CITIZENSHIP DENIED AS EVIDENCE OF RESIDENCY UNCLEAR

The case below illustrates a common problem: evidence of residency presented by an applicant lacks clarity and it is hard to determine the person's travels. Applicants are advised to consult with legal counsel when dealing with citizenship applications, especially in light of upcoming changes.

Sami v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between
Al-Askari, Sami, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent

[2015] F.C.J. No. 619

2015 FC 623

Docket: T-1785-14

 Federal Court
Montréal, Quebec

Shore J.

Heard: May 11, 2015.
Judgment: May 12, 2015.

(27 paras.)

---

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

·       SHORE J.:-- 

I. Introduction

1     This is an application for judicial review of a decision rendered by a Citizenship Judge refusing the Applicant's application for citizenship on the basis that the Applicant failed to meet the requirements of paragraph 15(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29 [Act].

II. Factual Background

2     The Applicant was born in 1989 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates [UAE] and became a permanent resident of Canada on July 8, 2004.

3     The Applicant filed an application for citizenship on June 8, 2011. Therefore, the relevant time period for the purposes of determining residency in accordance with paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act is from June 8, 2007 to June 8, 2011.

4     The Applicant attended an interview with a citizenship officer in March 2013 and, upon referral, appeared before the Citizenship Judge on November 20, 2013.

5     On December 12, 2013, the Applicant submitted additional documentation relating to his travel activities.

III. Impugned Decision

6     In a letter dated June 26, 2014, the Citizenship Judge communicated her decision (dated January 20, 2014) to the Applicant, wherein she refuses the Applicant's application for citizenship on the basis that the Applicant failed to meet the residency requirements for the applicable four-year period. In particular, the Citizenship Judge concluded:

·       [...] I am not satisfied that the information submitted allows me to conclude that Mr. AL-ASKARI was physically and distinctly present in Canada for at least 1 095 days during the relevant time period under examination as prescribed by law to meet the requirements of subsection 5(1)c) of the Citizenship [Act]. 

·       (Decision and reasons, Certified Tribunal Record, at p 13). 

7     In the reasons, the Citizenship Judge acknowledges receipt of additional documents in December 2013 and January 2014 submitted by the Applicant, which included officially sealed school transcripts and income tax declarations.

8     First, the Citizenship Judge noted discrepancies in respect of the Applicant's declared absences from Canada, as found in his Original Application and Residency Questionnaire. According to the Citizenship Judge, although these variations in respect of length of absences leave the Applicant within the requisite 1,095 days prescribed under the Act, they nonetheless impugn the Applicant's credibility.

9     The Citizenship Officer then proceeded to analyze the official travel documents provided by the Applicant in support of his application for citizenship: the translated UAE Residency and Nationality System Report and the Applicant's three Syrian passports, two of which cover the entire period under examination.

10     The Citizenship Judge raised numerous concerns pertaining to the passports used by the Applicant in his travels, as evidenced in the Applicant's Residency and Nationality System Report for the UAE. In sum, the Citizenship Judge found that the evidence raised "doubts as to the completeness [of] the Applicant's declarations regarding his absences from Canada" and that she could therefore not "rely on these declarations with any great degree of confidence" (Decision and Reasons, Certified Tribunal Record, at p 16).

11     The Citizenship Judge then assessed additional documentary evidence adduced by the Applicant, such as evidence pertaining to education in Canada, banking and financial transactions, tenancy, social ties and other indicators of residence, in order to validate the Applicant's "physical" and "distinct" presence in Canada for the relevant timeframe.

12     In particular, the Citizenship Judge noted that segments of the four-year relevant timeframe were not accounted for and that portions of the evidence amounted to "passive indicators" of residency.

13     The Citizenship Judge ultimately found that the evidence was "incomplete, inconsistent and unclear" and did not form sufficient and "satisfactory indicia of residence" (Decision and Reasons, Certified Tribunal Record, at p 19).

14     These findings led the Citizenship Judge to conclude:

·       The sum effect of all the above is that I am unable to determine with any degree of confidence or accuracy the actual number of days the Applicant was within Canada and the actual number of days that the Applicant was absent from Canada. I find that, on a balance of probabilities, the evidence before me does not reasonably show nor suffice to establish residence in the Applicant's case. 

·       (Decision and Reasons, Certified Tribunal Record, at p 19) 

IV. Legislative Provisions

15     Section 5 of the Act outlines the requirements applicants must fulfill in order to receive Canadian citizenship. Notably, paragraph 5(1)(c) provides that permanent residents must demonstrate that they have accumulated three years of residence in Canada within the four years preceding the date of their application:

·       Grant of citizenship

·       5. 

(1) The Minister shall grant citizenship to any person who 

·       (a) makes application for citizenship; 

·       (b) is eighteen years of age or over; 

·       (c) is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and has, within the four years immediately preceding the date of his or her application, accumulated at least three years of residence in Canada calculated in the following manner: 

·       (i) 

for every day during which the person was resident in Canada before his lawful admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be deemed to have accumulated one-half of a day of residence, and 

·       (ii) 

for every day during which the person was resident in Canada after his lawful admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be deemed to have accumulated one day of residence; 

·       (d) has an adequate knowledge of one of the official languages of Canada; 

·       (e) has an adequate knowledge of Canada and of the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship; and 

·       (f) is not under a removal order and is not the subject of a declaration by the Governor in Council made pursuant to section 20. 

* * *

·       Attribution de la citoyenneté

·       5. (1) Le ministre attribue la citoyenneté à toute personne qui, à la fois: 

·       a) 

en fait la demande; 

·       b) 

est âgée d'au moins dix-huit ans; 

·       c) est un résident permanent au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés et a, dans les quatre ans qui ont précédé la date de sa demande, résidé au Canada pendant au moins trois ans en tout, la durée de sa résidence étant calculée de la manière suivante: 

·       (i) 

un demi-jour pour chaque jour de résidence au Canada avant son admission à titre de résident permanent, 

·       (ii) 

un jour pour chaque jour de résidence au Canada après son admission à titre de résident permanent; 

·       d) a une connaissance suffisante de l'une des langues officielles du Canada; 

·       e) a une connaissance suffisante du Canada et des responsabilités et avantages conférés par la citoyenneté; 

·       f) n'est pas sous le coup d'une mesure de renvoi et n'est pas visée par une déclaration du gouverneur en conseil faite en application de l'article 20. 

V. Issue

16     This application raises the following issue:

·       Did the Citizenship Judge err in finding that the Applicant failed to meet the requirements of physical presence in Canada pursuant to paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act? 

VI. Standard of Review

17     A Citizenship Judge's decision in respect of whether an applicant has met the residency requirements for the purposes of establishing citizenship is reviewable on the standard of reasonableness (Chaudhry v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 179 at para 20 [Chaudhry]; Atwani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1354 at para 10 [Atwani]).

18     The highly discretionary nature of the Citizenship Judge's findings attracts considerable deference from this Court:

·       [14] It is now settled law that the standard of review applicable to the decisions of Citizenship Judges is that of reasonableness: see, for example, Zhang v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 483; Chen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1140. Whether dealing with questions of mixed fact and law, as when applying one of the jurisprudential tests of the concept of residency to the particular facts of the case, or purely factual questions, as when computing days of absence, Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick (2008 SCC 9) instructs us that the reviewing court should show deference and resist substituting its own view for that of the Citizenship Judge. To the extent that the impugned decision is intelligible and justified and can be considered a defensible outcome in respect of the facts and the law, it should not be set aside on judicial review: Paez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 204. 

·       (El Falah v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2009] F.C.J. 1402 at para 14) 

19     As such, it is not within this Court's mandate to substitute its view for the Citizenship Judge's findings of fact and of mixed fact and law (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vijayan, 2015 FC 289 at para 64; Qureshi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1081 at para 38).

VII. Analysis

20     The Applicant bears the onus of providing sufficient evidence demonstrating that he meets the residency requirements set out in paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Act (Mizani v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 698 at para 19; Chaudhry, above at para 25). Justice Judith A. Snider's reasoning in Atwani, above, is instructive:

·       [12] The Applicant submits that the Citizenship Judge erred by failing to make a specific determination of how many days the Applicant was actually physically present in Canada. In the absence of such a determination, the Applicant argues, the Judge cannot reasonably have concluded that the residency requirement of s. 5(1)(c) was not met. This argument, in my view, is fatally flawed. The burden is on the Applicant - not on the Citizenship Judge - to establish, with clear and compelling evidence, the number of days of residence. In this case, the Applicant failed to provide consistent and credible evidence with respect to his absences from Canada. 

·       [13] As recently stated by Justice Rennie in Abbas v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 145 at para 8, [2011] F.C.J. No 167: 

·       Irrespective of which test is applied, each applicant for citizenship bears the onus of establishing sufficient credible evidence on which an assessment of residency can be based, whether it is quantitative (Re Pourghasemi) or qualitative (Koo). 

·       [Emphasis added.] 

21     In the matter at hand, the Applicant was required to demonstrate at least 1,095 days of physical presence in Canada within the four-year period between June 2007 and June 2011.

22     The Citizenship Judge ultimately found that the Applicant's evidence lacked clarity, credibility, and was overall ambiguous, which led her to conclude that the Applicant failed to meet his burden of establishing his physical presence in Canada for the relevant time period.

23     The Applicant claims that the Citizenship Officer made mathematical calculation errors in respect of the Applicant's number of days of absence from Canada, therefore unreasonably impugning his credibility. The Applicant argues that the Citizenship Judge erred in finding that the Applicant's passport data, or even proof of his continued enrolment in educational institutions in Canada, as evidenced by academic transcripts and attestations, are inconclusive, in and of themselves, to determine his physical presence in Canada for the minimum requisite 1,095 days. Moreover, the Applicant submits that in applying the strict physical presence test, the Citizenship Judge's findings in respect of other indicators of residence such as banking, housing and other social activities are superfluous.

24     The Court finds that the Applicant's submissions amount to a disagreement with the Citizenship Judge's weighing of the evidence and fail to demonstrate a reviewable error.

25     It is this Court's view that the Citizenship Judge conducted a thorough assessment of the evidentiary record before her and identified numerous shortcomings in respect of the evidence of the Applicant's physical presence in Canada during the material four-year period.

26     Upon review of the Citizenship Judge's decision and reasons, parties' submissions and the Certified Tribunal Record, the Court finds no basis upon which it may intervene.

VIII. Conclusion

27     In light of the above, the Court's intervention is unwarranted.

JUDGMENT

THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is dismissed. There is no serious question of general importance to be certified.

SHORE J

SERGIO R. KARAS QUOTED IN NATIONAL POST EDITORIAL

I was quoted in today's National Post Editorial by George Jonas.

http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/george-jonas-judges-evading-the-law

May 22, 2015

George Jonas
Posted with permission from National Post

Judges should interpret and follow the law, not circumvent it. But I'm equally troubled by mandatory requirements of any kind.

In 2010 four young men robbed a bank in Toronto. They managed to gather up the loot and make it out of the building, only to crash their getaway car into an 18-wheeler within a block. Captured, charged, tried and convicted, they were sentenced to prison terms ranging from nine months to two years less a day.

The sentences may sound rather light for armed robbery, but if the trial judge found them appropriate for the circumstances, I wouldn't be prepared to second-guess him. He heard all the evidence; I didn't. All the same, I wouldn't have given much for the chances of Amijad Nassri when he sought relief from his 9-month sentence at the Ontario Court of Appeal.The relatively longest sentence went to Abdirahman Diriye, an agile bandit who had vaulted a counter during the robbery and held a knife to a teller's neck. The lookout of the gang, Mohamed Noori, got 13 and a half months. The judge gave the shortest sentence to Amijad Nassri, 21 at the time, who was behind the wheel of the getaway car, albeit only for a short time.

"Amijad, son," I would have said, had he asked me, "you should thank your lucky stars. You were caught robbing a bank with your buddies, and all you got for it was nine months in the cooler. With mandatory remissions, if you begin serving your sentence when the groundhog starts looking for his shadow, you'll be out before the end of the black-fly season

"I suggest, instead of appellate counsel, you had better spend your money on driving lessons."

That's what I would have told the young man - and I would have been wrong. The Ontario Court of Appeal reduced Nassri's sentence from nine to less than six months.

What happened? Did the appellate judges credit Nasri's defence at his trial that he didn't know when he used his father's car to drive his friends to the bank that they intended to rob it? It was a good story, even if the trial judge didn't believe it, but the appellate judges didn't advert to it at all. Nasri was appealing only his sentence, not his conviction, and for reasons that had nothing to do with his lack of mens rea or guilty mind, which had been his defence at trial.

Nasri wasn't a Canadian, and it was too harsh a sentence for him

The young man's successful defense at appeal was unrelated, not only to his guilt or innocence, but even to the severity of his penalty in relation to his crime. Nasri didn't plead that nine months was too harsh a sentence for driving a getaway car during a bank robbery. For all he knew or cared, it might have been a perfectly proportionate sentence for a Canadian, maybe even lenient - but Nasri wasn't a Canadian, and it was too harsh a sentence for him.

The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed. Writing for the three-member panel, Justice Robert Sharpe expressed the view that the consequences of a nine-month sentence for the appellant before the court "would be grossly disproportionate to this offence."

Here's the reason. Only weeks before Nasri had been sentenced, the Harper-government enacted legislation that reduced the previous threshold of a two-year sentence for the mandatory deportation of foreign criminals to a six-month sentence. People could appeal, but their chances were slim. As Justice Sharpe put it, a nine-month sentence would in effect deprive "the appellant of the right to appeal deportation" to the country of his origin, which in Nasri's case happened to be Syria.

Considering that the consequences for Nasri would have been near-certain deportation to a country accurately described by Justice Sharpe as "one of the most dangerous places on Earth," it's difficult to disagree that for this young man the consequences would have been disproportionate to the offence. Still, the Ontario appellate court's reasoning would limit the punishment of non-Canadians from war-zones to less than six months for any but capital crimes.

Whether it troubles the Supreme Court or not, it troubles me, and ought to trouble all Canadians

Whether it troubles the Supreme Court or not, it troubles me, and ought to trouble all Canadians. Judges should interpret and follow the law, not circumvent it. But I'm equally troubled by mandatory requirements of any kind. Deportation shouldn't be rigidly tied to the disposition of other matters. We may want to see an immigrant embezzler spend a year in jail without necessarily wanting to see him deported to Idi Amin's Uganda. Judges may seem inexplicably lenient (or inexplicably harsh) at times to outside observers, myself included, but they are in a far better position to determine the outcome of particular cases than inflexible bureaucrats, self-serving politicians, or loudmouth journalists.The former chair of the Ontario Bar Association's immigration section, Sergio Karas, was quoted as finding it "somewhat troubling that the court seems to be trying to fit the sentence to fall shy of the six months bar, which was intended by Parliament to expedite the removal of noncitizen criminals." I bet the government finds it somewhat troubling, too, and may turn to the Supreme Court to see if it may also be troubled by judges taking the bit between their teeth to the extent of judicial nullification of the law.

National Post

SERGIO R. KARAS QUOTED IN NATIONAL POST ON IMMIGRATION AND CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/bank-robbers-jail-term-slashed-by-ontario-court-so-he-would-avoid-deportation-to-syria

Bank robber’s jail term slashed by Ontario court so he would avoid deportation to Syria

Republish Reprint

Adrian Humphreys, National Post | May 19, 2015 8:03 PM ET
More from National Post

Aaron Lynett/National Post“Sentencing judges have long recognized that in crafting an appropriate punishment, the repercussions of a sentence must be considered.”

•   
• The Ontario Court of Appeal slashed a jail term handed a Syrian-born bank robber so he could avoid deportation to his homeland, where he could be conscripted into the civil war.

Because of the “collateral immigration consequences,” the appeal court reduced Amjad Nassri’s sentence by more than one third — from nine months to less than six months — for a bank heist that ended when he crashed into a truck during his getaway.

“It is self-evident that depriving the appellant of the right to appeal deportation to one of the most dangerous places on Earth would be grossly disproportionate to this offence,” wrote Justice Robert Sharpe on behalf of a panel of three judges.

The decision, however, is being criticized for circumventing the Harper government’s crackdown on foreign criminals remaining in Canada. Just weeks before Nassri was sentenced, the government’s new legislation speeding removal of foreigners sentenced to more than six months was enacted.

“It is somewhat troubling that the court seems to be trying to fit the sentence to fall shy of the six months bar, which was intended by Parliament to expedite the removal of non-citizen criminals,” said Sergio Karas, an immigration lawyer who is a former chair of the Ontario Bar Association’s immigration section.

Amjad Nassri was 21 in 2010 when he drove three men to a Toronto CIBC. As he kept his father’s Corolla running outside, his cohorts — armed with knives and their faces covered by bandanas — burst inside.

‘It is self-evident that depriving the appellant of the right to appeal deportation to one of the most dangerous places on Earth would be grossly disproportionate to this offence’

Mohamed Noori stayed at the front door keeping watch. Abdirahman Diriye and an unidentified accomplice vaulted over the cashier’s counter where one held a large knife to the back of a teller’s neck.

Within a minute they were running toward Nassri’s car. When everyone was inside, he peeled away.

He did not get far. Almost immediately he drove through a stop sign and into an 18-wheeler tractor-trailer. While his cohorts ran off, he remained and offered to pay the truck driver to ignore the crash, court heard.

Diriye, Noori and Nassri were arrested. The other two, who were younger than Nassri, pled guilty. Diriye was sentenced to two years less a day and Noori to 13.5 months.

Nassri went to trial, claiming he didn’t know his friends were planning to rob the bank. The judge didn’t buy it and found him guilty of robbery and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose. The Crown asked for a 13 month sentence; Nassri’s lawyer asked for eight.

The trial judge said eight months would “not accurately reflect the seriousness of this offence,” and sentenced him to nine months.

After sentencing, Nassri and his lawyer realized the gravity of his situation. One month before, the government’s Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act came into force limiting immigration appeal rights of permanent residents found inadmissible for “serious criminality.” The threshold dropped from a sentence of two years to a sentence of six months.

Nassri’s lawyer was unaware of the change.

Nassri came to Canada in 2005 with his parents and became a permanent resident here. He had no criminal record at the time of the robbery. By the time he was sentenced in 2013, he was taking business courses at college and running a small business, court heard. The judge found he was well on his way to rehabilitation.

During the appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal heard evidence from an immigration lawyer that Nassri’s attempts at an immigration appeal would be “futile.”

Court also heard of “dangerous and grievous conditions” in Syria: “The fresh evidence strongly suggests that [Nassri] would be subject to mandatory military service upon returning to Syria, leading to his involvement in the civil war,” Sharpe wrote.

The court said the 2013 Supreme Court decision R. v. Pham allows courts to lower sentences in light of collateral consequences. That decision said the sentencing objective of rehabilitation made other consequences relevant.

Karas said Nassri still had ways to avoid removal to Syria without a cut-rate sentence: “Even though the legal remedies are now more limited, they are by no means non-existent,” he said.

But Nassri’s lawyer for the appeal, David Harris, defended the court’s decision.

“Sentencing judges have long recognized that in crafting an appropriate punishment, the repercussions of a sentence must be considered,” he said, pointing to loss of employment and the impact on the offender’s family. Pushing his client toward “inevitable deportation” made the original sentence disproportionate, he said.

National Post

CONTRADICTIONS IN JOB DETAILS AND FINANCIAL RECORDS DOOM VISA APPLICATION

The case below shows how contradictions and incomplete visa applications may result in a refusal.

Farid v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

Between
Mariana Beshara Nawwar Farid, Applicant, and
The Minister Of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Respondent

[2015] F.C.J. No. 556

2015 FC 579

Docket: IMM-8398-13

 Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario

Russell J.

Heard: April 2, 2015.
Judgment: May 4, 2015.

(41 paras.)

---

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

·       RUSSELL J.:-- 

I. INTRODUCTION

1     This is an application under s 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 for judicial review of the decision of a visa officer [Officer], dated November 3, 2013, which refused the Applicant's application for a temporary resident visa.

II. BACKGROUND

2     The Applicant is a citizen of Egypt. In March 2013, she was offered a job with a company located in Toronto. In May 2013, the Applicant applied for a work permit and temporary resident visa.

3     In August 2013, the applications were rejected because the Officer was unsatisfied with the Applicant's financial documentation.

4     In October 2013, the Applicant re-applied for a work permit and temporary resident visa.

III. DECISION UNDER REVIEW

5     The Applicant's second application was rejected on November 3, 2013. The Officer was not satisfied that the Applicant would leave Canada at the end of her stay as a temporary resident because of her family ties in Canada and Egypt, and because of her limited employment prospects in Egypt. The Officer was also not satisfied by the contact information on the Applicant's employment letter. The Officer indicated that the "[f]ax number may have been erased and there are no land line numbers which is uncommon in Egypt. No evidence of social insurance subscription" (Certified Tribunal Record [CTR] at 4). The Officer also said that there was no documentation relating to the Applicant's husband.

6     Further reasons for the Decision are provided in the Global Case Management System [GCMS] notes (CTR at 105):

·       Prev intvw notes show contradictions. On the one hand, PA indicates that husb earns low salary from govt job but then indicates that salary from private engg work is EGP 30k per month which is very high yet could not indicate why he insists on keeping govt job. 

·       Also if husb is earning that much, how come she indicated wishes to go to Cda for 2 yrs to save some money. 

·       Funds last time were deposited all at once. This time, no evidence of funds at all. 

·       After a careful review of all the foregoing, I am not satisfied that PA is well-established in Egypt nor that she would return to Egypt after the 2 yrs of her LMO have been terminated, if granted a WP. 

·       No docus provided this time as evidence of husb's employment and reasons why he is not accompanying. I believe that husb is only staying behind to act as a tie to Egypt. 

·       Refused. 

IV. ISSUES

7     The Applicant raises the following issues in this proceeding:

·       1. 

Whether the Officer fettered his or her discretion; 

·       2. 

Whether the Officer breached procedural fairness; and 

·       3. 

Whether the Decision is unreasonable. 

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

8     The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir] held that a standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance. Instead, where the standard of review applicable to a particular question before the court is settled in a satisfactory manner by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless, or where the relevant precedents appear to be inconsistent with new developments in the common law principles of judicial review, must the reviewing court undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of review analysis: Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at para 48.

9     The Applicant submits that the Officer's factual assessments are reviewable on a standard of reasonableness: Dhillon v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 614 at para 19 [Dhillon]. The Respondent submits that the Officer's conclusions with respect to findings of fact or mixed fact and law are reviewed on a standard of reasonableness: Dunsmuir, above, at paras 47, 53, 55, 62; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at paras 52-62 [Khosa].

10     The Court agrees that the Officer's factual determinations are reviewable on a standard of reasonableness: Dhillon, above, at para 19; Zhou v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 465 at para 8. Questions of procedural fairness are reviewable on a standard of correctness: Mission Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24 at para 79; Exeter v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 251 at para 31.

11     When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the analysis will be concerned with "the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law": see Dunsmuir, above, at para 47; Khosa, above, at para 59. Put another way, the Court should intervene only if the Decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls outside the "range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law."

VI. STATUTORY PROVISIONS

12     The following provisions of the Act are applicable in this proceeding:

·       Obligation on entry

·       20. 

(1) Every foreign national, other than a foreign national referred to in section 19, who seeks to enter or remain in Canada must establish, 

[...]

·       (b) 

to become a temporary resident, that they hold the visa or other document required under the regulations and will leave Canada by the end of the period authorized for their stay. 

[...]

·       Temporary resident

·       22. 

(1) A foreign national becomes a temporary resident if an officer is satisfied that the foreign national has applied for that status, has met the obligations set out in paragraph 20(1)(b), is not inadmissible and is not the subject of a declaration made under subsection 22.1(1). 

* * *

·       Obligation à l'entrée au Canada

·       20. 

(1) L'étranger non visé à l'article 19 qui cherche à entrer au Canada ou à y séjourner est tenu de prouver: 

[...]

·       b) 

pour devenir un résident temporaire, qu'il détient les visa ou autres documents requis par règlement et aura quitté le Canada à la fin de la période de séjour autorisée. 

[...]

·       Résident temporaire

·       22. 

(1) Devient résident temporaire l'étranger dont l'agent constate qu'il a demandé ce statut, s'est déchargé des obligations prévues à l'alinéa 20(1)b), n'est pas interdit de territoire et ne fait pas l'objet d'une déclaration visée au paragraphe 22.1(1). 

13     The following provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 are applicable in this proceeding:

·       Issuance

·       179. 

An officer shall issue a temporary resident visa to a foreign national if, following an examination, it is established that the foreign national 

·       (a) 

has applied in accordance with these Regulations for a temporary resident visa as a member of the visitor, worker or student class; 

·       (b) 

will leave Canada by the end of the period authorized for their stay under Division 2; 

·       [...] 

* * *

·       Délivrance

·       179. 

L'agent délivre un visa de résident temporaire à l'étranger si, à l'issue d'un contrôle, les éléments suivants sont établis: 

·       a) 

l'étranger en a fait, conformément au présent règlement, la demande au titre de la catégorie des visiteurs, des travailleurs ou des étudiants; 

·       b) 

il quittera le Canada à la fin de la période de séjour autorisée qui lui est applicable au titre de la section 2; 

·       [...] 

VII. ARGUMENT

·       A. 

Applicant

14     The Applicant submits that the Officer erred in finding that she would not return to Egypt when her visa expired: Dhanoa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 729; Cao v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 941. The Applicant relies primarily on the fact that her husband will remain in Egypt, where he works and earns a high income. She also has other family members who will remain in Egypt. The Applicant says that her lack of employment prospects in Egypt cannot be a valid consideration because no applicant would ever receive a work permit if that were the standard.

15     The Applicant also submits that the Officer erred in discounting her employment letter. The Officer should have contacted the Applicant or her employer if there were questions regarding the letter. The Applicant also complains that, in an earlier temporary resident visa application, she was not advised that there were problems with the employment letter. As a result, it was reasonable for her to expect that the letter was sufficient. Further, it is uncommon for employees in Egypt to have social insurance numbers.

16     Finally, the Officer erred in finding that there was no documentation concerning the Applicant's husband. The Applicant submitted documents relating to his employment, property ownership and tax records.

·       B. 

Respondent

17     The Respondent objects to the evidence attached to the Applicant's affidavit which was not before the Officer. Judicial review should proceed only on the basis of the evidence that was before the decision-maker: Lemiecha v Minister of Employment and Immigration (1993), 72 FTR 49 at para 4; Samsonov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1158 at para 7.

18     The duty to provide reasons for temporary resident visas is minimal. An applicant has no legal right to obtain a visa and bears the burden of establishing the merits of his or her request; and the refusal of a temporary resident visa has a minimal impact on someone who is outside of Canada: Donkor v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 141; Obeng v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 754; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 620. The Officer met the minimal requirements. The Officer gave reasons for not being satisfied that the Applicant would leave Canada at the end of her authorized stay. The Officer considered the Applicant's family ties in Canada and the limited employment prospects in her home country. There was also insufficient contact information in the Applicant's employment letter and she failed to provide evidence of a social insurance number. The Officer is entitled to consider the totality of the circumstances: Wong v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 246 NR 377 (FCA); Pei v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 391 at para 15. The Officer clearly explained why the Applicant's application was rejected and the Applicant simply asks the Court to reweigh the evidence.

19     The Federal Court has held that an officer has no obligation to provide a visa applicant with a running score of the weaknesses in an application: Thandal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 489 at para 9; Nabin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 200 at paras 7-10 [Nabin]; Kaur Soor v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1344 at para 12. The Officer had no obligation to notify the Applicant of his or her concerns.

20     Finally, the Officer was not bound by any findings in the Applicant's previous visa applications. The Officer was only required to consider the evidence placed before him or her in this application. Regardless, there are no findings concerning the employment letter in the previous decision.

·       C. 

Applicant's Reply

21     In reply, the Applicant reiterates her submissions and submits that if the Officer required her social insurance number, the Officer could have contacted the Applicant for the information. She was unable to include it in her original application because of long delays in obtaining it from the Egyptian government.

VIII. ANALYSIS

22     The Respondent is right to point out that it is not open to the Applicant to supplement the record and ask the Court to consider materials and facts that were not before the Officer. See Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 FCA 22 at paras 19-20. Consequently, I will only address the concerns raised by the Applicant on the basis of the record that was before the Officer.

23     Two principal points arise out of the Decision: the Officer's concerns about the contact information on the Applicant's employment reference letter, and "No docus for husb."

24     It is not clear why the contact information provided was a problem. The contact information on the reference letter included the company's address and gave the cell phone of the general manager who signed the letter. The reasons say that the "[f]ax number may have been erased and there are no land line numbers which is uncommon in Egypt." It is unclear whether the contact information prevented the Officer from making appropriate investigations with the company, or whether it caused the Officer to doubt the authenticity of the reference letter. After reading the GCMS notes, my conclusion is that the Officer is simply pointing out certain features of the reference letter but they do not play any material role in the Decision which is clearly based upon the Officer's determination that he or she was not satisfied that the Applicant would leave Canada at the end of the visa period.

25     The reasons say there were no documents for the Applicant's husband, and the GCMS notes elaborate and say "No docus provided this time as evidence of husb's employment and reasons why he is not accompanying. I believe that husb is only staying behind to act as a tie to Egypt."

26     The CTR contains a letter from the Applicant in which she says that she is submitting the following "financial support documents" (CTR at 16):

·       a) 

The experience letter for the Applicant's spouse's work as a civil engineer in Saudi Arabia; 

·       b) 

The current employment letter and the payslips for the Applicant's spouse as a civil engineer from the local unit of Talkha-El Dakahha -- Egypt; 

·       c) 

The business registration for the spouse's engineering consulting company; and 

·       d) 

The Notice of Assessment from the "National Taxes Authority" for the years 2012, 2011, 2010, and 2005 related to the consulting office income. 

27     The Applicant explains that "[m]y spouse is working as a civil engineer in the local unit of Talkha city, El Dakha, Egypt from 07/04/1997 till 07/10/1997 and from 01/01/2002 till now" [sic, emphasis removed]. She also explains that "[m]y spouse has an Engineering Consulting Office from 01/09/2004."

28     My review of the CTR reveals that it does not include the evidence of the husband's current employment (as referred to above) and does not explain why he is not accompanying. There is an experience letter relating to the Applicant's husband's work as a civil engineer in Saudi Arabia which indicates that he worked for the company until 2001 (CTR at 18). There are a series of other documents following this experience letter but they all appear to be written in Arabic.

29     Applicants are advised that their supporting documents must be provided in English or French, or be translated into English or French (Government of Canada, Guide 5487 -- Applying for a Work Permit outside of Canada):

·       Translation of documents

·       Unless instructed otherwise by a CIC employee, all supporting documentation must be: 

·       * 

in English or French; or 

·       If it is not in English or French, it must be accompanied by: 

·       * 

the English or French translation; and 

·       * an affidavit from the person who completed the translation; 

·       * 

and a certified photocopy of the original document. 

·       [Emphasis in original] 

30     The CTR does not contain translated copies of the documents. The documents may be, as the Applicant says, evidence of her husband's current employment and consulting work. But without translated copies of the documents, there was no way for the Officer to know what information they contained, and there is no way for the Court to know.

31     In her application record, the Applicant includes (at 85, 87, 92-94):

·       a) 

A "Certificate of Experience" for her spouse showing that he returned to work for the local unit for Talka city center on 12/01/2002. While the translation is not clear, it appears that he continues to work for the company ("he one of staff headed by the center city of Talkha so far..."); 

·       b) 

A "Statement of Salary Synonyms" for the month of July 2013; 

·       c) 

A "Tax Card" from the Arab Republic of Egypt. It is unclear what information the tax card provides. It provides a starting date of 01/09/2004 and says it was issued for an individual. An annex, dated 15/05/ 2011, provides that the Applicant's husband requested that the address of an engineering office be moved as of 16/11/2006. The final page is described as a "Tax avowal/ wealth avowal" which simply states it was issued 15/05/2011 and expires 14/05/2016. 

32     There is no evidence that any of this documentation was before the Officer. It does not appear in the CTR which, in accordance with Rule 17 of the Federal Courts Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22, is a certified record of the documents that were before the Officer.

33     At the oral hearing of this application, the Applicant questioned the accuracy and the completeness of the CTR but offered no reason why it should be incomplete. The record shows that the Applicant has made several visa applications that have been refused and she does not appear to be entirely clear as to what she submitted with each application as she regards them all as part of one application, which they are not.

34     The Applicant also requested further time to provide the Court with evidence that the CTR is incomplete and that she did submit the documentation referred to in this application as listed above.

35     If the Applicant felt that the CTR was incomplete, she should have obtained a copy of it and submitted evidence of its incompleteness with her application. In fact, the covering letter that accompanies the CTR shows that a copy of the CTR was sent to the Applicant in accordance with Rule 17. I have no evidence before me that the Applicant did not receive her copy or that she could not have raised any issues regarding the CTR in her application.

36     In any event, even if the information that the Applicant says she submitted had been before the Officer, it is entirely unclear what the documentation establishes. The tax card references an engineering office but it does not establish that her husband has a consulting business. There is no other documentation to establish her husband's consulting business, and there is no evidence as to the reasons why he is not accompanying the Applicant.

37     On the record before me, then, I cannot say that the Officer was mistaken regarding the husband's documentation, or that it gives rise to a material reviewable error.

38     The Respondent is right to say that the Applicant has no legal right to a visa and bears the burden of establishing the merits of her request and providing the information and documentation required for the Officer to make an assessment. See Hamza v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 264 at para 22 [Hazma]; Nabin, above, at para 7.

39     It is also clear that, in this context, the Officer was under no obligation to contact the Applicant with a view to correcting any weaknesses or gaps in her application. The Officer's concerns are in relation to the sufficiency of the evidence, not with the credibility or authenticity of the evidence. See Lam v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 152 FTR 316 at para 4; Hassani v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1283 at para 24; Hamza, above, at para 24. I can see no procedural fairness issue.

40     All in all, I can find no reviewable error with this Decision that would require it be returned for reconsideration.

41     Both sides agree there is no question for certification and the Court concurs.

JUDGMENT

·       THIS COURT'S JUDGMENT is that

·       1. 

The application is dismissed. 

·       2. 

There is no question for certification. 

RUSSELL J.