Ontario Bar Association's immigration section.
"One would expect that citizenship applicants would be vetted extensively for compliance with residency, security and knowledge testing," Mr. Karas said.
"It is amazing that such a vetting process appears to have been a comedy of errors in this case.
"One is left to wonder about the level of competence and care that some Citizenship and Immigration Canada employees may be demonstrating. ... It is unclear how often these mistakes happen. This situation merits a thorough investigation of internal policies and practices."
Sonia Lesage, a spokeswoman for CIC, defended the department. "These safeguards worked in this instance as we found the error and fixed it. The certificate was cancelled in November 2013 and the Federal Court upheld our process."
National Post

Saturday, November 8, 2014

CITIZENSHIP GRANTED IN ERROR CAN BE REVOKED

In the unusual case below, there were a series of administrative errors by Citizenship officials. The Federal Court held that the legislation contemplated this case and that to hold otherwise would lead to an "absurdity" where a person who was not legally entitled to citizenship would enjoy that valuable privilege.  Note that the court indicates that the applicant "did not return phone calls" when officers discovered the error and wanted to correct it. Of  course...

The better question, however, is what kind of incompetence prevails at Citizenship and Immigration, a department that does not distinguish itself for efficiency and thoroughness?

Afzal v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between
Shaheen Afzal, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent
[2014] F.C.J. No. 1084
2014 FC 1028

Docket: T-2042-13

 Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario

Rennie J.


Heard: August 13, 2014.
Judgment: October 29, 2014.
(35 paras.)


JUDGMENT AND REASONS
1     RENNIE J.:-- On September 26, 2013, the applicant attended before a citizenship judge in Hamilton, Ontario, swore the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and committed to faithfully observe the laws of Canada. She was issued a certificate of citizenship and left at the conclusion of the ceremony a Canadian citizen. Or did she?
2     Previously, the applicant had failed both of the mandatory pre-conditions to citizenship established by section 5(1)(d) and (e) of the Citizenship Act (RSC, 1985, c C-29) (the Act):

·       Grant of citizenship

·       5. 
(1) The Minister shall grant citizenship to any person who 
[...]

·       (d) 
has an adequate knowledge of one of the official languages of Canada; 

·       (e) 
has an adequate knowledge of Canada and of the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship; 
* * *

·       Attribution de la citoyenneté

·       5. 
(1) Le ministre attribue la citoyenneté à toute personne qui, à la fois : 
[...]

·       d) 
a une connaissance suffisante de l'une des langues officielles du Canada; 

·       e) 
a une connaissance suffisante du Canada et des responsabilités et avantages conférés par la citoyenneté; 
3     On the written test, the applicant scored 2/6 on the language component and 8/20 on the knowledge component. Her scores did not improve on her subsequent appearance before the citizenship judge, receiving 0/6 on the language component and 4/20 on the knowledge component. The citizenship judge checked the boxes indicating that the applicant did not meet the mandatory requirements of section 5(1)(d) and (e). In the "Reasons" section the judge wrote:

·       Applicant signed ICES consent form. The Applicant failed the language hearing 0/6 and does not comply with paragraph 5(1)(d) of the Citizenship Act. The Applicant failed the knowledge hearing 4/20 and does not comply with paragraph 5(1)(e) of the Citizenship Act. 
4     No recommendation was made by the citizenship judge to the Minister under section 5(3) of the Act that the Minister grant citizenship on compassionate grounds.
5     There ensued a series of administrative errors. The citizenship judge checked the wrong "Decision" box, indicating that the application for Canadian citizenship was granted. The next day, on September 5, 2013, the departmental citizenship official responsible for processing the file signed the box "Decision seen" and checked the box "Citizenship Granted 5(1)," compounding the original error. A few days later, the applicant received a notice to appear for a citizenship ceremony and on September 26, 2013, she took the Oath of Citizenship and was given a citizenship certificate.
6     Immediately after the ceremony however, citizenship officer Jean-Simon Cantin, who served as clerk for the citizenship ceremony (and was not the officer who checked the "Decision seen" box), observed the error. He immediately called the applicant at her home and left a message with her son. The next day, officer Cantin called the applicant on her cellular phone, again leaving a message. The calls were not returned.
7     On or about November 22, 2013, the Registrar concluded that the applicant had been issued the certificate in error, and pursuant to section 26(3) of the Citizenship Regulations (SOR/93-246) (Regulations), cancelled the citizenship certificate. Section 26(3) of the Regulations provides:

·       26 (3) Where the Minister has determined that the holder of a certificate of naturalization, certificate of citizenship, miniature certificate of citizenship or other certificate that contains the holder's photograph, or certificate of renunciation, issued or granted under the Act or prior legislation or any regulations made thereunder is not entitled to the certificate, the Registrar shall cancel the certificate

·       (emphasis added) 
* * *

·       26 (3) Lorsque le ministre a déterminé que le titulaire d'un certificat de naturalisation, d'un certificat de citoyenneté, d'un certificat de citoyenneté petit format ou autre certificat de citoyenneté portant sa photographie, ou d'un certificat de répudiation délivré ou attribué en vertu de la Loi ou de la législation antérieure ou en application de leurs règlements n'a pas droit à ce certificat, le greffier annule le certificat

·       (je souligne) 
8     In sum, the applicant received a highly valued privilege which the Minister seeks to take back, and the question framed for decision is whether the Regulations provide the authority to do so. The applicant contends that the Regulations do not confer in the Registrar the authority to revoke a certificate of citizenship. The Regulations are not a collateral mechanism to supplement the statutory grounds under which citizenship, once obtained, can be lost. Section 7 in Part II of the Act, makes this clear:

·       No loss except as provided

·       7. 
A person who is a citizen shall not cease to be a citizen except in accordance with this Part or regulations made under paragraph 27(j.1). 
* * *

·       Perte de la citoyenneté

·       7. 
Le citoyen ne peut perdre sa citoyenneté que dans les cas prévus à la présente partie ou aux règlements pris en vertu de l'alinéa 27(j.1). 
9     The applicant also says that the cancellation was unlawful as the decision was made without notice to her and in breach of procedural fairness and must be set aside.
10     Before considering these arguments, I turn to the consequences of the failure of the Minister to appeal the decision of the citizenship judge. No notice of appeal from the decision of the citizenship judge was filed even though the Minister and his officials had knowledge of the error within the 60-day appeal period provided by section 14(5). The applicant contends that, having missed the appeal period, the Registrar cannot, through the device of an administrative, regulatory provision, collaterally attack the decision of the citizenship judge.
11     In my view, this argument is a distraction from the central question of the interpretation of the statute and regulations. Subsequent to the issuance of the certificate, no appeal could be taken from the citizenship judge's decision. That decision was spent, replaced by the oath and certificate. It must be remembered that the error was discovered after the certificate was issued and the oath taken. It was too late to appeal -- not because 60 days had expired, which it had not, but because the factual substratum of the appeal had evaporated. The foundation of the applicant's claim or proof of citizenship was no longer the citizenship judge's decision, but rather it was the certificate of citizenship.
I. Issues and Standard of Review
12     The central question before the Court is the resolution of the tension or interface between section 7 of the Act and section 26(3) of the Regulations. The Regulations upon which the Registrar relied to cancel the certificate are authorized by section 27 of the Act. Section 27(j) and (k) of the Act provide:

·       Regulations

·       27. 
The Governor in Council may make regulations 
[...]

·       (j) 
providing for the surrender and retention of certificates of citizenship, certificates of naturalization or certificates of renunciation issued or granted under this Act or prior legislation or any regulations made thereunder if there is reason to believe that the holder thereof may not be entitled thereto or has contravened any of the provisions of this Act; 
[...]

·       (k) 
providing for the surrender and cancellation of certificates referred to in paragraph (j) where the holder thereof has ceased to be entitled thereto; 

·       (emphasis added) 
* * *

·       Règlements

·       27. 
Le gouverneur en conseil peut, par règlement 
[...]

·       j) 
régir la restitution et la rétention des certificats de citoyenneté, de naturalisation ou de répudiation délivrés en vertu de la présente loi ou de la législation antérieure ou en application de leurs règlements lorsqu'il y a des raisons de croire que leur titulaire n'y a peut-être pas droit ou a enfreint la présente loi; 
[...]

·       k) 
régir la restitution et l'annulation des certificats mentionnés à l'alinéa j) lorsque leur titulaire a cessé d'y avoir droit; 

·       (je souligne) 
13     The core of the applicant's position is that in section 7, Parliament directed its mind to the circumstances under which citizenship could be lost and expressly prescribed the extent to which citizenship could be lost using regulatory authority. Neither of the exceptions in section 7 (misrepresentation or material disclosure) nor the circumstances contemplated by regulation 27(j.1) (born outside of Canada to a Canadian but did not become a citizen prior to February 15, 1977) are engaged in this case.
14     The central question, being one of statutory interpretation, is assessed against a correctness standard of review. Whether there was a breach of procedural fairness is also assessed against a standard of correctness, but the determination by the Registrar that the applicant's citizenship was granted as a result of administrative error involves applying a legal standard to a set of facts. It is therefore a question of mixed fact and law and is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness.
II. The Statutory Scheme Governing Citizenship
15     The foundation of Canadian citizenship is statutory. There is no independent or free-standing right to citizenship except as accorded by the provisions in Part I of the Act -- The Right to Citizenship. Largely writ, citizenship can be acquired through birth (section 3(1)(a) and (b)) or, as in this case, consequent to permanent residency (section 3(1)(c)). Part II of the Act - Loss of Citizenship - authorizes revocation of citizenship pursuant to subsection 10(1) where the Governor-in-Council is satisfied, on the basis of a report from the Minister, that the person has obtained citizenship by fraud or misrepresentation. Administrative error is not one of the enumerated grounds in Part II.
16     In the case of a permanent resident seeking Canadian citizenship, the specific statutory pre-conditions of the Act must be met. Those conditions require demonstration of a certain level of linguistic competence in either of Canada's official languages and an adequate knowledge of Canada's social, civic and political norms. These competencies must be established before citizenship can be granted.
17     Section 14(1) provides that a citizenship application "shall be considered by a citizenship judge who shall...determine whether or not the person who made the application meets the requirements of this Act and the regulations". Under section 14(2), the citizenship judge shall approve or not approve the application. As noted, section 14(5) allows the Minister or the applicant to appeal the decision of the citizenship judge within sixty days.
18     Section 12 in Part IV of the Act - Certificate of Citizenship - provides that where an application for citizenship under section 5 is approved the Minister shall issue the certificate.

·       Application for certificate of citizenship

·       12. 
(1) Subject to any regulations made under paragraph 27(i), the Minister shall issue a certificate of citizenship to any citizen who has made application therefore. 

·       Issue of certificate

·       (2) 
When an application under section 5 or 5.1 or subsection 11(1) is approved, the Minister shall issue a certificate of citizenship to the applicant. 

·       When effective

·       (3) 
A certificate issued pursuant to this section does not take effect until the person to whom it is issued has complied with the requirements of this Act and the regulations respecting the oath of citizenship. 
* * *

·       Demandes émanant de citoyens

·       12. 
(1) Sous réserve des règlements d'application de l'alinéa 27i), le ministre délivre un certificat de citoyenneté aux citoyens qui en font la demande. 

·       Délivrance aux nouveaux citoyens

·       (2) 
Le ministre délivre un certificat de citoyenneté aux personnes dont la demande présentée au titre des articles 5 ou 5.1 ou du paragraphe 11(1) a été approuvée. 

·       Entrée en vigueur

·       (3) 
Le certificat délivré en application du présent article ne prend effet qu'en tant que l'intéressé s'est conformé aux dispositions de la présente loi et aux règlements régissant la prestation du serment de citoyenneté. 
III. The Applicant's Perspective on the Statutory Scheme
19     The applicant contends that she is a citizen, has the certificate to prove it, and, further, that in section 7 Parliament expressly addressed the only circumstances under which citizenship, once obtained, can be lost. The Regulations contemplated by section 27 of the Act are necessarily confined to the implementation and support of those circumstances in Part II of the Act pertaining to the loss or revocation of citizenship, or where the certificate is required for civil or criminal proceedings or as evidence in an investigation. Further, the language of section 27(j) of the Act "if there is reason to believe that the holder thereof may not be entitled thereto" cannot constitute an independent authority to revoke citizenship, as Parliament has expressly considered this in sections 7 and 10.
20     To elaborate, the applicant's perspective is that section 26(3) of the Regulations has to be interpreted in conjunction with sections 7, 12(2), 14(1) and (14(5) of the Act, and if done so, section 26(3) of the Regulations does not give the Registrar the power to cancel a citizenship certificate that was issued after an application for citizenship was approved by a citizenship judge. More bluntly, the applicant asserts that the respondent is relying on section 26(3) of the Regulations to do what the Act does not allow. Section 12 of the Act requires that citizenship be granted, and Parliament has prescribed and limited the means of recourse to either an appeal or the launch of revocation proceedings.
21     In sum, the applicant's argument is that the finality contemplated by the statutory scheme cannot, in the absence of legislative authority, be set aside simply because the Minister wishes the result were otherwise. To interpret the Regulations so broadly would render the scheme meaningless, as the certificate could be revoked simply by administrative action of the Registrar who came to the view that the applicant was not entitled to the certificate. The legislation contemplates a right of appeal (now a right to seek leave to commence judicial review) to the Federal Court and revocation proceedings. The statute itself provides that the Minister shall issue the certificate and, similarly, that if not content with the decision of the citizenship judge, the Minister may appeal.
IV. Analysis
A. The Statutory Foundation for Cancellation by Regulation
22     Any consideration of the relationship between statutes and regulations begins with two principles. First, it is axiomatic that the words of an act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the act, the object of the act, and the intention of Parliament Second, the Regulations are subordinate legislation, and as such cannot derogate from or be inconsistent with the statute. As Professor Ruth Sullivan explains in Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at page 312, "the paramountcy of statutes over delegated legislation operates as a presumption" and in cases of conflict, "the statute is presumed to prevail". The Regulations cannot take away that which the statute has granted.
23     To this extent the applicant's argument is well-founded. Statutes cannot be undone by subordinate legislation. In order to revoke by regulation, a citizenship certificate, granted by statute, there must be a foundation in the statute. There is such a foundation. Indeed, there are two: section 12(3) and section 27(j) of the Act. I turn first to section 12(3).
24     Section 12(3) provides:

·       When effective

·       12 (3) A certificate issued pursuant to this section does not take effect until the person to whom it is issued has complied with the requirements of this Act and the regulations respecting the oath of citizenship. 
* * *

·       Entrée en vigueur

·       12 (3) Le certificat délivré en application du présent article ne prend effet qu'en tant que l'intéressé s'est conformé aux dispositions de la présente loi et aux règlements régissant la prestation du serment de citoyenneté. 
25     Subsection 12(3) provides a legislative foundation for the cancellation of a certificate issued in error. A certificate, even if issued, is of no effect where the conditions precedent to citizenship have not been met. The applicant's citizenship was not revoked and sections 7, 10 and 18 not engaged, as the applicant never had citizenship. The requirements of the Act had not been fulfilled.
26     I turn to the second legislative foundation which supports the regulatory action. To repeat, section 27 authorizes regulations:

·       Regulations

·       27. 
The Governor in Council may make regulations 
[...]

·       (j) 
providing for the surrender and retention of certificates of citizenship, certificates of naturalization or certificates of renunciation issued or granted under this Act or prior legislation or any regulations made thereunder if there is reason to believe that the holder thereof may not be entitled thereto or has contravened any of the provisions of this Act; 
[...]

·       (k) 
providing for the surrender and cancellation of certificates referred to in paragraph (j) where the holder thereof has ceased to be entitled thereto; 

·       (emphasis added) 
* * *

·       Règlements

·       27. 
Le gouverneur en conseil peut, par règlement 
[...]

·       j) 
régir la restitution et la rétention des certificats de citoyenneté, de naturalisation ou de répudiation délivrés en vertu de la présente loi ou de la législation antérieure ou en application de leurs règlements lorsqu'il y a des raisons de croire que leur titulaire n'y a peut-être pas droit ou a enfreint la présente loi; 
[...]

·       k) 
régir la restitution et l'annulation des certificats mentionnés à l'alinéa j) lorsque leur titulaire a cessé d'y avoir droit; 

·       (je souligne) 
27     Sections 27(j) and (k) contemplate two circumstances where a certificate of citizenship may be cancelled. In this case, the Registrar believed that the applicant was not entitled to the certificate. That belief had an objective foundation, rooted in the record before her. The action was purely administrative, and required no adjudicative assessment, or importantly, re-adjudication of the substance of the citizenship judge's decision. The authority under the Regulations was used as it was intended, not to change, vary or substitute a Ministerial decision for the one that was reached under the Act, rather to ensure that the outcome conformed with the adjudicative process contemplated by the Act itself. Viewed in this light regulation 26(3) is analogous to Federal Court Rule 397(1)(a) which allows the Court to reconsider an order where the order does not accord with the reasons given. That is precisely what occurred here. Rules of practice applicable to superior courts contain mechanisms to address administrative errors and it is not surprising to see an analogous provision in legislation like the Citizenship Act.
28     To read section 7 as to trump section 27 of the Act would produce two absurd results. First, the valued right of citizenship would be given to someone who was not, as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, entitled to it. Parliament's intention that all Canadians possess a minimal degree of linguistic ability and civic awareness would be thwarted. Secondly, the procedure triggered to remedy the administrative error, namely that of a ministerial report and Cabinet consideration and adjudicative review, would be entirely disproportionate to the nature of the issues underlying cancellation of the certificate.
29     Further, to borrow from Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 23 a "label of absurdity" can be attached to interpretations that render some part of the statute "pointless or futile". The argument advanced by the applicant with respect to the scope of section 7 neutralizes both section 12(3), the purpose of which is to provide a fail-safe measure in circumstances such as these and section 27(j), which contemplates that citizenship certificates might be issued in circumstances where the requirements of the Act were not met. This is not a case where citizenship, once lawfully granted, is lost or revoked. Here, the applicant never had citizenship. That is the effect of sections 12(3) and 27(j).
30     Section 27 of the Act contemplates cancellation in situations such as those in this case where a certificate has been issued through administrative error as well as in exigent or emergent circumstances. Parliament, in enacting section 27, understood the necessity of regulations to give effect to the Act and its objectives. This interpretation of section 27(j) and (k) is a plain and obvious reading of the statute, but also is consistent with the obligation under section 12 of the Interpretation Act (RSC, 1985, c I-21) to read the statute with a "fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects". This interpretation also aligns with the principle of achieving "harmony, coherence, and consistency" within and between statutes (Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v Rex, 2002 SCC 42 at para 27, citing R v Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56 at para 52). No section of the statute is negated, and there is coherence between sections 12(3) and 27 of the Act and section 26(3) of the Regulations.
31     In sum, section 26(3) of the Regulations is authorized by section 27(j) and (k) of the Act. Regulation 26(3) is neither inconsistent with, nor a derogation from, any right created by the Act itself; rather section 26(3) implements, administratively, the intent of Parliament as reflected in sections 12(3) and 27(j) and (k) of the Act. This interpretation also ensures that the privilege of Canadian Citizenship is granted only as intended by Parliament.
32     Before concluding, I turn to Stanizai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 74, and in particular in paragraph 44 of the decision, where Justice Anne Mactavish states that "an error within the offices of the respondent does not have the effect of overriding the statutory requirements of the Citizenship Act and conferring a discretion on the Minister to withhold citizenship that he would not otherwise have." This decision is relied on by the applicant, but it is entirely distinguishable on its facts. In Stanizai, the applicant met all the statutory requirements for citizenship but the Minister nevertheless delayed in granting citizenship. The applicant in the present case did not meet the statutory requirements for citizenship. Further, Stanizai did not involve the use of section 26(3) of the Regulations to cancel the citizenship certificate. The decision does not advance the applicant's position.
33     I turn now to the applicant's alternative argument, namely that the cancellation breached the principles of procedural fairness. The standard of review for this is correctness.
34     The Court of Appeal, in Valeta v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 138, made clear its view as to the application of the principles of procedural fairness in matters dealing with citizenship. Regardless of the scope and extent to which those principles apply, and in respect of which aspect of the process they might apply, the applicant in this case had notice that there was an issue with her citizenship certificate. The obligation to provide notice and the duty of fairness discharged by the two calls to the applicant by officer Cantin. The applicant chose not to avail herself of further information that would have been forthcoming had she returned the calls. A party cannot turn a blind eye, or a deaf ear, to the information that is made available to her and then plead lack of notice and breach of procedural fairness.
35     In any event, even if there was a breach of procedural fairness, I would withhold relief. Relief under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act is equitable and discretionary and can be withheld where setting aside the decision would not affect the ultimate result; Mobil Oil Canada Ltd. v Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, [1994] 1 SCR 202, at paras 51, 52. In this case, the applicant failed both of the mandatory requirements established by statute. To set aside the decision would serve no purpose, as the applicant would still be ineligible for citizenship. Remedies that serve no purpose will not be granted.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS that the application for judicial review is dismissed with costs.
RENNIE J.
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