Kathirgamathamby v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration)
Between
Sabanayagam Kathirgamathamby, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent
Sabanayagam Kathirgamathamby, Applicant, and
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Respondent
[2013] F.C.J. No. 874
2013 FC 811
Docket IMM-2972-12
Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario
Heneghan J.
Heard: January 31, 2013.
Further submissions: February 15 and March 7, 2013.
Judgment: July 23, 2013.
Docket IMM-2972-12
Federal Court
Toronto, Ontario
Heneghan J.
Heard: January 31, 2013.
Further submissions: February 15 and March 7, 2013.
Judgment: July 23, 2013.
(27 paras.)
· REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
HENEGHAN J.:--
INTRODUCTION
1 Mr.
Sabanayagam Kathirgamathamby (the "Applicant") seeks judicial review
of the decision of an officer (the "Officer") at Citizenship and
Immigration Canada at the Case Processing Centre in Vegreville, Alberta, dated
March 6, 2012, denying his application for permanent residence. The application
was refused because the Applicant was found to be inadmissible to Canada
pursuant to paragraph 36(1)(b) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the
"Act").
BACKGROUND
2 The
Applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. On September 25, 2007, he landed at the
Los Angeles airport, from Sri Lanka, in possession of a fraudulent passport. He
was arrested and charged with fraud under the United
States Code, particularly 18 U.S.C. s.1028(a)(4). He
pleaded guilty to the charge on December 13, 2007. He was held in immigration
custody from September 2007 until April 2009.
3 In
May 2009, the Applicant entered Canada and applied for refugee protection. A
report was prepared, pursuant to section 44 of the Act, on October 2, 2009. On
February 1, 2011, the Applicant was found to be a Convention refugee.
4 On
February 18, 2011, the Applicant, his wife and two children applied for
permanent residence in Canada. On November 21, 2011, Citizenship and
Immigration Canada ("CIC") asked the Applicant to explain his
criminal charge in the United States and to amend his application to reflect
his conviction. By letter dated November 30, 2011, the Applicant explained that
because his life was in danger in Sri Lanka, he "had to obtain a
fraudulent passport to escape Sri Lanka."
5 By
letter dated March 6, 2012, the Officer informed the Applicant that he was
found inadmissible under subsection 36(1) of the Act for the offence of fraud
in the United States in 2007. The Officer found the offence under the United
States Code 1028(a)(4) to be equivalent to section 403 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (the
"Criminal Code"), an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term
not exceeding ten years. Accordingly, the Officer refused the Applicant's
permanent residence application.
SUBMISSIONS
6 The
Applicant focused his initial arguments upon the equivalency assessment
conducted by the Officer. He argued that he could not be charged or convicted
in Canada, in the face of section 133 of the Act. He submits that there cannot
be equivalency in the circumstances of a Convention refugee who was convicted
of any offence equivalent to those set out in section 133.
7 Further,
the Applicant submits that the Officer erred in the equivalency analysis. He
argues that section 403 of the Criminal Code relates to the use of documents
relative to identity theft. He says that since this essential element of
section 403 was not established, the Officer erred in finding equivalency
between the American offence of which he was convicted and section 403.
8 The
Applicant also argues that the Officer unreasonably failed to consider the
availability of humanitarian and compassionate ("H&C") factors,
pursuant to section 25 of the Act, when rejecting his permanent residence
application.
9 The
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the "Respondent") disputes
the Applicant's view of section 133 of the Act and submits that section 133
does not apply to his situation because he was not a refugee claimant in Canada
when he was charged and convicted.
10 The
Respondent initially argued that the Officer reasonably concluded that section
403 was equivalent to the offence for which the Applicant was convicted in the
United States.
11 The
Respondent also argues that the Officer reasonably did not consider H&C
factors, on the basis that the Applicant had not requested such consideration
and had failed to disclose his conviction of an offence.
12 In
the course of the hearing of this application for judicial review further
arguments arose as to the evidentiary basis for the Officer's equivalency
analysis and the parties were given the opportunity to file further
submissions, first by the Respondent with submissions to be filed by the
Applicant in reply. The Respondent, by further submissions filed on February
15, 2013, argued that the Officer had not been authorized to conduct an
equivalency analysis because the Applicant had already been found inadmissible
for his conviction in the United States. As well, the Respondent sought to file
the affidavit of Helen Medeiros, together with exhibits, in support of its
further submissions.
13 By
reply submissions dated March 7, 2013, Counsel for the Applicant objected to
the Respondent's attempts to introduce further evidence and argued that the
Respondent's defence had been based on the Officer's purported equivalency
exercise, and not on a prior inadmissibility finding.
DISCUSSION AND DISPOSITION
14 The
dispositive issue in this application for judicial review is the Officer's
finding of inadmissibility on the basis of subsection 36(1), specifically
paragraph 36(1)(b). This finding depends on the equivalency analysis conducted
by the Officer. The inadmissibility finding then is a question of mixed fact
and law reviewable on the standard of reasonableness; see the decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
190 at para. 51.
15 In
the present case, the three issues raised by the Applicant are subject to
review on the standard of reasonableness. The issues of the availability of a
section 133 defence and the Officer's equivalency analysis involve questions of
mixed fact and law, while the issue of the Officer's failure to consider
H&C factors relates to the exercise of his discretion.
16 In
Dunsmuir, supra, para. 47, the Supreme Court of Canada
stated:
· ...A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the
qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of
articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is
concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned
with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes
which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.
17 I
agree with the Respondent that the application of section 133 does not arise
here. The decision in Uppal v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (2006), 289 F.T.R. 196 is
determinative. The Applicant used a fraudulent document to enter the United
States, not Canada. At paragraphs 21-25, Justice Layden-Stevenson made it clear
that section 133 could shield a person from a finding of inadmissibility only
if the fraudulent document was used for the purpose of entering Canada.
18 However,
in my opinion, there is a problem with the Officer's treatment of the
equivalency issue and with the Respondent's submissions concerning the same.
19 In
his initial submissions, the Respondent took the position that the Officer had
reasonably concluded that there was equivalency between the American offence
and section 403 of the Criminal Code but in the supplementary submissions, he
argues that the Officer was not authorized to conduct an equivalency assessment
because the Applicant had already been found to be inadmissible.
20 In
my opinion, those two positions advanced by the Respondent are inconsistent and
diametrically opposed. The basis for the inadmissibility finding was the
alleged equivalency between the offence in the United States and the offence
described in section 403 of the Criminal Code. Further, in any event, in my
view the equivalency finding is flawed because the Certified Tribunal Record
("CTR")does not contain evidence that would support that finding.
This evidentiary defect is not cured by the affidavit which the Respondent
sought to file with his further submissions of February 15, 2013.
21 The
Respondent seeks to rely on the material contained in the response to the
request made under Rule 9 of the Federal Courts
Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22 as
constituting the evidence for the equivalency analysis. In my opinion, this
argument cannot succeed.
22 The
Rule 9 response, according to the terms of Rule 9, is the decision and the
reasons for that decision. The decision itself cannot be the
"evidence" in support of the decision.
23 In
any event, neither the Rule 9 response nor the CTR contain evidence as to the
constituent elements of the American offence for the purpose of conducting the
tests for equivalency as set out in the decision in Hill
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)
(1987), 73 N.R. 315 (F.C.A.). The absence of a reliable evidentiary foundation
for the equivalency analysis means, in my opinion, that that analysis is not
reasonable.
24 The
Officer committed a reviewable error in the conduct of the equivalency
analysis. The Officer's decision simply states that the American offence is
equivalent to section 403 of the Criminal Code. However, there is neither any evidence
in the record to support this finding, nor any reasoning from the Officer
explaining how he reached this conclusion. The decision accordingly fails to
meet the criteria of transparency and intelligibility.
25 In
my opinion, the Officer further erred in declining to consider H&C factors.
Although the Applicant did not explicitly request consideration of H&C
factors, he did point out that he used a fraudulent passport in order to escape
danger to his life. He provided an explanation.
26 This
fact, together with the fact that he was recognized in Canada as a Convention
refugee, invites consideration of all relevant factors that could promote the
continuing protection of the Applicant. The H&C discretion conferred by
section 25 of the Act is such a relevant factor, a point recognized by Justice
Snider in Abid et al. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) (2011), 384 F.T.R. 74 at paras. 35 and
39, as follows:
· [35] The first error made by the Officer, in my view, is that he
incorrectly found that no submissions on H&C grounds were made. While the
submissions of the Applicants' consultant leave much to be desired, there are a
number of references to H&C grounds (albeit without use of the term
"humanitarian and compassionate grounds"). The consultant refers to
the status of the Principal Applicant as a Convention refugee. Moreover, the
letter of January 26, 2010 from the consultant contains the following:
· It is also important to understand my client is a very decent,
honest and credible person... . It is true that he made a mistake 17 years ago
and he paid for that mistake and he is now a family man and a licensed
technician in Canada. He has no criminal records in Canada or anywhere in the
world after 1993.
In my view, these were clear H&C submissions.
[...]
· [39] The H&C Guidelines provide that, when assessing criminal
inadmissibility and an exemption for it, an officer is required to take into
account a series of factors. One of the key factors is the likelihood of
re-offending.
Criminal inadmissibilities
· When considering the H&C factors, officers should assess whether
the known inadmissibility, for example, a criminal conviction, outweighs the
H&C grounds. They may consider factors such as the applicant's actions,
including those that led to and followed the conviction. Officers should
consider:
· * the type of criminal conviction;
· * what sentence was received;
· * the length of time since the conviction;
· * whether the conviction is an isolated incident or part of a
pattern of recidivist criminality; and
· * any other pertinent information about the circumstances of the
crime
27 In
the result, this Application for judicial review is allowed, the decision is
set aside and the matter remitted to a different officer for re-consideration,
no question for certification arising.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that
this Application for judicial review is allowed, the decision is set aside and
the matter remitted to a different officer for re-consideration, no question
for certification arising.
HENEGHAN J.
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